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EDITED BY

WILLIAM T. HARRIS, A. M., LL. D.

Volume XX.

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INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION SERIES

ROUSSEAU'S ÉMILE

OR TREATISE ON EDUCATION

ABRIDGED, TRANSLATED, AND ANNOTATED

BY

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COURS DE PÉDAGOGIE, AND LEÇONS ÉLÉMENTAIRES DE PSYCHOLOGIE

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE significance of Rousseau in education as well as in politics must be found in his revolutionary attitude toward established institutions. Some of his biographers relate the story that when the Academy of Dijon, in 1749, offered a prize for an essay on the question whether the progress of the arts and sciences has tended to the purification of morals and manners, he followed the suggestion of Diderot, who reminded him of the greater notoriety which he could gain by advocating the negative side. He accordingly wrote an essay denouncing civilized life in such eloquent terms that he became at once famous as a censor of civilization. He found this line of authorship so flattering to his conceit and so well fitted to his mode of life, his habits of thought, and literary style, that he adopted it as a career, and attacked one after the other the existing foundations of civilization. The essay just named was published in 1750; that on the origin of inequality among men, in which he laid the axe to the root of the social system of Europe, in 1752; in 1762 he completed his raid against the political basis of government by his work on the social contract; his Nouvelle Héloïse appeared in 1760, sapping the ethics of the family relation; his Émile, in 1762, uproots whatever is traditional in education and religion. Thus he attacks

the four cardinal institutions of civilization—the family, civil society, the state, and the Church—together with the school, which is the means of conserving them.

There have been many reformers, but none more radical than Rousseau; for he advocates the overthrow of civilization and the return to a state of nature.

Nature is a word of many meanings. It may signify human nature as revealed in the institutions which man has founded. The nature of bees and ants appears in the social organizations that they form and in the products of their united industry. So, too, human nature is revealed in the social unities of civilized life and in the works erected to continue them and secure them.

But the word *nature* may signify physical nature as opposed to man—it may stand for matter and brute force; it may mean the untamed animal appetites that hold sway in human beings when not guided by moral or religious principles.

The opposite of civilization is savagery, and Voltaire wittily exposed the fallacy of the revolutionary appeal to Nature when he wrote to Rousseau acknowledging the gift of his essay on the origin of inequality among men: "I have received your new book against the human race, and I thank you for it. No one could paint in stronger colors the horrors of human society from which our ignorance and weakness promise themselves so many delights. Never has any one employed so much genius to make us into beasts. When one reads your book he is seized at once with a desire to go down on all-fours."

The truth is, that this appeal to Nature is always a piece of jugglery. A high-sounding word is used in two very different senses, and, as Macbeth says, the word of

promise is kept to our ear but broken to our hope.* This juggling with ambiguous words lends itself most readily to a purely literary style wielded by a man unscrupulous of truth and ambitious of producing an effect on his audience. This is the besetting sin in the great orators of reform; they are mostly close imitators of Rousseau.

Spurzheim, the phrenologist, in his tractate on The Natural Laws of Man, takes the word in an ideal sense when he says: "Natural laws are necessarily conformable to reason; they produce certain never-varying effects; whatever is undertaken in conformity with their decrees prospers, and penalty is always in proportion to their infringement. . . . Natural law is submitted to the free scrutiny of all, and is appreciated in great part by means of reason. . . . It is not the arbitrary dictum of self-elected and presumed interpreters of a revelation. . . . Natural laws are inherent in beings and are often plainly to be seen; always demonstrable, universal, invariable, and harmonious."

It is obvious that the appeal to Nature in this case is prompted by a desire to escape from the control of authority. If my individual intellect can discover the laws of Nature, and these laws are the highest truth, then I am right in emancipating myself from "self-elected and presumed interpreters of a revelation." I may take on myself a free and independent attitude, and find for myself the rules of conduct by examining the structure of the world.

The impulse to escape from the bonds of external

---

* "And be these juggling fiends no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense;
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope."—MACBETH, Act V, Scene 7.

arbitrary authority by attaining scientific knowledge is reasonable and good, and furnishes a justification of this revolutionary movement. But its watchword, "Return to Nature," involves the danger of paltering in a double sense. Instead of finding the laws of human nature, it may find only the laws of animal nature, or, worse still, the laws of matter and brute force.

The nature or principle of matter is exclusion; each body excludes all others and is impenetrable. Spiritual being is inclusive, and each soul lives its true life only in communion with others; each avails itself of the experience of all others; each lives the life of all. The truth and goodness discovered by another can be made mine by my self-active participation in it. Spiritual participation does not divide and diminish, but increases rather. My truth grows in me when I impart it to others. Material participation diminishes; the barrel of meal or the cruse of oil if consumed by one can not be consumed by another. This confusion between spiritual and material laws which we find in the school of writers that demand freedom from external authority, explains the mixture of good and bad, wise and unwise prescriptions which we find side by side in their books. When Nature as a spiritual principle is followed for a while in Rousseau's Émile, there is wholesome truth; when he takes Nature as the principle of matter and force, the result is paradox and error.

Rousseau's first sentence gives his argument—Virgil begins his Æneid with "arms and the man," and Homer's Iliad with "Achilles's wrath": "Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man." But is man as he comes from Nature good? No, says Rousseau. "We are born weak—we have need of strength; we are born destitute of everything—we have need of assistance; we

are born stupid—we have need of judgment." How can that be good which lacks everything necessary for its perfection? It is not good, but needs education in order to become good. This, too, Rousseau admits, and at once sets up the claim for three sorts of education—from nature, from men, and from things. Education from things is what we learn from personal experience of objects; education from nature is "the internal development of our faculties and organs"—that is to say, our vital growth; education from men is the use we make of our natural growth, and this, he says, "is the only education of which we are truly masters." Nature gives us the raw material to be educated—it gives us bodily growth and organs. But this is only man as an animal. Man even as a savage is above this, for he has a tribal institution, a language, and an elaborate system of conventional usages which he teaches to his children.

When Rousseau attempts to tell us further what he means by Nature, he speaks of "primitive dispositions, including our sensations and feelings of pleasure and pain, together with the judgments founded on these; . . . these dispositions are what I call our nature." It would follow from this that education by nature is the reaction upon ourselves of the deeds that flow from our disposition. Man's will-power is the agent of his education. He learns by doing. Yes, he grows by doing; for the exercise of his faculties educatively depends on his will-power. The will permits and causes exercise, or it inhibits exercise; it retards the growth of one faculty while it promotes growth in another.

According to this, Rousseau ought to have seen that nearly all the education which he describes as the result of nature is only education from men; for this includes all action of the will to control and direct nature. Man

in so far as he is a spiritual being is self-determined, and it is this higher nature which is properly called human nature.

Human nature does not "come from the hand of the Author of Nature" directly like the sun and stars, nor even like plants and animals; for human nature is directly the product of man's will, strange as it always seems to us when we first realize this sublime truth. For human nature is the result of the realization of moral ideals, and these are realized only by the virtuous action of the will. Before moral ideals and without them we have only the natural man (or perhaps only the anthropoid ape).

Nature, as material existence in time and space, is the polar opposite of man as spirit. Man, as merely natural, finds himself to be his own worst foe. "By nature he is totally depraved"—that is, he is governed by his environment of external things and internal impulses, just like the lower orders of being. The greedy swine fight for the possession of the acorn that drops in their midst. Violence reigns where there is no self-determination; it reigns still where the principle of exclusion and selfishness is adopted among men.

The state of human nature exists as the product of culture. All things in time and space exist for man on condition that he have intelligence and skill to use them. He conquers Nature by two kinds of combinations—practical and theoretical—both being forms of social combination. All arts and industries, all manufactures and commerce, all division of labor, and all civil order, are the result of practical combination. All knowledge and science give us power over things and forces; all moral, religious, and æsthetic ideals belong to the theoretical combination. They come from the participation of the

individual in the experience and reason of his fellow-men.

The mere animal does not progress in experience except in the slow vital process of transmission by inheritance. But the human being can amass experience and communicate it to others by language after he has generalized it. Each can help all, and all each. Each contributes his mite to society, giving to all the small outcome of his individual experience; each receives from society the immeasurable gift of the aggregate experience of all mankind in all ages. Thus, in the case of the animal, the species and individual are at two extremes; in the case of man these extremes approach, and the individual becomes more and more able to sum up in himself the net results of the experience and thought of the entire race.

It is this revelation of human nature in social combination which Rousseau fails to see, and, failing in this, he misses the chief aim of education. "The natural man," says he, "is complete in himself; he is the numerical unit, the absolute whole, who is related only to himself or to his fellow-man. Civilized man is but the fractional unit that is dependent on its denominator, and whose value consists in its relation to the whole, which is the social organization. Good social institutions are those which are best able to make man unnatural, and to take from him his absolute existence in order to give him one which is relative."

He had forgotten that he wrote a moment before, "We are born weak, and stupid, and destitute of everything"; that we are, as products of Nature, the pitifullest fractions until we borrow denominators from education by our fellow-men, who teach us the arts by which we can conquer Nature and obtain clothing, shelter, and daily food.

Since Rousseau's time natural science has turned through half a circle. In D'Holbach's System of Nature, matter and force, by mere mechanical action, produce plants, animals, and men. Under the leadership of Darwin, it is no longer mechanical action of the environment, but internal reaction against environment, that produces development. New and higher species are developed through the struggle for existence. Each being strives not only to adjust itself to its environment, but also to modify its environment so as to promote its own purposes.

Here we have the opposite principle, or that of "strive," instead of Rousseau's "let alone." The evolutionist of today regards human progress as the result of innumerable strivings—in short, as the result of what Rousseau calls the education of man as opposed to the education of nature and things. If man had let himself alone, he would have remained the monkey that he was. Not only this, but if the monkey had let himself alone he would have remained a lemur, or a bat, or a bear, or some other creature that now offers only a faint suggestion of what the ape has become by his struggle to exist.

The invention that makes man successful in the struggle for existence is participation of the fractional individual in the integer or total which he creates in the form of institutions—family, society, and the state; for it is the savage man who is the fraction. The civilized man is made a whole by society, which offers him his share of the products of all ages and all climes as an equivalent for his daily labor.

Robinson Crusoe on a desert island is the type of man as an isolated individual. He has to do all for himself, and he does nothing well. By division of labor in civilized society each one does some one thing rapidly and

well, and partakes by exchange in what others produce rapidly, cheaply, and well.

Rousseau was the prophet of the French Revolution, whose center was in Paris and its circumference in all the cities of Europe; especially in those national capitals which had imitated the splendors of Versailles and withdrawn their nobility from useful supervision and administration of affairs on their own estates, causing them to attend royal court and consume in riotous living the substance produced by their down-trodden peasantry.

Rousseau is still a prophet for the youth who has begun to question external authority. He impels to free thinking, but does not get further than to suggest paradoxes. Rousseau voices the problem of Europe in the eighteenth century; it is Goethe alone who solves it, and shows the true relation of the individual to the social whole. Since man ascends above the animal by his ability to profit by the experience and labor of all his fellow-men, he can not choose but live in a social whole and subordinate himself to authority. But the authority must be organized not for itself as a final end, but solely for the increasing self-direction of the individual. Each submits to external authority because it is his own general human nature governing himself as an individual. Each learns the lessons of morality and religion because they contain the wisdom of the race; but he is bound to change the lessons out of the form of external authority into internal conviction through verification and insight.

But Rousseau builded better than he knew. Dr. Payne, the translator of this volume, has well shown the great positive impulse that Émile gave to education. It has made educators recognize the sacredness of childhood. Its author is the great pioneer in the work of studying human character as it develops in children.

Without a study of the Émile one can not explain Pestalozzi, Basedow, Froebel, or any of the great leaders in education that belong to the present century.

W. T. Harris.

Washington, D. C., *November, 1892.*

INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.

An educational classic might be defined as an epoch-making book in the history of education—a book which has served as a starting-point for a new advance into this field of investigation, and to which the thoughts of men are ever returning for fresh inspiration and direction. As thus defined, an educational classic is not necessarily the book which in its period contains the greatest amount of absolute truth, but the book which has been the greatest stimulus to educational thought, and which has longest held a high place in the esteem of thoughtful men. A seductive style may give a long currency to educational sophisms and paradoxes, and the very perversity of a book may challenge to better thinking, though any literary work which has received the long sanction of the wise and good is likely to have a large measure of truth in it. Save as an interesting curiosity, men will finally abandon a book which experience has shown to be pervaded with actual error.

It is not probable that any two persons equally competent would entirely agree on a list of the great worthies among educational writers, but I venture to enumerate the following as the GREATER EDUCATIONAL CLASSICS of the world: Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's

Morals, Quintilian's Institutes, the Didactica Magna of Comenius, Richter's Levana, Pestalozzi's How Gertrude teaches her Children, Froebel's Education of Man, Rosenkranz's Philosophy of Education, Rabelais's Gargantua, Montaigne's Essays, Rousseau's Émile, Mulcaster's Positions, Ascham's Schoolmaster, Locke's Thoughts, Spencer's Education. Of this list of educational classics, the three books that best deserve this pre-eminence are Plato's Republic, Rousseau's Émile, and Spencer's Education; and if a further reduction were to be made, I would designate Rousseau's Émile as the great educational classic of the world. This, of course, is largely a matter of opinion, depending in part on our conception of what constitutes a great classic, and then on our estimate of the intrinsic worth and actual influence of the various books which have affected the education of the world. When we consider the fact that the idea of universal education has prevailed in civilized countries for only about one hundred years; that the great leader in the social and political reform which characterizes this period was Rousseau; that all the great writers on education since Rousseau's time, irrespective of country—Madame Necker in France, Pestalozzi and Froebel in Germany, Spencer in England, and Horace Mann in America—have caught their inspiration from the Émile; and that the ideas which dominate in the education of the moment—sense-perception, self-instruction, mild discipline, the sacredness of childhood, care of health, etc.—are easily traceable to the pages of Rousseau; we are justified in saying of the Émile what Rousseau himself said of the Republic, "*C'est le plus beau traité d'éducation qu'on a jamais fait.*"

Just as the Republic is in its main intent a treatise on political philosophy, and only incidentally, though necessarily, a treatise on education, so the educational doctrines

contained in the Émile are incidental to his political and social theory; his reconstruction of society and government required men and woman radically different from those of the existing type, and for their creation there was required an education radically different from the education of the times. The parent works are the Discours sur l'Inégalité and the Contrat Social. In these works Rousseau's theory is that man is naturally good, but has been depraved by society, and that the only means of reform is to return to nature. The Émile is the development of this theory, and is the most complete monument of Rousseau's philosophy.* The opening sentence furnishes the key to this philosophy, political, social, and educational: "Tout est bien, sortant des mains de l'auteur des choses; tout dégénère entre les mains de l'homme." This fiction of Nature as the benignant, wise, and infallible patron and guide of the human race was not a new thing in philosophy, but Rousseau gave it such an air of respectability, and surrounded it with such a halo of sentiment, that it has almost run rampant in the pages of Rousseau's disciples.

That such a man as Rousseau should have been the prophet, if not the author, of the French revolution, and that his Émile should have revolutionized modern education, is certainly one of the most curious phenomena of history, but a phenomenon which can be explained, at least in part, by the condition of French society, goaded to the verge of revolution by secular abuses of royal prerogative; by the vehemence of his denunciations of existing wrongs; by his deft and matchless appeals to sentiment, emotion, and passion; and to a style of composition which is the

* G. Vapereau, in J. J. Rousseau jugé par les Français d'aujourd'hui, p. 56.

perfection of graceful and seductive rhetoric. The ideas which he expresses are neither new nor remarkable—they had been heard hundreds of times before—but he had the skill to put back of these ideas such intensity of motive power that they became projectiles of irresistible force. Despite his obvious and lamentable imperfection in other respects, Rousseau was an ardent patriot, a devoted advocate of the rights of the people, and had a heart overflowing with sympathy and affection for the helpless and the friendless. His intense emotional nature was at once his weakness and his strength; it made it difficult for him to see men and ideas in their actual relations, for intense feeling blunts intellectual discernment; but it made him the impetuous and resistless champion of the people as against the usurpations of prerogative and custom.

As the world goes, those abrupt changes in national and social life known as reforms seem inevitable. Like eruptions on the surface of the body, they are at once the proofs of internal disorder and the prophecies of returning health. In a normal state of the bodily functions the processes of waste and repair produce needed readjustments from moment to moment, and leave no occasion for remedial processes of the spasmodic or convulsive type, and much less for heroic treatment by cautery and knife; and it is conceivable that in the body politic there might be such adaptation and readjustment from moment to moment that growth and progress might be uninterrupted, and never require the intervention of the reformer. This is the ideal mode of progress, but the actual or historical mode is very different. In government there has always been a tendency to exalt office over function, and at intervals in human history the course of popular liberty has been obstructed till revolution has cut through a way for

a farther advance. In the history of human thought there have been periods when formula and sign have usurped the place of thought and thing, and then some analyst, with his dialectics, cuts clear through to the substance of things, and the world has a reform in philosophy. In religion the tendency has always been immanent to exalt symbol over substance, and to degrade worship into soulless formalism; but the soul's needs are so vital and so pressing that a reascent toward truth can not long be delayed, and in response to this need a Martin Luther or a George Fox appears, and then follows what we call a reform in religion. Similarly in education, there have been recurring periods when some partial thought has secured such domination that wholesome training has become impossible, till a reformer appears who restores the lost equilibrium, and then very likely he inaugurates a movement which leads up to another catastrophe. Usually these reforms have consisted in bringing about some readjustment between words and things, or between thoughts and things. At times education becomes almost wholly "livresque," devoted to the study of books and words rather than of things, and at others it becomes mainly literary or humanistic, to the neglect of the study of matter. The records of human thought, sentiment, and achievement form one term of the contrast, while matter and its phenomena, under the term Nature, constitute the other. Ever since education began to have a history human thought has oscillated with almost rhythmical movement from one of these poles to the other, but with a general tendency toward the study of letters; and so it has usually happened that educational reform has invited a return to Nature, and has sounded a warning against books and words.

Rousseau has all the marks of a reformer of the his-

torical type. He is animated by intense feeling; his nature is emotional rather than intellectual, and seen through the haze of his warm imagination, things lose their normal proportions and relations and become distorted and vague. The political, social, and religious aspect of things in France was doubtless bad enough in his day, but Rousseau works himself up into the belief that nothing short of a revolution will meet the requirements of the case; things have become so bad that they are not worth saving; they should be destroyed, in order to make room for something better; and so he breaks entirely and abruptly with the past, and sets his face squarely toward the state of nature and that condition of primitive innocence and bliss which had been destroyed by the pernicious acts of man. And Rousseau had in full measure another characteristic of the reformer—he was tender-hearted and humane, and his foremost motive was the happiness and good of the human race. I believe this is the one constant virtue that runs through his entire career. In addition to these qualities, he was liberally endowed with another which distinguishes him from all other reformers—he was a genius in literary art, and could clothe with matchless grace and eloquence whatever flowed from his voice and pen. The words of a mere thinker are often lifeless, and as soon as uttered fall powerless to the ground; but Rousseau's were winged words, that are still making the circuit of the world, and wherever they go they touch the human heart and so produce an effect that is perennial.

Rousseau's dominating passion was his love of solitude, or, as the phrase goes, his love of Nature. He chafed under the restraints of society, and was truly himself and at his best only in the seclusion of some remote valley or forest, where he could repose under the shadows of great trees, hear the song of the nightingale, and wander at

will in solitary places without fear of contact with man and human institutions. To escape from the din and turmoil of Paris into the peaceful solitude of Montmorency was to gain an entrance into an earthly paradise. Probably most men at times feel this instinct to revert to a state of nature, but in Rousseau this instinct was a ruling passion. In his early life this instinct induced a sort of vagabondage which led to long foot-journeys into Italy; and in later life it found satisfaction in the Hermitage at Montmorency, and finally at Ermenonville. The ideal life was that of a solitary, and the ideal man was a savage in the unmolested freedom of the wilderness, untainted by the leaven of civilization. To a man of Rousseau's temperament the reading of Robinson Crusoe must have been a decisive event, and this book may properly be held accountable for the general spirit that is discernible throughout his writings, and particularly in the Émile.

There are but few books of a philosophical character so thoroughly autobiographical as the Émile, and there is no other philosophy that is so colored and modeled by the personality of its author. The Confessions is a sort of running commentary on the Émile. Rousseau hated society, despised doctors, preferred reverie to books, found his happiest inspiration in trees and brooks, and birds and mountains, and his natural deism found delight in contemplating the grander aspects of Nature—dawn, sunrise, storm, thunder-peal, darkling forest, cloudless night; and so Émile, his illustrative pupil, is to share all these prepossessions, and be led in the way of all such inspiration and influence.

The general plan of the Émile exhibits Rousseau's skill in literary art. Instead of writing a formal treatise on education in didactic style, after the fashion of the day, he gives us in moving pictures a sort of panorama of

a human life from very infancy up to maturity, passing through the various stages of an education according to Nature. The Émile might be called an educational romance, after the style of the Cyropædia or of the Gargantua, and its form might have been suggested by these works, or quite possibly by that incomparable political romance, the Republic. As Tom Brown at Rugby gives us a vivid idea of a boy's life at an English public school, so the history of Émile's imaginary career as the pupil and companion of Rousseau for twenty years gives us a detailed account, in the concrete, of the principles and methods of a new system of education.

There have been but few historical personages so difficult to comprehend as Rousseau. His life is full of contradictions and surprises. He had his evil genius and his good angels. In aspiration he could be almost angelic, while in fact and act he sometimes descended to poltroonery, and almost to infamy. In forming a judgment of him as a man, it is easy to take a partial view, and condemn or praise without stint; but it is a very hard thing to form of him a perfectly just and equitable judgment; just as in general it is easier to be an impassioned advocate than an impartial judge. It is the spirit of modern historical criticism to read the story of a human life with suspended judgment, and in the making up of a final verdict to take an account of environment, and in the award of commendation and censure to exercise the spirit of judicial fairness. The features of Rousseau's career that first attract the attention very naturally alienate our good-will, and there are many indisputable facts that admit of no just defense; but a closer and more discerning scrutiny will give rise to a sympathetic and appreciative spirit, and will discover much that is worthy of hearty approval and warm admiration.

Rousseau's books reflect the spirit of the man, and they should be read with the judgment held in suspense. His aphoristic, unqualified statements, and particularly his paradoxes, give us an unpleasant mental shock, and we decline to be taught by a man who falls so easily and so frequently into what seem rank absurdities; but when we discover that aphorism and paradox are with Rousseau favorite rhetorical devices—that their very intent is to surprise and startle; when we discover by further reading that these extreme statements, seemingly so arbitrary and untrue, are qualified and illustrated in such a way as to give us a glimpse of a many-sided truth that had hitherto escaped us; and when, finally, by a sort of syntax or synthesis, we catch the general spirit of the book as a whole, we find ourselves in a state of wholesome respect, and even of admiration.

These remarks epitomize my experiences with this man and his books, and I counsel the reader to begin his studies without prejudice, to weigh as he goes, but when he has finished to reweigh all with scrupulous fidelity, and in the final estimate of character to temper justice with charity.

As a sort of general preparation for the interpretation of the Émile, the attention of the reader is called to the following observations:

The method of the book is best described in Rousseau's own words: "Un recueil de réflexions et d'observations, sans ordre et presque sans suite." The argument is purely deductive, starting with assumed principles or general truths, and terminating with supposed conclusions or facts; but the argument is never conducted in a systematic way. There is frequent repetition, apparent contradiction, long digressions, and, at times, tedious details; so that it is by a process of slow induction that the purpose and spirit of the whole become manifest.

Rousseau had a grievance that weighed heavily on his mind; the old order of things in education appeared to him an iniquity, the abolition of which seemed to justify the extremest measures. The book, therefore, embodies a violent reaction against the education that, in vigour, and we may expect the impetus of the author's zeal to carry him considerably beyond the limit of actual truth. Indeed, exaggeration and overstatement seem to be necessary elements of the reformer's art; and he who is intent on seeing things in their just proportions and actual relations must make allowance for overwrought zeal, and discounts, sometimes at a heavy rate, those overdrafts on the future.

Rousseau was a man of sentiment rather than of reason, and this book is a record of his emotions rather than of his thoughts. In this respect he is the very antithesis of Locke, whose Thoughts are so devoid of feeling as to be almost sterile. The immense native power of the Emile is due to the feeling which lurks every thought; but when the purpose of the reader is to discern the thought and estimate its value, he should be careful not to mistake sentiment for logic.

After so much that is preliminary, let us make a summary analysis of the education that Rousseau would have substituted for that which he covers with his condemnation. Let it be recollected that many of the reforms which he recommended have been adopted and embodied in modern education, and that for this reason it is not easy to see the contrasts that Rousseau saw.

I. *Education should be natural.* It is not an easy thing to form a clear conception of what Rousseau and the writers of his school mean by Nature when they say that education should be natural, and that the teacher in his method should follow Nature. And there is no proof

that these writers themselves have ever clarified this term in their own minds. Indeed, it may not be uncharitable to suppose that, if they have not resorted to the use of this term in order to conceal thought, they have at least fallen into such a loose habit of employing it that they willingly bewilder their readers who attempt to discover their meaning. Mr. Spencer's personification of the term is well known, and his pages are easily distinguished by the recurrence of the proper noun Nature. It is a little astonishing that a grave philosopher should assign no better reason for denying a proposition than that it is "contrary to the beautiful economy of Nature"; but his manner of using the term is dignified, and though the reader is not instructed by this fiction, he is not disgusted with it. We can not say so much of the copyists and echoes of Rousseau and Spencer. Their easy familiarity with "Nature" does not edify, but disgusts, and even a benevolent reader who is in search of truth soon has the conviction fastened on him that his author is playing with sound, *vox et præterea nihil.* What patience shall we have with a writer* who runs on in this way, "Nature furnishes knowledge by object lessons? She makes her pupil learn to do by doing, to live by living. She gives him no grammar of seeing, hearing, etc.; she gives no compendium of abstract principles. She teaches quietly; she bides her time."

Returning to Rousseau, it is evident that we can not interpret his Émile till we have formed a notion, more or less adequate, of what he means by Nature. In his case this is not so difficult if we are guided simply by the context, and do not attempt to understand his own definition of the term (pages 3, 4). City and country, Paris and the

* Joseph Payne, Lectures, etc., (p. 45 Amer. ed.)

forest of Montmorency, Robinson Crusoe on his desert isle and a city lad confined to ceiled house and brick pavements, the Red Indian roaming at will in his native forests and a creature and slave of society fashioned by the priest, the tailor, and the school-master—these are the terms of a contrast that was ever present to the mind of Rousseau. The ideal man was the savage, isolated from human society and untainted by civilization; the ideal life was independence of custom, freedom from the restraints of other wills, and obedience to nothing but things; the ideal religion was a spontaneous theism, a direct communion with unseen powers without the intervention of creeds or priest, an artless and childish wonderment produced by natural phenomena, and a reverential fear produced by the incomprehensible; and the ideal education was experience resulting from personal contact with matter and force, and thus converted into prudence.

It was not through sheer perversity that Rousseau maintained the thesis that society had been corrupted by the arts and sciences, and that civilization itself was a lapse from a state of primitive innocence and peace. He was a constitutional idealist, sentimentalist, and utopian, and his recoil from the corruptions and restraints of existing society was so complete that only a new world, constructed on new principles, or, what would amount to the same thing, the present world divested of its so-called civilization, would satisfy his ideals. In this general pursuit it must be said that Rousseau was in respectable, even illustrious, company. Plato wrote his Republic, Harrington his Oceana, More his Utopia, Sidney his Arcadia, and Hobbes his Leviathan, each to express his dissatisfaction with things as they existed, and to find gratification in the ideal construction of a world on better principles. In all these creations there is some element of perennial

truth, something of which the succeeding generations of men need to be reminded in order to keep the world, or to make the world, a delectable habitation for the race. This surely is no mean pursuit, and their seeming vagaries deserve at least an honest effort at interpretation.

A return to Nature is a return to simplicity. There is much truth in Rousseau's saying, that we no longer know how to be simple in anything. Look at the countless devices and machines for teaching a child how to read! What useless lumber! Create in the child a desire to read, and all this apparatus is of no account; the process becomes simplified to the last degree, and the child can not be held back from learning how to read.

In geography we invent maps, charts, globes, armillary spheres, etc., but all this rubbish comes between the child's eyes and the real object which is to be observed, namely, the earth. In other words, art has obscured Nature, or reality, and a reform in teaching requires us to do away with these obstructions and to return to simplicity.

There is no doubt a tendency, as education is studied as an art, to encumber teaching with devices, aids, and methods without number, and what is simple as an actual fact becomes wonderfully complex from the analyst's point of view. A foreign language as seen through an analytical grammar is frightfully complex, but when learned by contact with a native its difficulties are unnoticed. The methods and devices brought from normal schools are many times incumbrances that compromise if not destroy the talent that was native in the teacher. Rousseau would say that the short cut to a good method is a strong desire to teach; that when the end is clearly seen there will be but little difficulty in finding a direct route to it. "Follow Nature" is thus convertible into "*Simplify*"! The

time will never come when this precept will not be wholesome.

To follow Nature also signifies to return to reality. There may be formal teaching just as there is formal logic, both arts being occupied with symbols and not with realities. The universal teaching instrument is language, and the use of symbols is unavoidable, but teacher and pupil should understand that these symbols must be vitalized by a content. The question of the ages has been how to connect symbol and substance in such a way that learning may be a concrete, living process. Hobbes aimed a blow at a secular error in learning when he wrote: "Words are wise men's counters but the money of fools"; and Comenius attempted to work a reform in teaching by writing his Orbis Sensualium Pictus, a scheme for bringing symbol and substance together by means of pictures. Here is an undoubted evil; it has affected education from time immemorial, and it will threaten the education of all succeeding times.

In the third place, to follow Nature is to resort to personal experience rather than to follow authority; it is to gain knowledge at first hand rather than to accept the results of other men's experience. As Rousseau puts it in a concrete way, "The child is not to learn science, but to discover it." This is akin to the dogma of Socrates, "Science can not be taught, only drawn out." This doctrine has been pushed to its furthest limit by Mr. Spencer, who makes education consist in the process of rediscovery, and requires each child to reproduce the experiences of the race.

It would not seem a very difficult achievement to reach right conclusions on this point. To trust to mere authority altogether is absurd; it is to forego the pleasure of living, and in an important sense to cease to be a man;

but to renounce authority altogether, and to depend for our knowledge wholly on our own experience, is simply impossible, and, if possible, would be very absurd. There is evidently a middle ground which leaves a wide field for personal experience, and at the same time allows the individual to give almost indefinite extension to his knowledge by appropriating the accumulated experiences of the race.

Simplify your methods as much as possible; distrust the artificial aids that complicate the process of learning; bring your pupil face to face with reality; connect symbol with substance; make learning, so far as possible, a process of personal discovery; depend as little as possible on mere authority. This is my interpretation of Rousseau's precept, "Follow Nature."

II. *Education should be progressive.*—The mind, like the body, passes through successive stages of growth, and in both cases the transition from one stage to the next indicates a corresponding change in treatment. The infant is a creature *sui generis.* Infancy is a little world so peculiar in nature and need as to be virtually cut off from the succeeding stage of life, and hence requires a treatment peculiarly its own. There is an infant physiology and an infant psychology.

The next section of human life is childhood. The child has his peculiar nature and needs; the treatment due an infant must be abandoned, and a new system adopted in conformity with the nature of this new creature.

Boyhood follows childhood, and manhood, in turn, succeeds boyhood. These are successive, and in some sense independent, sections of human life, and so peculiar in nature and need as to require modes of treatment specifically different.

This, in outline, is Rousseau's theory of progressive education. The obvious thing to be said of it is that it is

so systematic and artificial as to be unnatural. The one momentous fact common to all these so-called stages is *growth*, and all normal growth is a series of insensible transitions. Throughout the history of each individual there is an unbroken continuity of the same organic processes, mental and physical. All the so-called faculties of the mature man have their roots or beginnings in very childhood, and at no one of these artificial stages can we say that there is the appearance of anything essentially new—so new and peculiar as to require special treatment. Education should be progressive in the same sense and to the same degree that life and growth are progressive; not progressive in the sense of an abrupt winding up of a lower system of regimen and an equally abrupt inauguration of a higher, but progressive in the actual and wholesome sense of insensible ascent and modification.

Rousseau's theory on this subject embodies a reaction from an old-time error, which consisted either in ignoring the rights of children altogether or of prescribing the same general treatment for children and men. Modern education is peculiarly the education of children. Child-life has been so much studied, and so much sympathy and sentiment have been created in the child's behalf, that infant methods have gained an ascendency that is not only harmful to children but to adults, for infant methods have been transported into the higher schools. It is not altogether wise to treat children as though they were men, but it is still more unwise to treat men as though they were children. It is not even best to fix a child's treatment on a dead level with his present condition; the education that is not moderately presumptive and aspiring is not of the right type. I think it can not be doubted that in many cases the education of children has become so puerile as not only to be worthless, but positively harmful.

In our effort to make it progressive it has become stationary, and even retrograde. The reform of Jean-Jacques has gone too far.

III. *Education should be negative.* Discipline, training, the development of faculty, power, and skill—this may be set off as one of the ends of education, while the acquirement of knowledge, or the furnishing of the mind, may stand for the second purpose of this art. Generally speaking, the acquisition of knowledge has occupied the first place in the teacher's art, and education has been reduced to the process of learning memory-lessons, while the development and discipline of the mind itself have received no special attention. Rousseau believed that as education was administered in the schools of his day there was a vast disproportion between the mass of knowledge accumulated and the child's power to comprehend and use it; and so, in his usual aphoristic style, he says that the important thing in education is not to gain time, but to lose it, and that he would prefer that Émile should reach his twelfth year without knowing his right hand from his left, or right from wrong. He pushes this doctrine so far as to say that the only habit a child should form is that of forming no habit. His thought is, that as far as possible the child's mind should be kept a *tabula rasa* up to the age of twelve, but with all its powers developed, and ready when the signal is given to undertake the work of acquisition, without prepossession or prejudice, and thus able to maintain its equipoise and independence.

This notion of making education negative, and that of reducing it to a process of rediscovery by requiring the child to gain his knowledge by personal experience—these two ideas Rousseau may have borrowed from the Abbé de Condillac, for whom he has expressed great admiration. In the introduction to his Grammaire, Con-

dillac develops the theory which Mr. Spencer has so happily formulated, but he is met with the objection that if the child is to repeat the experience of the race his progress in knowledge will be very slow. The Abbé meets this objection in a very clever way. The child's first study should be mental and moral science, for by this means his mind will be prepared for rapid acquisition! It may not have occurred to him that, according to the 'genesis of knowledge in the race," mental science comes somewhat late. Rousseau generalizes his friend's theory, and so escapes the special absurdity referred to. He would extend this process of mental discipline and preparation over a period of twelve years, and thus abridge the time required for gaining the knowledge really necessary for the conduct of life.

Here as elsewhere we shall fail in our interpretation of Rousseau if we do more or less then catch the general spirit of his paradox. This is doubtless all he expected or intended; but a reformer must needs quicken the pace of his sluggish disciples by the stimulus of exaggeration. To form the mind before furnishing it, is as impossible as to form the body without feeding it. To train the mind, it must be exercised on something, and a secondary fruit of this exercise is some acquisition.

If, in imitation of Rousseau, I were to try my hand at a paradox, I would say, in this connection, that useless knowledge is sometimes the most useful; meaning by this that the subjects that are best for pure training are sometimes of the least value for practical purposes. Algebra and geometry are instances of this; they are incomparable disciplines, but the average student derives only very little advantage from the knowledge that is acquired while the discipline is in progress. Rousseau may not have had this case in mind when he uttered this paradox,

but the thought is large enough to include it. A man may say implicitly what was never before his mind explicitly, and all legitimate interpretation assumes this.

Again, by making education negative, or, as Rousseau says to the same purpose, by losing time rather than by trying to gain it, we extend the period of childhood and allow the pupil to lead a sort of vegetative life, which Froebel seems to have had in mind when he conceived the occupations and gifts at the kindergarten. This is a century of haste; of all peoples, we seem to be the most addicted to this vice, and the general drift of our education is to curtail the period of discipline and preparation. We need, therefore, to be recalled from time to time to the duty of going slowly in order that we may go safely and well. *Festina lente!*

Though my purpose in this introduction is appreciation rather than criticism, it is manifestly fair to state what seem to be some errors in Rousseau's pedagogy. It is inevitable that an author whose theories are not controlled by actual experience should fall into serious error, and this is the more likely to happen when the thought is begotten of intense, tumultuous feeling.

The reader will not have gone far before discovering that, while his author is preaching the simplicity and artlessness of Nature, he is at the same time devising a scheme of education which is artificial to the last degree. The discipline to which Émile is subjected is a systematic espionage. Everything is foreseen and prearranged to such a degree that the poor boy has not the privilege of one spontaneous act. The story of the juggler is typical of Rousseau's system of discipline. What will such a boy be worth when the moment of emancipation comes?

Whenever the value of knowledge is discussed the emphasis is put on what is coarsely practical, and there is

no appearance of the thought that for the higher life of the soul there must be attainment whose value is purely contemplative, without the least taint of practical utility. Rousseau's doctrine of memory makes it necessary for Émile to live a sort of hand-to-mouth intellectual life, but does not allow him to store up resources within himself. Such an education is unwise and unsafe.

In the isolation of Émile from society during the period of his education Rousseau doubtless intended to show what a human being might become when allowed to develop under normal conditions. It is related that a naturalist once discovered in a mine what seemed to be a new species of plant, but when transplanted on the surface of the earth it turned out to be the common *tansy* —an abnormal habitat had altered its appearance past recognition. This return to Nature accords with Rousseau's theory of society as being unnatural and corrupt, but an education molded after this conception is manifestly vicious. Society is an existing fact, and is doubtless the normal human state, while solitude, though wholesome and necessary at times, is an exceptional state and ever abnormal. As Émile must finally live in society, he should be educated in society, and an essential part of his training should come from his contact with other wills. Educated to be obedient only to things and to his own inclinations, he will cut a sorry figure when transplanted into the world of the Contrat Social.

Should the child be adjusted to his environment, or should his environment be adapted to him? Doubtless there should be created within the child a power of resistance, and even of conquest, that will not only allow him to support existence under change of surroundings, but will enable him to modify, almost to recreate, his environment to suit his caprices or his needs. Rousseau seems

to vacillate between these two purposes, but the general spirit of the Émile is to regard the child's nature as a fixed, hard fact, and to bend surroundings and circumstances to his needs.

Émile's education is of the liberal type. He is, first of all, to be a fully developed man, capable of becoming anything or of doing anything at need; and the course of his training is not to be perverted by narrow and groveling aims. All this is admirable; but when Sophie's education is taken in hand Rousseau makes an abrupt descent. It is not a woman who is to be trained to the perfection of her powers as a human being, but a servant to man's needs and pleasures, or at most a companion to share his joys and sorrows. In kind, his conception was the Hebrew ideal,* which is doubtless the ideal of all sensible men, but Sophie falls far short of this lovable, this matchless original. Rousseau earns our applause when he counsels against the selection of a blue-stocking for a wife, but Sophie bears too much resemblance to his Theresa to merit even our respect.

The Émile has justly been called the Gospel of Childhood. If it had no other claims to consideration it would deserve the homage of parents and teachers by reason of that sacredness with which it invests the personality of every child. In what other book of human origin can we find such compassion for the weakness of childhood, such tender regard for its happiness, and such touching pleas for its protection and guidance? What other book has ever recalled mothers to a sense of their duties with such pathos and effect? The Émile has made the ministry of the school-room as sacred as the ministry of the altar; and by unfolding the mysteries of his art and disclosing

* Proverbs xxxi, 10–31.

the secret of his power, it has made the teacher's office one of honor and respect.

The power of the book lies in its general spirit rather than in any doctrine or method which it embodies. If read with kindly feeling and without prejudice, it can not fail to inspire teachers with the noblest ambition, and to quicken their methods with living power. I have read many books which profess to illustrate the art of education and to prescribe rational methods of instruction, but to none am I so much indebted in all good ways as to the Émile, and there is no other book which I can so heartily commend to teachers as a perennial source of inspiration and kindly aid.

It has been no easy task to make the selections composing this volume—to decide what to retain and what to reject from the original work. It was plain, on the start, that a translation of the whole was not desirable, simply on the ground of bulk, for it would require at least two volumes like this; and then, by omitting merely the unimportant or less important parts, the volume would be swelled to an unwieldy size. A fragment of the whole would be misleading; it would convey an erroneous impression of the book and its author, and would leave the statement of important doctrines without the illustrations and amendments necessary for their proper interpretation. In making my selections I have endeavored to give the reader a fair idea of the book as a whole. I have not restricted myself to what is currently orthodox in doctrine, or to what will have the approval of sobriety and good taste. At times Rousseau preaches false doctrines, and sometimes is almost grotesquely prejudiced and absurd, and it would be unfair to the reader to omit specimens of these bad humors.

In my translation I have aimed to give a faithful reproduction of Rousseau's thought, and to this end I have seldom or never resorted to paraphrase, even when the author's meaning seemed obscure, but have made my rendering as nearly literal as good English would allow. It is quite possible that my close adherence to the text may sometimes have betrayed me into the use of Gallicisms, but such mistakes are less vexatious and misleading than those which almost inevitably result from free translation.

Partly to re-enforce my own opinions of Rousseau and his work, but much more to place before my readers the opinions of distinguished Frenchmen on their immortal countryman, I add an appendix containing short quotations from a very remarkable book by John Grand-Carteret—J. J. Rousseau jugé par les Français d'aujourd'hui.

My translation of the Émile is made from the collected edition of Rousseau's works, in twenty-nine volumes, published in Paris, 1824, and edited by Auguis. The notes unsigned are mainly Rousseau's own, and those in brackets are by his editors; my own annotations (signed P.) are such as I have been accustomed to give students as aids in the interpretation of the Émile.

As I sum up my impressions of Rousseau and the Émile, I chance to be upon a mountain of the Cumberland range, where the peculiar effects and charms of Nature are almost wholly undisturbed by human agency. My cottage is in the midst of a forest, where wild birds and wild flowers hold undisputed sway.

As I have read and written and meditated from day to day thus in touch with Nature, I think I have been able in some measure to discern the secret which was working itself outward in Rousseau's heart and thought; and this sympathy with Nature has helped me to under-

stand and interpret much that before had been obscure and meaningless; and, while not blind to his weaknesses and vices, I come from my studies with a new admiration and respect for the man and his works.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THIS collection of reflections and observations, without order and almost without connection, was begun to please a good mother,* who knew how to think. My original purpose was to write only a memorandum of a few pages; but my theme led me on against my will, and that memorandum insensibly became a sort of book, too large, doubtless, for what it contains, but too small for the subject which it discusses. I hesitated a long time about publishing it; and I was often made to feel, while working at it, that the writing of a few pamphlets is not a sufficient preparation for composing a book. After making vain efforts to do better, I think it my duty to publish my book just as it is, judging that it is important to turn public attention in this direction, and that, even though my ideas are perchance bad, my time will not be wholly lost if I succeed by this means in stimulating others to produce better ones. A man who, from his retreat, casts his reflections before the public without puffers or partisans to defend them, without even knowing what is said or thought of them, has no reason to fear that, if he has deceived himself, his errors will be accepted without examination.

* Madame de Chenonceaux.

I shall say little of the importance of a good education, nor shall I stop to prove that the education of the day is bad. Thousands of others have said this before me, and I have no desire to fill a book with things which everybody knows. I shall merely observe, that for countless ages there has been a perennial protest against the current practice, but no one has seen fit to propose a better. The literature and the learning of our century tend much more to destroy than to construct. Censure is administered in a tone of authority; but in order to bring about a reform, there must be adopted a different tone, and one less pleasing to philosophic arrogance. Notwithstanding so many treatises whose only purpose, it is said, is public utility, the very first of all the utilities—that of forming men—is still forgotten. My subject was entirely new after Locke's treatise,* and I am very much afraid it will be still so, after my own.

We do not know childhood. Acting on the false ideas we have of it, the farther we go the farther we wander from the right path. Those who are wisest are attached to what is important for men to know, without considering what children are able to apprehend. They are always looking for the man in the child, without thinking of what he was before he became a man. This is the study upon which I am most intent, to the end that, though my method may be chimerical and false, profit may always be derived from my observations. I may have a very poor conception of what ought to be done, but I think I have a correct view of the subject on which we are to operate. Begin, then, by studying your pupils more thoroughly, for it is very certain that you do not know them. Now, if you read this book of mine with this

* Thoughts on Education, 1721.

purpose in view, I do not believe that it will be without profit to you.

With respect to what will be called the systematic part of my work, which in this instance is nothing but the order of nature, I allow that this is what will disconcert the reader the most. It is here, doubtless, that attacks will be made upon me, and perhaps with justice. People will think they are reading, not so much a treatise on education, as the reveries of a visionary upon education. How should I proceed in the case? In what I write I do not follow the ideas of others, but my own. I do not see as other men do, and this has long been a reproach to me; but is it within my power to give myself other eyes, and to affect myself with other ideas? By no means. It is within my power, however, not to confide too much in my own opinion, and not to think that I am wiser than all the world beside. In a word, I can not avoid feeling as I do, but I can be on my guard against my own feelings. This is all I can do, and is what I shall engage to do. And if I sometimes speak in the indicative mode, it is not for the purpose of imposing my beliefs on the reader, but to speak to him just as I think. Why should I declare, under the form of a doubt, a thing of which I have not the least doubt? I say exactly what passes within my own mind.

While setting forth my opinions with such freedom, I have so slight a purpose to make them seem authoritative that I always state my reasons for them, so that men may weigh them and judge of me accordingly; but though I have no obstinate desire to defend my opinions, I still feel obliged to assert them; for the maxims which give rise to differences of opinion between myself and others are by no means indifferent. They are maxims whose truth or falsity it is important to understand, for they

effect the happiness or the unhappiness of the human race.

I am continually admonished to propose what is practicable! This is equivalent to saying, "Propose to do what is being done"! or, at least, "Propose some good which is allied to the existing evil"! Such a proposition, with respect to many things, is much more chimerical than my own; for by such an alliance the good is corrupted, and the evil is not cured. I would rather follow the established usage throughout than to adopt a good one by halves—there would be less contradiction in man; he can not direct his efforts to two opposite ends at once. Fathers and mothers, what you are willing to do is the *practicable!* Ought I to be held accountable for what you desire?

In every kind of undertaking there are two things to be considered: first of all, the absolute good of the proposed measure; and then, the facility with which it can be executed.

Thus, in the first place, it suffices, in order that an undertaking may be admissible and practicable in itself, that it have in it some intrinsic good—in the present case, for example, that the proposed education shall be fit for man and well adapted to the human heart.

The second consideration depends on conditions found in certain situations—conditions accidental to the thing itself, and which consequently are not essential, but may vary *ad infinitum.* Thus, an education of a certain kind may be practicable in Switzerland, but not in France; one kind of education may be best for the middle class, and another for the nobility. The facility of execution, greater or less, depends on a thousand circumstances which it is impossible to determine save by a particular application of the method to such or such a country, or

to such or such a condition. Now, all such special applications, not being essential to my subject, do not form a part of my plan. Others may give attention to them if they see fit, each for the country or class which he has in view. It is sufficient for me that, wherever men are born, they may be trained according to my plan; and that, having been trained as I propose, they will constitute what is best both for themselves and for others. If I do not fulfill this agreement, I am doubtless wrong; but if I do fulfill it, it would be wrong to demand more of me, for this is all I promise.

ÉMILE.

BOOK FIRST.

INFANCY—GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

EVERYTHING is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man.* He forces one country to nourish the productions of another; one tree to bear the fruits of another. He mingles and confounds the climates, the elements, the seasons; he mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave; he overturns everything, disfigures everything; he loves deformity, monsters; he will have nothing as Nature made it, not even man; like a saddle-horse, man must be trained for man's service—he must be made over according to his fancy, like a tree in his garden.

* This is the key-note to Rousseau's theory of education, and is the central thought of all the writers of the Spencerian school, whose definition of education might be formulated as follows: *Education is adaptation to environment by environment.* By Nature, these writers seem to mean the world of matter and of physical forces, personified as an intelligent and infallible guide; and from environment they carefully exclude all the modifications of matter and force which have been made by human art.

Rousseau, who was ever inclined to adopt extreme views, and who was incapable of stating a case with judicial fairness, sought to divest the current education of its artificial and absurd forms by a

Plants are formed by cultivation and men by education. Had man been born tall and strong, his stature and strength would have been useless to him until he had been taught to use them; they would have been injurious to him by preventing others from thinking of assisting him; and, left to himself, he would have died of want before he had known his needs. People pity the lot of the child; they do not see that the human race would have perished if man had not begun by being a child.

We are born weak; we have need of strength: we are born destitute of everything; we have need of assistance: we are born stupid; we have need of judgment. All that we have not at our birth, but which we need when we are grown, is given us by education.

We derive this education from nature, from men, or from things. The internal development of our faculties and organs is the education of nature; the use which we learn to make of this development is the education of men; while the acquisition of personal experience from the objects that affect us is the education of things.*

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return toward *primitive simplicity;* and so he sequesters Émile, his trial pupil from the abnormal society of the day, somewhat as a naturalist might remove a plant from an abnormal habitat in order to discover its real character and to restore it to proper conditions of growth. Rousseau believed that French society had become so bad, or so *unnatural*, that a child could not be trained into a real man while surrounded by so many perverting and disturbing influences; but after he has received his training he is restored to society, protected against its allurements, and capable of working for its regeneration. Possibly his scheme of education may have been borrowed from Plato's Allegory of the Cavern.—(P.)

* This is a very crude statement. "The internal development of our faculties and organs" is not education in any intelligible and helpful sense; "the use which we learn to make of this development" is only a part of education, while "the acquisition of per-

Each one of us is thus formed by three kinds of teachers. The pupil in whom their different lessons are at variance is badly educated, and will never be in harmony with himself; while he in whom they all agree, in whom they all tend to the same end—he alone moves toward his destiny and consistently lives; he alone is well educated.*

Now, of these three different educations, that of nature is entirely independent of ourselves, while that of things depends on ourselves only in certain respects. The education we receive of men is the only one of which we are truly the masters; but even this is true only in theory, for who can hope to have the entire direction of the conversation and acts of those who surround a child?

As soon, then, as education becomes an art, it is well-nigh impossible for it to succeed, for no one has in his control all the conditions necessary for its success. All that can be done by dint of effort is to approach the final purpose as nearly as possible; but to attain it we must be aided by fortune.

What is this purpose? It is the very one proposed by nature, as has just been shown. Since the co-operation of the three educations is necessary for their perfection, it is to the one over which we have no control that we must direct the other two. But perhaps this word nature has too vague a meaning; we must here make an attempt to determine it.

Nature, we are told, is but habit.† What does this

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sonal experience from the objects that affect us" is more properly the education of nature.—(P.)

* See Plutarch's Morals: Of the Education of Children.

† M. Formey assures us that [this is not exactly what has been said; but yet it seems to me the very thing that is said in the following line to which I proposed to respond:

mean? Are there not habits that we contract only through compulsion, and that never stifle nature? Such, for example, is the habit of plants whose vertical direction is impeded. The plant, set at liberty, preserves the inclination it was forced to take; but the sap has not on this account changed its primitive direction, and if the plant continues to grow, its prolongation again becomes vertical. The same is true of the inclinations of men. So long as we remain in the same condition we can preserve those which result from habit and which are the least natural to us; but the moment the situation changes, habit ceases and the natural is restored. Education is certainly nothing but a habit. Now, there are people who forget and lose their education, and others who hold to it. Whence comes this difference? If we were to limit the term nature to habits that are in conformity with Nature, we might spare ourselves this nonsense.

We are born sensible, and from our birth we are affected in different ways by the objects which surround us. As soon as we have the consciousness, so to speak, of our sensations, we are disposed to seek or to shun the objects which produce them: first, according as they are agreeable or disagreeable to us; then, according to the congruity or the incongruity which we find between ourselves and these objects; and, finally, according to the judgments which we derive from them relative to the idea of happiness or perfection which is given us by the reason.

"La nature, crois-moi, n'est rien que l'habitude."

M. Formey,* who does not wish to make his fellow-creatures proud, modestly gives us the measure of his own brain for that of the human understanding.

* This M. Formey was the author of an Anti-Émile, and edited an expurgated edition of the Émile, under the title of the Émile Chrétien.—(P.)

These dispositions are extended and strengthened in proportion as we become more susceptible and enlightened; but, constrained by our habits, they change more or less with our opinions. Before this alteration, these dispositions are what I call our nature.

It is, then, to these primitive dispositions that everything should be referred; and this might be done if our three educations were merely different: but what are we to do when they are opposed to one another; when, instead of educating a man for himself, we wish to educate him for others? Then agreement is impossible. Compelled to oppose nature or our social institutions, we must choose between making a man and a citizen, for we can not make both at once.*

The natural man is complete in himself; he is the numerical unit, the absolute whole, who is related only to himself or to his fellow-man. Civilized man is but a fractional unit that is dependent on its denominator, and whose value consists in its relation to the whole, which is the social organization. Good social institutions are those which are the best able to make man unnatural, and to take from him his absolute existence in order to

* This is like the difficulty which Mr. Bain finds in "reconciling the whole man with himself" (Education as a Science, p. 2), and points to one of the most serious problems in education. There *is* some degree of incompatibility, as things go, between the artisan, or the citizen, and the *man*, and there is always occasion to readjust these relations on the basis of the higher claims of manhood. This is the explanation of "labor troubles," "civil-service reform," etc. Rousseau's doctrine is doubtless correct: education must have chief and direct reference to the future man, and only a subordinate and remote reference to the future artisan or citizen. In his famous "orders of activities" (Education, p. 32) Mr. Spencer would seem to reverse this order, placing the narrower aim first and the wider last.—(P.)

give him one which is relative, and to transport the *me* into the common unity, in such a way that each individual no longer feels himself one, but a part of the unit, and is no longer susceptible of feeling save when forming a part of the whole.

In order to be something, to be one's self and always one, we must act as we speak; we must always be decided on the course we ought to take, must take it boldly, and must follow it to the end. I am waiting to be shown this prodigy in order to know whether he is man or citizen, or how he manages to be both at the same time.

From these objects, necessarily opposed one to the other, there come two forms of institutions of contrary nature—the one public and common, the other private and domestic.

Would you form an idea of public education? Read the Republic of Plato. It is not a work on politics, as those think who judge of books by their titles, but it is the finest work on education ever written.*

When one would refer us to the land of chimeras, he names the educational system of Plato; though if Lycurgus had formed his only on paper, I should have thought it the more chimerical. Plato has done no more than purify the heart of man; but Lycurgus has made it unnatural.

A system of public instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no longer a country there can no longer be citizens. These two words,

* Perhaps the reader need not be admonished that the Republic *is* a treatise on government, and that education is treated only as an incidental question; though the general doctrine of education as a function of the state is so profound, that this dialogue may justly be regarded as the first great educational classic in order of time.—(P.)

country and *citizen*, ought to be expunged from modern languages. I have a good reason for saying this, but I do not care to state it, as it has no bearing on my subject.

I do not regard as a system of public instruction these ridiculous establishments called colleges.* Nor do I take into account the education of the world, because this education, tending toward two opposite ends, fails to reach either of them; it is fit only to make men double-faced, seeming always to attribute everything to others, but never attributing anything save to themselves. Now these pretenses, being common to everybody, deceive no one. They are so many misspent efforts.

Finally, there remains domestic education, or that of nature; but what would a man be worth for others who had been educated solely for himself? If perchance the double object proposed could be realized in a single individual by removing the contradictions in human life, we should remove a great obstacle to man's happiness. To form a conception of such a one, we should need to see him in his perfect state, to have observed his inclinations, to have seen his progress, and to have followed the course of his development. In a word, it would be necessary to know the natural man. I believe that my reader will have made some progress in these researches after having read this essay.

To form this rare creature, what have we to do? Much, doubtless, but chiefly to prevent anything from being done.

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* In several schools, and particularly in the University of Paris, there are professors whom I love, whom I hold in high esteem, and whom I deem very capable of wisely instructing youth, if they were not compelled to follow the established usages. I have urged one of these to publish the plan of reform which he has thought out. Perhaps we may finally be tempted to cure the evil when we see that it is not without a remedy.

When all we have to do is to sail before the wind, simple tacking suffices; but if the sea runs high and we wish to hold our place, we must cast anchor. Take care, young pilot, that your cable does not slip, that your anchor does not drag, and that your boat does not drift on shore before you are aware of it!

In the social sphere, where all have their destined places, each should be educated for his own. If an individual who has been trained for his place withdraws from it, he is no longer good for anything. Education is useful only so long as fortune accords with the vocation of parents. In every other case it is harmful to the pupil, were it only for the prejudices which it has given him. In Egypt, where the son was obliged to follow the vocation of his father, education at least had an assured object; but with us, where the classes alone are permanent, and where men are ever passing from one to another, no one knows whether, in educating his son for his own social order, he may not be working in opposition to the son's interest.

In the natural order of things, all men being equal, their common vocation is manhood, and whoever is well trained for that can not fulfill badly any vocation connected with it. Whether my pupil be destined for the army, the church, or the bar, concerns me but little. Regardless of the vocation of his parents, nature summons him to the duties of human life. To live is the trade I wish to teach him.* On leaving my hands, he will not, I grant, be a magistrate, a soldier, or a priest. First of all he will be a man; and all that a man ought to be, he can be when the occasion requires it, just as well as any one

* *Qui se totam ad vitam instruxit, non desiderat particulatim admoneri, doctus in totum, non quomodo cum uxore aut cum filiis viveret, sed quomodo bene viveret.*—SENECA, Ep. 94.

a child can but impede the circulation of the blood and other fluids, prevent him from growing strong, and weaken his constitution. In countries where these extravagant precautions are not taken the men are all tall, strong, and well-proportioned; but where children are bound in swaddling-clothes, the country swarms with the hump-backed, the lame, the knock-kneed, and the sickly—with all sorts of patched-up men. For fear that the body may be deformed by free movements, we hasten to deform it by putting it in a press. We would purposely render it impotent in order to prevent it from becoming crippled!

Could a constraint so cruel fail to leave its effect on the dispositions of children as well as on their physical constitution? Their first feeling is that of suffering and pain. They find only obstacles to all the movements they have need of making; more unfortunate than a criminal in chains, they make useless efforts, they become irritated, they cry. Their first language, you say, is a tear. I can well believe it. From the moment of their birth you cross their desires; the first gifts they receive from you are chains; the first attentions they experience are torments. Being free in nothing save in voice, why should they not use it to utter their complaints? They cry because of the wrong you do them. If you were thus pinioned, your cries would be louder than theirs.

Whence comes this unreasonable, this unnatural custom? Ever since mothers, despising their first duty, have been no longer willing to nourish their own children, they must be intrusted to hireling nurses, who, thus finding themselves mothers to others' children for whom the voice of nature did not plead, have felt no anxiety but to rid themselves of their burdens. A free child must have

ceaseless care, but when he is securely tied we may toss him into a corner and pay no heed to his cries.

It is asserted that if children were allowed their freedom they might fall into bad postures, and so contract movements that would be unfavorable to the proper development of their limbs. This is one of those vain conjectures begotten of our false wisdom, which no actual experience has ever confirmed. Of that multitude of children who, among people that are more sensible than we are, have been brought up with limbs left in perfect freedom, not a single one is to be seen who is maimed or lame. They can not give to their movements force enough to make them dangerous; and when they fall into a strained position, the pain they suffer at once warns them to change it.

Where there is no mother there can be no child. Their duties are reciprocal; and if they are badly fulfilled on one side, they will be neglected on the other. The child should love his mother before he knows that this is his duty. If the voice of kin is not strengthened by habit and duty, it dies out in early life, and the heart is dead, so to speak, before it is born. Thus, at the very start, the path of nature is forsaken.

But a woman may miss the right way by taking an opposite course: when, instead of neglecting her motherly duties, she carries them to an extreme; when she makes of her child her idol; when she augments and nourishes his weakness in order to prevent him from feeling it; and when, through the hope of rescuing him from the laws of nature, she shields him from painful experiences, without thinking how, in the attempt to preserve him for the moment from slight inconveniences, she is laying up in store for him a multitude of accidents and perils, and forgets what a barbarous precaution it is to prolong the

trouble to make him bad, we complain of finding him such.

Would you, then, have him preserve his original form? Guard it from the moment of the child's birth. As soon as born take possession of him, and do not give him up until he is a man. Save in this way, you will never succeed. As the real nurse is the mother, the real preceptor is the father. Let them agree in the discharge of their functions as well as in the system they follow, and let the child pass from the hands of one into the hands of the other. He will be better educated by a judicious though ignorant father, than by the most skillful teacher in the world; for zeal will much better supply the place of talent than talent the place of zeal.

But business, official cares, duties, you say! Duties indeed! the last, doubtless, is that of a father!* Let us not think it strange that a man whose wife disdains to nourish the fruit of their union himself disdains to undertake its education. There is no more charming picture than that of family life; but the lack of one trait disfigures all the others. If the mother has too little strength to be a nurse, the father will have too much business to be a teacher. The children sent from home and dispersed in

* When we read in Plutarch that Cato the Censor, who governed Rome with so much glory, was himself the teacher of his son from his very infancy, and with such assiduity that he left everything to be present when the nurse—that is, the mother—was dressing and bathing the child; when we read in Suetonius that Augustus, the master of the world which he had conquered and which he governed, himself taught his grandsons to write and to swim, and the elements of the sciences, and that he kept them constantly about him: we can not help laughing at the good people of that period who amused themselves with such trifles—too limited in their capacity, doubtless, to be able to grasp the important affairs of the great men of our time!

boarding-schools, convents, and colleges, will carry otherwheres the love of home—or, rather, they will bring home the habit of being attached to nothing. Brothers and sisters will scarcely know one another. When they are all assembled in state, they can be very polite and formal, and will treat each other as strangers. The moment that intimacy between parents ceases, the moment that family intercourse no longer gives sweetness to life, it becomes at once necessary to resort to lower pleasures in order to supply what is lacking Where is the man so stupid as not to see the logic of all this?

A father who merely feeds and clothes the children he has begotten so far fulfills but a third of his task. To the race, he owes men; to society, men of social dispositions; and to the state, citizens. Every man who can pay this triple debt and does not pay it, is guilty of a crime, and the more guilty, perhaps, when the debt is only half paid. He who can not fulfill the duties of a father has no right to become such. Neither poverty, nor business, nor fear of the world, can excuse him from the duty of supporting and educating his own children. Reader, believe me when I predict that whoever has a heart and neglects such sacred duties will long shed bitter tears over his mistake, and will never find consolation for it.*

A teacher! What an exalted soul he should be! In truth, to form a man, one must be either a father or more

* "The course that I had pursued with respect to my children, however reasonable it may have appeared to me, had not always left my conscience tranquil. While planning my Treatise on Education, I felt that I had neglected duties from which nothing could excuse me. My remorse finally became so keen that it came near forcing me to make a public avowal of my fault in the beginning of the Émile."—(Les Confessions, Partie II, livre vii.)

than a man. And yet this is the service you calmly intrust to mercenaries!

Is it impossible to find this rare mortal? I do not know. In these degenerate times, who knows to what height of virtue a human soul may yet ascend? But suppose we have found this prodigy. It is by considering what he ought to do that we shall see what he ought to be. The first thing that occurs to me is that a father who should comprehend the full price of a good tutor would decide to do without one; for it would require more trouble to secure one than to become one himself. Or, if he desires to secure a friend, as I have suggested, let him educate his son for becoming such, and Nature will already have done half the work.

But what does this rich man do, this father who is so full of business, and compelled, as he says, to abandon his children? He pays another man to discharge those duties which are binding on himself. Venal soul! do you expect with your money to give your son another father? Be not deceived; it is not even a master whom you give him, but a valet; and presently he will make of your son a second.

We hear much said about the qualities of a good tutor. The first that I would require of him—and this single one supposes many others—is that he should not be a man for sale. There are employments so noble that we can not practice them for money without showing ourselves unworthy to practice them: such is the pursuit of arms, and such the office of a teacher. Who, then, shall educate my child? I have already told you—yourself. I can not. You can not, do you say? Then call in a friend to your aid. I see no other resource.

Some one, of whom I know nothing save his rank, made me a proposition to educate his son. Doubtless he

did me a great honor; but, rather than complain of my refusal, he ought to commend my discretion. Had I accepted his offer and erred in my method, the education would have been a failure. Had I succeeded, it would have been still worse: the son would have renounced his title, he would no longer have desired to be a prince.

I have too high an opinion of the magnitude of a teacher's office, and too keen a sense of my own incapacity for it, ever to accept such an employment, no matter whence the offer may come; and even the plea of friendship would be to me but an additional motive for refusing it. I fancy that, after having read this book, but few will be tempted to make me such a proposition; and I beg those who might do so no longer to give themselves the useless trouble. I once made a trial of this employment which sufficed to assure me that I had no fitness for it;* and my position would excuse me from it even though my talents had rendered me capable of it. It has seemed to me that I owe this public declaration to those who appear not to hold me in sufficient esteem to believe me sincere and firm in my resolution.

I have therefore formed the plan of providing myself with an imaginary pupil, and of assuming that I have the age, the health, the knowledge, and all the talents suitable for undertaking his education and conducting it from the moment of his birth up to the time when, having be-

* This refers to Rousseau's engagement with M. de Mably as tutor to his children.—(P.) "The mildness of my disposition would have made me a very proper person to teach, had not fits of anger mingled their storms with my work. As long as all went well and I saw my plans and labors succeeding, I could not do too much—I was an angel; but when things went wrong, I was a devil. When my pupils did not understand me, I raved; and when they showed signs of ugliness, I could have killed them."—Les Confessions, part i, liv. vi.

come a mature man, he will no longer need any other guide than himself. This method seems to me useful for preventing an author who is distrustful of himself from losing himself in speculation; for, the moment he departs from established usage, he has only to test his own method on his pupil and he will at once discover, or his reader will discover for him, whether he is following the progress of infancy and the course natural to the human heart.

I will merely observe, contrary to the ordinary opinion, that the tutor of a child ought to be young—just as young as a man can be and be wise. Were it possible, I would have him a child, so that he might become a companion to his pupil and secure his confidence by taking part in his amusements. There are not things enough in common between infancy and mature years, so that there comes to be formed at that distance a really solid attachment. Children sometimes flatter old people, but they never love them.*

It is thought that a tutor should already have had the training of one pupil. This is requiring too much, for a man can have trained but one. If two were necessary for his success, by what right did he undertake the care of the first?

There is a great difference, I assure you, between following a young man four years and conducting him twenty-five. You give your son a tutor when he is already grown; but I would have him have one before he is born. Your man can take another pupil every four years; but mine shall never have but one. You make

* It is a mistake to suppose that there can be any real sympathy between two children, as Rousseau seems to assume. Some disparity in age is essential to the rise of this emotion. We sympathize with another, not because we have experiences similar to his, but because we have had them.—(P.)

a distinction between a preceptor and a tutor,* which is another piece of folly. Do you distinguish between a disciple and a pupil? There is but one science which is to be taught children, and this is the science of human duty. This science is one; and, notwithstanding what Xenophon has said of the education of the Persians, it is not to be divided. And I would call the master of this science a tutor rather than a preceptor, because we are less concerned with the instruction of our pupil than with his guidance. The master ought not to give precepts, but should cause his pupil to find them.

The poor man has no need of an education, for his condition in life forces one upon him, and he could receive no other.† On the contrary, the education which the rich man receives from his station is the one which befits him the least, both with respect to himself and to society. Moreover, the education of nature ought to make a man fit for all the conditions of human life. Now, it is less reasonable to educate a poor man for becoming rich, than to educate a rich man for becoming poor; for, in proportion to the number of these two classes, there are more men who are ruined than there are who rise from poverty to wealth. Let us, therefore, choose our pupil from among the wealthy, for we shall at least be sure of having given one more man to society, while a poor man may make a man of himself.

For the same reason I shall not be offended if Émile

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* Précepteur et gouverneur.

† At this day it is not necessary to challenge such a statement as this, the basis of our public-school policy being the right of every child, regardless of condition in life, to participate in the blessings of education. Education is another name for freedom, and freedom is a right from which no man, not a criminal, should be debarred.—(P.)

is a child of rank, for there will be at least one victim rescued from prejudice.

Émile is an orphan. It is not important that he have a father and mother. Charged with their duties, I succeed to all their rights. He ought to honor his parents, but he owes obedience to no one but me. This is the first, or rather the only, condition that I require.

To this I should add what is but a corollary to it, that we shall never be separated from each other save by our own consent. This clause is essential, and I would have the pupil and his tutor regard themselves so inseparable that their destiny in life should always be a subject of common interest between them. The moment they discover their separation in the distance, the instant they foresee the moment which is to render them strangers to each other, they are already so in effect; each one lays his plan for himself; and both, thinking of the time when they shall no longer be together, maintain their association with reluctance. The pupil regards his master only as the overseer and scourge of infancy; and the master regards his pupil only as a heavy burden from which he longs to be released. With one accord they long for the moment when they may be delivered from each other; and as there is never any real attachment between them, one has but little vigilance and the other but little docility.

In the family which God gives him, a father has no choice and ought to have no preference. All his children are equally his children, and he owes them all the same care and the same tenderness. Whether crippled or not, whether sickly or robust, each of them is a trust of which he must render an account to him from whom he has received it; and marriage is a contract made with Nature, as well as between the husband and wife.

But whoever takes upon himself a duty which Nature has not imposed on him, should provide himself in advance with the means for fulfilling it; otherwise he makes himself accountable for what he will not be able to accomplish. He who charges himself with an infirm and sickly pupil, exchanges his function of tutor for that of a nurse; in caring for a useless life, he loses the time which was destined to the augmentation of its value; and he runs the risk of seeing a weeping mother some day reproach him with the death of a son whom he has long kept alive for her.

I would not assume charge of a sickly and debilitated child, were he to live for eighty years. I do not want a pupil always useless to himself and to others, whose only occupation is to keep himself alive, and whose body is a hindrance to the education of the soul. What would I accomplish by lavishing my care upon him to no purpose, except to double the loss of society by taking from it two men instead of one? If some one else would take my place and devote himself to this invalid, I have not the least objection, and would approve his charity; but my own talent does not run in this line. I can not teach one to live whose only thought is to keep himself from dying.

The body must needs be vigorous in order to obey the soul: a good servant ought to be robust. I know that intemperance excites the passions, and also that in the long run it debilitates the body; mortification and fasting produce the same effect from opposite causes. The weaker the body, the more it commands; the stronger it is, the better it obeys. All the sensual passions find lodgment in effeminate bodies; and the less they are satisfied the more irritable they become.

A debilitated body enfeebles the soul. Hence arises the sway of medicine—an art more pernicious to men

than all the ills which it pretends to cure. For my part, I do not know of what malady the doctors cure us, but I do know that they give us some which are very fatal—cowardice, pusillanimity, credulity, and fear of death. If they cure the body, they destroy courage. Of what consequence is it to us that they make dead bodies walk? What we need is men, and we do not see them coming from their hands.

Medicine is in fashion with us, and it ought to be. It is the amusement of indolent and unemployed people, who, not knowing what to do with their time, spend it in keeping themselves alive. If they had had the misfortune to be immortal, they would be the most wretched of creatures; for life, which they would never have any fear of losing, would have no value for them. These people need physicians to threaten in order to flatter them, and each day to give them the only pleasure of which they are susceptible, that of not being dead.

If you would find men who are truly courageous, look for them in places where there are no doctors, where people are ignorant of the consequences of disease, and where they hardly think of death. Naturally, man can suffer with constancy and die in peace. It is the doctors with their prescriptions, the philosophers with their precepts, and the priests with their exhortations, who abase his heart and make him unlearn how to die.

Then give me a pupil who needs none of these gentry, or I will not take him. I do not wish others to spoil my work; I will educate him alone, or will have nothing to do with him. The wise Locke, who had spent a part of his life in the study of medicine, strongly recommends that children should never be doctored, neither by way of precaution nor for trifling ailments. I shall go further, and I declare that, never calling physicians for myself, I

shall never call them for my Émile unless his life is in evident danger; for then they can do nothing worse than kill him.

The only useful part of medicine is hygiene; and hygiene is less a science than a virtue. Temperance and labor are the two real physicians of man; labor sharpens his appetite, and temperance prevents him from abusing it.

Men were not made to be massed together in herds, but to be scattered over the earth which they are to cultivate. The more they herd together the more they corrupt one another. Infirmities of the body, as well as evils of the soul, are the inevitable effect of this over-accumulation. Man is of all animals the one that can least support life in flocks; men herded together like sheep would all perish within a little time. The breath of man is fatal to his fellows; this is no less true literally than figuratively.

Cities are the graves of the human species. After a few generations, races perish or degenerate; they must be renewed, and this regeneration is always supplied by the country. Send your children away, therefore, so that they may renew themselves, so to speak, and regain, amid the fields, the vigor they have lost in the unwholesome air of places too thickly peopled.

Children should be bathed frequently; and in proportion as they gain strength the warmth of the water may gradually be diminished, until, finally, winter and summer, they may be bathed in cold water, and even in water at the point of freezing. As, in order not to expose their health, this lowering of temperature must be slow, successive, and insensible, a thermometer may be employed for the purpose of exact measurement.

This use of the bath, once established, ought not to be interrupted, but should be maintained throughout life. I value the bath not merely in its bearing on cleanliness and

actual health, but also as a salutary precaution for rendering the tissues and fibers flexible, and for making them adapt themselves without effort and risk to different degrees of heat and cold. For this purpose, while the body is growing, I would have people gradually accustom themselves to bathe, sometimes in water of all degrees of warmth, and often in waters of all possible degrees of cold. Thus, after having accustomed themselves to support the different temperatures of water, which, being a dense fluid, touches them at more points and affects them more sensibly, they would become almost insensible to atmospheric changes.

Do not suffer the child to be restrained by caps, bands, and swaddling-clothes; but let him have gowns flowing and loose, and which leave all his limbs at liberty, not so heavy as to hinder his movements, nor so warm as to prevent him from feeling the impression of the air. By keeping them dressed and within-doors, children in cities are suffocated. Those who have them in charge have yet to learn that cold air, far from doing them harm, invigorates them, and that warm air enfeebles them, makes them feverish, and kills them. Place the child in a wide cradle, well cushioned, where he can move at his ease and without danger. When he begins to grow strong, let him creep about the room and develop his little limbs, by giving them exercise; you will see him gain in strength day by day. Compare him with a child of the same age who has been tightly confined in swaddling-clothes, and you will be astonished at the difference in their progress.

I repeat it, the education of man begins at his birth. Before he can speak, before he can understand, he is already instructing himself. Experience precedes lessons; the moment he knows his nurse he has already acquired much knowledge. We should be surprised at the knowl-

edge possessed by the most boorish man, if we followed his progress from the moment of birth to the present hour of his life. If we were to divide all human knowledge into two parts, one common to all men and the other restricted to scholars, the last would be very small compared with the first. But we scarcely think of general acquisitions, because they are made without our notice and even before the age of reason; whereas science brings itself into notice only by the distinctions which it creates: just as, in algebraic equations, quantities in common are not taken into account.

The only habit which the child should be allowed to form is to contract no habit whatever.* Let him not be carried on one arm more than on another; let him not be accustomed to hold out one hand more than the other, nor to use it more often; nor to desire to eat, to sleep, or to be awake at the same hours; nor to be unable to stay alone by day or by night. Make a preparation long in advance for the exercise of his liberty and the use of his strength by allowing his body to have its natural habits, by putting him in a condition to be always master of himself, and in everything to do his own will the moment he has one.

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* This is one instance out of very many which illustrates Rousseau's rhetorical style. He seemed to fear that the exact statement of a truth might not affect the dull understandings of his readers, and so he resorts to the story-teller's trick of exaggeration. Reformers count on the dullness or the inertia of their followers, and make a considerable margin between what they require and what they expect. There is, doubtless, a truth at the bottom of this statement. Habit prevents versatility, and so is opposed to growth. It is easier to follow an old route, though a bad one, than to strike out a new and better one. During the formative or growing period, fixed habits are an obstruction; but in the end, the half of education is habit.—(P.)

As soon as the child begins to distinguish objects, it is important that a choice should be made in those which are presented to him. Naturally, man is interested in all objects which are new. He has such a sense of his feebleness that he fears whatever is unknown to him; and the habit of seeing new objects without being injured by them destroys this fear. Children brought up in nicely kept houses where spiders are not tolerated, are afraid of spiders, and in many cases this fear clings to them when they have become grown. I have never seen peasants, whether man, woman, or child, who were afraid of spiders.

Why, then, should not the education of a child begin before he speaks and understands, since a mere choice in the objects presented to him is sufficient to render him timid or courageous? I would have him accustomed to see new objects, such as ugly, disgusting, or nondescript animals, but little by little, or at a distance, till he becomes accustomed to them, and till, from having seen them handled by others, he finally comes to handle them himself. If, during his infancy, he has seen toads, snakes, and crabs, without being frightened, he will see without horror, when grown, any animal whatever. Objects cease to be frightful to him who sees them every day.

All children are afraid of masks. I begin by showing Émile a mask of a pleasing appearance, and presently some one puts it on before him. Thereupon I begin to laugh, and, as everybody joins in the laugh, the child laughs as the others do. Gradually I accustom him to masks that are less pleasing, and finally to faces that are hideous. If I have managed my gradation skillfully, far from being frightened at the last mask, he will laugh at it as at the first one. After this I have no fear that he will be frightened at masks.

When, in the farewell scene between Andromache and

Hector, the little Astyanax, frightened at the plumes which waved from his father's helmet, does not recognize him, but, crying, clings to the breast of his nurse and draws from his mother a smile mingled with tears, what is needed in order to cure him of this fright? Precisely what Hector does: throw the helmet on the ground and then kiss the child. In a calmer moment one would not stop at that point, but would take up the helmet, play with its plumes, and cause the child to handle them. Finally, the nurse would take the helmet, and put it on her own head while laughing—if, indeed, a woman's hand might dare to touch the arms of Hector.

If Émile is to be accustomed to the noise of fire-arms, I first burn a wad in a pistol. This sudden and momentary flash, this sort of lightning, pleases him, and I repeat the same thing with more powder. Little by little I load the pistol with a small charge without a wad; then I increase the charge, and, finally, I accustom him to the discharge of a gun, to bombs, to cannons, and to the most frightful explosions.

The discomfort caused by needs is expressed by signs, when the aid of others is necessary in order to provide for them. Hence the cries of children. They shed many tears, and this is as it should be. Since all their sensations are affective, children enjoy them in silence when they are agreeable, but when they are painful they make them known by their language and demand relief. Now, as long as they are awake they can hardly rest in a state of indifference; they either sleep, or are affected by their sensations.

When a child weeps he is in a state of discomfort; he has some need which he can not satisfy. We look about in search of this need, and when we have found it we provide for it. When we do not find it, or when we can

not provide for it, the tears continue to flow and we are importuned by them. We caress the child to keep him still, and we rock him or sing to him to put him to sleep. If he is obstinate, we become impatient and threaten him. Brutal nurses sometimes strike him. Strange lessons these for one who is just beginning to live!

This disposition of children to outbursts of temper, to spite, and to anger, requires the nicest management. Boerhaave is of the opinion that the most of their ailments are of a convulsive type, because, the head being proportionally larger than that of the adult, and the nervous system more extended, the nervous tract is more susceptible of irritation. Use the utmost care to keep them out of the reach of servants who annoy them, irritate them, and try their patience; they are a hundred times more dangerous to them, and more likely to do them harm, than the bad effects of air and climate. So long as children find resistance only in things, and never in wills, they will become neither rebellious nor choleric, and will the better keep themselves in a state of health.* Here is one of the reasons why children of the common people, freer and more independent, are generally less infirm, less delicate, and more robust than those whom we profess to bring up more wisely by a system of ceaseless restraints; but we must always recollect that there is a very great

* So far is this from being true, that children very readily ascribe will and intent to things, and will punish inert objects that have hurt them. This doctrine of the beneficent discipline of *things*, as distinguished from the discipline exercised by the human will, is one of Rousseau's favorite themes, and forms the groundwork of Mr. Spencer's chapter on Moral Education. As human wills must be encountered in actual life, as they form an essential part of our environment, the child may very properly be made to count with them.—(P.)

difference between obeying them and not exciting their opposition.

The first tears of children are prayers, and unless we are on our guard they soon become orders. Children begin by being assisted, but end by being served. Thus out of their very weakness, whence proceeds at first the feeling of their dependence, there presently springs the idea of empire and domination; but this idea being excited not so much by their needs as by our services, there begin to appear, at this point, the moral effects whose immediate cause is not in nature; and already we begin to see why, in this early period of life, it is important to discern the secret intention which dictates the gesture or the cry.

When the child makes the effort and reaches out his hand without saying anything, he expects to reach the object because he does not make a proper estimate of its distance—he has made a mistake; but when he complains and cries while reaching out his hand, he then no longer makes a mistake as to the distance, but is either commanding the object to come to him, or is commanding you to bring him the object. In the first case, carry him to the object slowly, stopping at short intervals; in the second, give no sign whatever of hearing him; the louder he cries the less you should listen to him. It is important to accustom him at an early period neither to command men, for he is not their master, nor things, for they do not hear him. Thus, when a child desires something which he sees or which you wish to give him, it is much better to carry him to the object than to bring this object to him. He draws from this procedure a conclusion suitable to his age, and one which can be suggested to him in no other way.

The Abbé de Saint Pierre called men large children;

conversely, we might call children little men. These propositions have their truth as maxims; but as principles they have need of explanation. When Hobbes called a rogue a robust child, he said a thing absolutely contradictory. All wickedness comes from weakness. A child is bad only because he is weak; make him strong, and he will be good. He who can do everything does nothing bad.* Of all the attributes of the omnipotent Divinity, goodness is the one which we can spare from his conception with the greatest difficulty. All peoples who have recognized two principles have always regarded the evil as inferior to the good; otherwise they would have made an absurd supposition.

Reason alone teaches us to know good and evil. The conscience, which makes us love the one and hate the other, although independent of the reason, can not be developed without it. Before the age of reason we do good and evil without knowing it; and there is no morality in our actions, although there sometimes may be in the feeling we have from the actions of others as they relate to us. A child wishes to disarrange whatever he sees; he breaks and injures whatever he can reach; he seizes a bird as he would seize a stone, and strangles it without knowing what he does.

Why is this? At first sight philosophy goes on to account for it by natural vices. Pride, the spirit of domination, self-love, the wickedness of man, and, it might be added, the sense of his weakness, make the child eager to do feats of strength, and to prove to himself his own power. But see this infirm and broken old man, brought back by the cycle of human life to the feebleness of infancy. He not only remains immobile and peaceable, but

* Nero and Charles V, for example!—(P.)

would have everything about him remain so; the least change troubles and disquiets him, and he would see the reign of universal calm. If the original cause were not altered, how could the same impotence, connected with the same passions, produce such different effects in the two ages? And where can we look for this difference in causes, save in the physical condition of the two individuals? The active principle, common to both, is in a state of development in one and in a state of extinction in the other; one is in a state of formation, and the other in a state of decay; one is tending to life and the other to death. The decaying activity is concentrated in the heart of the old man; in that of the child this activity is superabundant and extends itself outward; he is conscious of life enough, so to speak, to animate his whole environment. Whether he makes or unmakes matters not; it suffices that he changes the state of things, and every change is an action. Though he seems to have a greater inclination to destroy, this is not through badness. The activity which forms is always slow; and as that which destroys is more rapid, it is better adapted to his vivacity.

At the same time that the Author of Nature gives to children this active principle, he takes care that it shall do but little harm, by giving them but little strength to indulge themselves in it; but as soon as they come to consider the people who surround them as instruments which they can employ, they make use of them to follow their inclinations, and to supplement their own feebleness. This is how they become troublesome, tyrannical, imperious, depraved, unconquerable; a progress which does not come from a natural spirit of domination, but which gives them this spirit; for it does not require a long experience to feel how agreeable it is to act through the

hands of others, and to need only to set the tongue a-going in order to set the universe in motion.

This principle once known, we see clearly the point at which we abandon the order of nature. We see what must be done in order to maintain ourselves in it.

Maxims.

1. Far from having superfluous strength, children do not have enough for all the demands that Nature makes on them. We must therefore grant them the use of all the strength which Nature gives them and of which they can not make a misuse.

2. We must aid them, and supply whatever they lack either in the way of intelligence, or in the way of strength, in whatever concerns their physical need.

3. In the aid which we give them, we must limit ourselves exclusively to the actually useful, without granting anything to caprice or to unreasonable desires; for caprice will not torment them if we have not called it into being, provided it does not have its origin in nature.

4. We must carefully study their language and their signs, to the end that, at an age when they do not know how to dissemble, we may distinguish in their desires what comes immediately from nature and what from opinion.

The spirit of these rules is to grant to children more real liberty and less domination, to leave them more to do on their own account, and to exact less from others. Thus, early accustoming themselves to limit their desires to their powers, they will have but little sense of the privation of what is not within their power.

Here, then, is a new and very important reason for leaving the body and the limbs of children absolutely

free, with the single precaution of shielding them from the danger of falls, and of keeping out of their hands whatever may injure them.

Infallibly, a child whose body and limbs are free will cry less than one who is bound up in swaddling-clothes. He who experiences only physical needs weeps only when he suffers, and this is a very decided advantage; for then we know to a certainty when he needs help, and we ought not to lose a moment in giving it to him, if it be possible. But if you can not help him, keep quiet, and do not pet him in order to soothe him. Your caresses will not cure his colic; but he will recollect what he must do in order to be petted; and if he once learns that he can interest you in his case at his own pleasure, he has become your master, and all is lost.

Less opposed in their movements, children will weep less; less importuned by their tears, we shall be less troubled to keep them still; threatened or petted less often, they will be less timid or less willful, and the better remain in their natural condition. It is less by letting children cry, than by our efforts to keep them still, that we cause them to contract ruptures; and my proof of this is that the children who are the most neglected are much less subject to them than others. I am very far from wishing that on this account they should be neglected; on the contrary, it is important that we anticipate their needs, and that we do not wait to be apprised of them by their cries. But, on the other hand, I would not have the care we bestow on them misunderstood. Why should they not resort to tears when they see that they are available to secure so many things? When taught the price put on their silence, they take good care not to be prodigal of it. They finally make it so valuable that we can no longer purchase it; and it is

then that, by reason of weeping without success, they are exhausted by their efforts and become quiet.

The long crying-spells of a child who is neither bandaged nor ill, and who is left in need of nothing, are but the cries of habit or of obstinacy. They are not the work of Nature, but of the nurse, who, not being able to endure the trouble caused by them, multiplies the difficulty, without thinking that, by causing the child to keep quiet today, she encourages him to cry the more to-morrow.

The only way to cure or to prevent this habit is to pay no attention to it. No one likes to take useless trouble —not even children. They are obstinate in their undertakings; but if your firmness is greater than their obstinacy, they are beaten, and will not try the contest again. It is in this way that they are taught to spare their tears, and are accustomed to shed them only when pain forces them to cry.

Besides, when they cry through caprice or obstinacy, a sure way to prevent them from continuing is to divert their attention by some agreeable or striking object, which makes them forget that they wish to cry. Most nurses excel in this art, and, well managed, it is very useful; but it is of the utmost importance that the child does not notice the intention to divert him, and that he amuse himself without suspecting that we are thinking of him; but on this point all nurses are unskillful.

We no longer know how to be simple in anything, not even in our dealings with children. Gold or silver bells, coral, elaborate crystals, toys of all kinds and prices—what useless and pernicious furniture! Nothing of all this. No bells, no toys. Little branches with their fruits and flowers, a poppy-head in which the seeds are heard to rattle, a stick of licorice which he can suck and chew, will amuse him just as much as these gorgeous trinkets, and

will not have the disadvantage of accustoming him to luxury from the day of his birth.

Children hear spoken language from their birth; we speak to them not only before they comprehend what is said to them, but before they can reproduce the tones which they hear. Their organs of speech, still torpid, adapt themselves only little by little to the imitations of the sounds which are addressed to them; and it is not even certain that these sounds are at first carried to their ears as distinctly as to our own. I do not disapprove of the nurse's amusing the child with songs, and very cheerful and varied accents; but I do disapprove of her incessantly stunning him with a multitude of useless words of which he comprehends nothing except the tone which she throws into them. I would have the first articulations which he is made to hear few in number, easy to reproduce, distinct, and often repeated; and I would have the words which they express relate to sensible objects which can at once be shown to the child. The unfortunate facility which we have of using words which we do not understand commences sooner than we think. The pupil in class hears the verbiage of his master just as he heard in the cradle the babble of his nurse. It seems to me that it would be instructing him very usefully to bring him up without comprehending anything of this.

But an abuse of far greater importance, and one not less easy to prevent, is our over-haste in making children speak, as though we were afraid that they would never learn to speak of themselves. This indiscreet haste produces an effect directly contrary to the one we aim to secure; for by this means children are later in learning to speak, and they speak more indistinctly. The extreme attention which we give to all they say makes it unnecessary for them to articulate distinctly, and as they scarcely

deign to open their mouths, many of them retain for life a vicious pronunciation and a confused manner of speaking which render them almost unintelligible.

I have passed much of my life among the peasantry, and I have never known one of them, either man or woman, girl or boy, whose articulation was indistinct. How does this happen? Are the organs of peasants constructed differently from our own? No; but they are differently exercised. Opposite my window is a hillock, on which the children of the neighborhood collect to play. Although they are at some distance from me, I perfectly distinguish all they say, and from this source I often draw illustrations for this essay. Every day my ear deceives me as to their age. I hear the voices of children ten years old; but I observe, and I see the stature and the features of children from three to four. But I do not limit this experience to myself alone. City friends who come to see me, and whom I consult on this matter, all fall into the same error.

The cause of this is, that up to the age of five or six, city children, brought up within doors, under the wing of a governess, need only to mutter in order to make themselves understood. The moment they move their lips, special effort is made to hear them; words are addressed to them which they reproduce imperfectly; and, forced to pay attention to them, those who are constantly about them guess what they wish to say rather than what they do say.

In the country everything is different. Here, a mother is not always near her child, and he is obliged to learn how to say very distinctly and with a very loud voice what he needs to have her hear. In the open country, as children are relatively few in number, and often separated from father, mother, and other children, they exert

themselves to be heard at a distance, and to adapt their force of voice to the distance which separates them from those by whom they wish to be heard. This is the way we really learn to pronounce, and not by lisping a few vowels in the ear of an attentive governess. Thus, when we interrogate the child of a peasant, diffidence may prevent him from replying, but whatever he says he says distinctly; whereas it is necessary for the nurse to act as interpreter to the city child, without whose aid we understand nothing of what is muttered between his teeth.

I grant that country and village people go to the other extreme; that they almost always speak louder than is necessary; that in pronouncing too distinctly their articulation is strong and rough; that they overdo the matter of accent, and that their choice of terms is bad.

But, in the first place, this extreme seems to me less vicious than the other, seeing that the first law of discourse being to make one's self understood, the greatest fault one can commit is to speak without being understood. To pride one's self on having no accent, is to pride one's self on taking away from sentences their grace and force. Accent is the soul of discourse; it gives to it feeling and truth. Accent lies less than speech, and it is perhaps for this reason that well-bred people fear it so much. It is from the custom of saying everything in the same tone that has come the practice of quizzing people without their knowing it. This proscription of accent is followed by modes of pronunciation which are ridiculous, affected, and governed by fashion, such as are noticed particularly in the young people in court circles. This affectation in speech and bearing is what generally renders the presence of Frenchmen repulsive and disagreeable to other nations. Instead of putting accent into his speech,

he puts it in his manner. This is not a means of prepossession in his favor.

All these little faults of language which we so much fear to have children contract, are of no account—they are prevented or corrected with the greatest facility; but those which they are made to contract by making their speech indistinct, confused, and timid, by incessantly criticising their tone, and by picking over their words, are never corrected. A man who learns to speak only in his chamber will make himself but poorly understood at the head of a battalion, and will hardly overawe people who are engaged in a riot.

The child who would learn to talk should hear only the words which he can understand, and speak only those which he can articulate. The efforts which he makes for this purpose lead him to repeat the same syllable, as though practicing to pronounce it more distinctly. When he begins to stammer, do not fret yourselves so much to conjecture what he says. Always to claim the attention of others is of itself a sort of domination which the child ought not to exercise. Let it suffice for you to provide very attentively for what is necessary; it is his part to try to make you understand what is not necessary. Still less should you be in haste to require him to talk; he will easily learn to talk as he comes to feel the utility of it.

The greatest evil coming from the precipitation which makes children talk prematurely, is not that the first conversations held with them, and the first words which they speak, have no meaning for them, but that they have a different meaning from our own, and this without our being conscious of it; so that, while seeming to reply to us with great exactness, they speak to us without understanding us and without our understanding them. It is for the most part to such ambiguities that

is due the surprise produced in us by some of their sayings to which we attach ideas that they have never connected with them. This inattention, on our part, to the real meaning which words have for children, seems to me the cause of their first errors, and these errors, even after they had been cured, have an influence on their turn of mind for the rest of their life.

Contract, then, as much as possible, the vocabulary of the child. It is a great disadvantage for him to have more words than ideas, and to know how to say more things than he can think. I believe that one of the reasons why peasants generally have more accurate minds than people of the city is that their vocabulary is less extensive. They have few ideas, but they compare them very accurately.*

The first developments of infancy take place almost simultaneously. A child learns to talk, to eat, and to walk, almost at the same time. Here is properly the first epoch of his life. Before this, he is nothing more than he was before he was born; he has no feeling, no ideas, he hardly has sensations; he is not even conscious of his own existence.

"*Vivit, et est vitæ nescius ipse suæ.*"—Ovid, Tristia, lib. i.

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* "Words," says Hobbes, "are wise men's counters, but the money of fools." The disposition to accept empty words for ideas has justified educational reformers in declaiming against mere word-study and routine memorizing; but it is to be recollected that words are the instruments of thought, and that a small vocabulary implies a narrow range of thinking and a low power of intellectual discrimination. Provided words are properly significant, a large vocabulary is in every way desirable. Whether the child proceeds from ideas to words or from words to ideas is immaterial, provided there is an indissoluble union effected between the sign and the thing signified. Both orders of sequence are "natural."—(P.)

BOOK SECOND.

THE CHILD FROM THE AGE OF FIVE TO TWELVE—PHYSICAL EDUCATION—INSTRUCTION THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND THE SENSES.

We are now at the second period of life—that where infancy properly ends; for the words *infans* and *puer* are not synonymous. The first is comprised in the second, and signifies *one who can not speak.* Whence it happens that in Valerius Maximus we find *puerum infantem.** But I shall continue to employ this word according to current usage, until the age for which we have other names.

When children begin to speak, they cry less. This progress is natural; one language is substituted for another. As soon as they can use words to say that they suffer, why should they say it by cries ,save when the suffering is too keen to be expressed by words? If they continue to cry, it is the fault of those who are about them. When Émile has once said, *I am sick*, his sufferings must be very keen in order to force him to weep.

If a child is so delicate and sensitive as naturally to resort to crying, I at once dry up the source of his tears by making them useless and without effect. As long as he is crying, I do not go to him; but I run to him the moment he has become still. Very soon, his way of calling me will be to cease crying, or at least to utter but

* Lib. i, cap. vi.

one cry. It is through the sensible effects of signs that children judge of their meaning; for them, there is no other convention. Whatever ill may befall the child, it is very rare that he cries when he is alone, at least if he has no hope of being heard.

If he falls and bumps his head, if his nose bleeds, or if he cuts his fingers, instead of rushing to him with an air of alarm, I remain unmoved, at least for a little time. The mischief is done, and he must necessarily endure it; all my assiduity serves only to frighten him the more and to increase his suffering. In reality it is not so much the cut, but the fear, which torments him when he is wounded. I will at least spare him this last suffering; for most certainly he will judge of his misfortune as he sees that I judge of it. If he sees me run to him with a disturbed air, console him, and pity him, he will think himself lost; but if he sees that I remain cool, he will soon regain his own composure, and will think the evil cured when he no longer feels it. It is at this age that the first lessons of courage are learned, and that, suffering slight pains without dismay, we learn by degrees to endure those that are greater.

Far from being careful to prevent Émile from harming himself, I should be very sorry never to have him hurt, and to have him grow up without knowing what pain is. To suffer is the first thing he ought to learn, and that which he will have the greatest need to know. It seems that children are small and weak in order to learn these important lessons without danger. If a child falls from his chair, he will not break his leg; if he strikes himself with a stick, he will not break his arm; if he takes hold of a sharp knife, he will hardly press it tightly enough to make a very deep wound. I do not know that a case has ever been known where a child, left at liberty, has killed or

maimed himself, or has done himself any very great harm, save when he has been indiscreetly seated in some high place, or left alone near the fire, or when dangerous instruments have been left within his reach. What shall be said of that stock of machines collected around a child to arm him from head to foot against suffering, to such an extent that when grown he remains at their mercy, without courage and without experience, and thinks himself dead at the first scratch, and faints at the sight of the first drop of his own blood?*

Our pedantic mania for instruction is always leading us to teach children things which they would learn much better of their own accord, and to forget what we alone are able to teach them. Is there anything more foolish than the trouble we take to teach them how to walk, as though any one had ever been seen who, through the negligence of his nurse, was not able to walk when grown up? On the contrary, how many people have we seen who walk poorly all their lives, because they have been badly taught how to walk!

Émile shall have neither head-pads, nor wheeled panniers, nor go-carts, nor leading-strings; or, at least, from the moment he begins to know how to put one foot before the other, he shall be supported only on paved places, and care shall be taken to pass over these in haste.† Instead of allowing him to stagnate in the polluted air of his chamber, let him be taken out daily into the open meadow. There let him run and frolic and fall

* For the extreme development of this doctrine, see Spencer, Education, Chapter III.

† There is nothing more ridiculous and more uncertain than the walk of persons who have been guided too much by leading-strings while young. This is another of those observations which are trivial because they are just, and which are just in more senses than one.

down a hundred times a day; so much the better, for by this means he will learn the sooner to pick himself up. The blessings of liberty are worth many wounds. My pupil will often have bruises; but in return he will always be in good spirits. If yours have fewer, they are always perverse, always restrained, always sad. I doubt whether the advantage is on their side.

As children grow in strength, complaining is less necessary for them. As they grow in power to help themselves, they have less frequent need to resort to the assistance of others. Along with their growth in power there is developed the knowledge which puts them in a condition to direct it. It is at this second stage that the life of the individual properly begins. It is then that he takes knowledge of himself. Memory diffuses the feeling of identity over all the moments of his existence. He becomes truly one, the same, and consequently already capable of happiness or misery. It is important, then, that we begin to consider him here as a moral being.

Although at any given age the longest term of human life, and the probability of attaining it, are in a great measure determinate, nothing is more uncertain than the duration of life of any particular man; for very few attain to this longest term. The greatest risks to life are at its beginning. The shorter time we have lived, the shorter time ought we to expect to live. Of all the children who are born, only a half, at most, come to adolescence; and it is probable that your pupil will not live to be a man.

What must we think, then, of that barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which loads a child with chains of every sort, and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare for him, long in advance, some pretended happiness which it is

probable he will never enjoy? Were I even to assume that education to be reasonable in its object, how could we witness, without indignation, these poor unfortunates subject to an insupportable yoke, and condemned, like galley-slaves, to never-ending toil, without any assurance that such sacrifices will ever be useful to them? The age of mirth is passed in the midst of tears, chastisements, threats, and slavery. The victim is tormented for his good; and we do not see the death which we invite, and which is coming to seize him in the midst of this sad preparation. Who knows how many children perish, the victims of the misdirected wisdom of a father or a teacher? Happily released from his cruelty, the only advantage which they derive from the ills which they have been made to suffer, is to die without looking back with regret on a life of which they have known only the torments.

O men, be humane; it is your foremost duty. Be humane to all classes and to all ages, to everything not foreign to mankind. What wisdom is there for you outside of humanity? Love childhood; encourage its sports, its pleasures, its amiable instincts. Who of you has not sometimes looked back with regret on that age when a smile was ever on the lips, when the soul was ever at peace? Why would you take from those little innocents the enjoyment of a time so short which is slipping from them, and of a good so precious which they can not abuse? Why would you fill with bitterness and sorrow those early years so rapidly passing, which will no more return to them than to you? Fathers, do you know the moment when death awaits your children? Do not prepare for yourselves regrets by taking from them the few moments which Nature has given them. As soon as they can feel the pleasures of existence, allow them to enjoy it;

and at whatever hour God may summon them, see to it that they do not die before they have tasted life.

In order not to be running after chimeras, let us not forget what is befitting our condition. Humanity has its place in the order of things, and infancy has its place in the order of human life. We must consider the man in the man, and the child in the child. To assign to each his place, and to fix him there, to adjust human passions according to the constitution of man—this is all that we can do for his well-being. The rest depends on extraneous causes which are not in our power.

We do not know what absolute happiness or unhappiness is. In this life all things are intermingled; we experience no unmixed feeling; we do not remain for two moments in the same state of emotion. The affections of our souls, like the modifications of our bodies, are in a continual flux. Good and evil are common to us all, but in different degrees. He is the happiest who suffers the least pain; and he the most wretched who feels the fewest pleasures. There are always more sufferings than enjoyments, and this is the difference which is common to all. Human felicity here below is, then, but a negative state, and we must estimate it by the smallest quantity of evils which we suffer.

Every sensation of pain is inseparable from the desire to be delivered from it, and every idea of pleasure is inseparable from the desire to enjoy it. Every desire supposes privation; and all the privations which we feel are painful. It is, then, in the disproportion between our desires and our faculties that our unhappiness consists. A sensible being whose powers should equal his desires would be an absolutely happy being.

Keep the child dependent on things alone, and you will have followed the order of Nature in his education.

Offer to his indiscreet caprices only physical obstacles or punishments which result from his actions themselves, and which he recalls on occasion. Without forbidding him to do wrong, it suffices to prevent him from doing it. Only experience or want of power should serve as law for him. Grant nothing to his desires because he demands it, but because he has need of it. Do not let him know what obedience is when he acts, nor what control is when others act for him. Equally in his actions and in yours, let him feel his liberty. If he is lacking in power, supply the exact amount of it which he needs in order to be free and not imperious; and while receiving your aid with a sort of humiliation, let him long for the moment when he will be able to do without it, and when he will have the honor to serve himself.

In order to strengthen the body and to make it grow, Nature resorts to means which ought never to be thwarted. A child must not be constrained to keep still when he wishes to move, nor to move when he wishes to remain quiet. When the will of children has not been spoiled by our fault, they wish nothing that is to no purpose. They must jump, and run, and scream, whenever they have a mind to do so. All their movements are needs of their constitution which is trying to fortify itself; but we should distrust the desires which they themselves have not the power to satisfy. We must then be careful to distinguish the true or natural need from the fancied need which begins to appear, or from that which comes merely from that superabundance of life of which I have spoken.

I have already directed what must be done when a child cries in order to obtain this or that. I will only add that when he can ask for what he wants in words, and when, in order to obtain it more quickly, or to overcome a refusal, he supplements his demands with tears, it

ought to be firmly refused him. If a real need has made him speak, you ought to know it and to supply the demand at once; but to yield something to his tears is to encourage him to cry the more, to teach him to doubt your good-will, and to believe that importunity goes further with you than kindness. If he does not believe that you are good, he will soon become bad; and if he thinks you weak, he will soon become obstinate. It is important always to grant at the first intimation what we do not mean to refuse. Be not prodigal in refusals, but never recall them.

Be especially on your guard against giving the child empty formulas of politeness which he may use at need as magic words to subject to his caprices all that surrounds him, and to obtain on the instant whatever it pleases him to demand. In the ceremonious education of the wealthy, children are always made politely imperious by prescribing for them the terms which they must employ in order that no one may dare to resist them; they are suppliant neither in tone nor manner, but are even more arrogant when they entreat than when they command, as being more sure of being obeyed. We see at once that, in their mouth, *If you please* signifies *It pleases me*, and that *I beg you* signifies *I command you.* Admirable politeness, which for them amounts merely to a change in the meaning of words, and to an inability ever to speak otherwise than in a tone of command! As for me, I would rather have Émile rude than arrogant; I would much rather have him say, in making a request, *Do this*, than in commanding, *I beg you.* It is not the term which he uses that I care about, but rather the meaning which he connects with it.

There is an excess of severity and an excess of indulgence, and both are equally to be avoided. If you allow

children to suffer, you expose their health and their life, and make them actually miserable; if you are overcareful in sparing them every sort of discomfort, you are laying up in store for them great wretchedness by making them delicate and sensitive; you remove them from that condition of men to which they will one day return in spite of you. In order not to expose them to some ills of Nature, you are the author of others which she has not provided for them. You will tell me that I fall into the error of those unwise fathers whom I reproach with sacrificing the happiness of children out of consideration for a remote time which may never come. By no means; for the liberty which I grant my pupil amply rewards him for the slight discomforts to which I allow him to be exposed. I see little vagabonds playing in the snow, purple with cold, benumbed and hardly able to move their fingers. They are at liberty to go and warm themselves, but they do not do it; and if they were forced to go they would feel the rigors of constraint a hundred times more than they feel those of the cold. Of what, then, do you complain? Shall I make your child wretched by exposing him only to the discomforts which he is perfectly willing to suffer? I am doing him good at the present moment by leaving him free; and I am doing him a future good by arming him against ills which he ought to endure. If he could choose between being my pupil and yours, do you think he would hesitate for an instant?

Can you conceive that any real happiness is possible for any being outside of his constitution? And is it not to remove man from his constitutional state to desire to exempt him equally from all the ills of his species? This is certainly my belief. In order that man may appreciate great blessings, he must know small evils; such is his nature. If the physical life is too exuberant, the moral

life degenerates. The man who has not experienced suffering knows neither human tenderness nor the sweetness of commiseration. He would be touched by nothing, would be unsocial, and a monster among his fellows.

Do you know the surest way of making your child miserable? It is by accustoming him to obtain whatever he desires; for, as his desires are constantly growing through the facility of satisfying them, sooner or later your very inability will force you, in spite of yourself, to resort to a refusal; and this unaccustomed refusal will give him more distress than the very privation of what he desires. First he would have your cane, presently your watch, next the bird which he sees flying in the air, and finally the stars which he sees glittering in the heavens—in a word, he would have everything he sees; and, short of being God himself, how is he to be satisfied?

If these notions of domination and tyranny make men wretched in infancy, what will be their condition when they have become grown, and their relations with other men have begun to extend and multiply? Accustomed to see everything bend before them, what will be their surprise on entering the world to see that everything resists them, and to find themselves crushed under the weight of that universe which they imagined they could move at will! Their insolent airs and puerile vanity bring upon them only mortification, disdain, and raillery; they drink affronts like water; and cruel experiences soon teach them that they know neither their condition nor their strength. Not being able to do everything, they think they can do nothing. So many unaccustomed obstacles dishearten them, so many rebuffs humiliate them, that they become cowardly, timid, and cringing, and fall as much below themselves as they were once raised above themselves.

Considered in itself, is there anything in the world more helpless, more wretched, more at the mercy of everything that surrounds it, than an infant? Is there anything that has such need of pity, attention, and protection, as a child? Does it not seem that he presents a face so benignant and a look so touching solely to the end that every one who approaches him may become interested in his helplessness and run to his assistance? Then what is more shocking, more contrary to propriety, than to see a haughty and stubborn child give orders to all who are about him, and so indiscreet as to lord it over those who have only to abandon him in order to cause him to perish?

On the other hand, who does not see that the helplessness of early life puts so many restraints on children that it is barbarous to add to this enthrallment that of our own caprices, by depriving them of a liberty so contracted, which they can so little abuse, and of which they can be deprived with so little advantage to them and to us? If there is no object so ridiculous as a haughty child, there is none so pitiable as a timorous child. Since civil servitude begins with the age of reason, why anticipate it by private servitude? Let us allow life to have a moment's exemption from that yoke that has not been imposed on us by Nature, and leave to infancy the exercise of that natural liberty which diverts the child, at least for a time, from the vices that are contracted in slavery. Then let those harsh tutors and those fathers who are enslaved to their children come forward with their objections, and, before vaunting their methods, let them once learn the method of Nature.

Your child should obtain nothing because he demands it, but only because he has need of it;* nor should he do

* We should recollect that as pain is often a necessity, pleasure is sometimes a need. There is, then, but one simple desire of children

anything from obedience, but from necessity. And so the terms obey and command are proscribed from his vocabulary, and still more the terms duty and obligation; but the terms force, necessity, impotency, and constraint, should have a large place in it. Before the age of reason there can be no idea of moral being, or of social relations. Hence, so far as possible, we must shun the use of the words which express them, for fear that the child may at first attach to these words false ideas which we have not the skill or the power to destroy. The first false idea which enters his head is the germ of error and of vice; and it is to this first step that we must pay particular attention. Proceed in such a way that as long as he is affected only by sensuous things all his ideas shall stop at sensation; so proceed that on every hand he may perceive about him only the world of matter; for, unless you do this, you may be sure that he will not listen to you at all, or that he will form of the moral world of which you speak to him fantastic notions which you will never efface from his life.

To reason with children was the grand maxim of Locke, and it is the one chiefly in fashion to-day. Its success, however, does not appear to me to argue very much in its favor; and for my part I know nothing more silly than those children with whom one has reasoned so much. Of all the faculties of man, reason, which, so to speak, is but the aggregate of all the others, is that which is developed with the most difficulty and the latest, and it is this one which we propose to employ to develop the first!

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which should never be gratified—that of being obeyed. Whence it follows that in whatever they demand we must give especial attention to the motive which leads them to demand it. Whenever it is possible, grant them whatever can give them a real pleasure; but always refuse them what they demand merely through caprice, or in order to exert an act of authority.

The master-work of a good education is to make a reasonable man, and we propose to train up a child through the reason! This is to begin at the end, and to confound the instrument with the work. If children were capable of reasoning, they would have no need of being educated; but by speaking to them from their earliest years in a language they do not understand, we accustom them to be satisfied with words, to pass judgment on everything said to them, to esteem themselves just as wise as their teachers, and to become disputatious and stubborn; and whatever we expect to obtain from them by reasonable motives we never obtain save by motives of selfishness, fear, or vanity, which we are always obliged to add to the first.

Here is the formula to which may be reduced almost all the moral lessons which are given, or may be given, to children:

Teacher: You must not do that. *Child:* And why must I not do that? *T.* Because it is wrong. *C.* Wrong! What is it to do wrong? *T.* To do what is forbidden. *C.* What is the penalty for doing what is forbidden? *T.* You will be punished for your disobedience. *C.* I will do it in such a way that nothing will be known about it. *T.* You will be watched. *C.* I will hide myself. *T.* You will be questioned. *C.* I will lie. *T.* You must not lie. *C.* Why must I not lie? *T.* Because it is wrong to lie. Etc., etc.

This is the inevitable circle. Were you to go outside of it, the child would no longer understand you. Are not these very useful instructions? I would be very glad to know what could be put in the place of this dialogue. Locke himself would certainly be very much embarrassed to tell us. To know good and evil, and to understand the reason of human duties, is not the business of a child.

Nature would have children be children before being men. If we wish to pervert this order, we shall produce precocious fruits which will have neither maturity nor flavor, and will speedily deteriorate; we shall have young doctors and old children. Childhood has its own way of seeing, thinking, and feeling, and nothing is more foolish than to try to substitute our own for them. I would as soon require a child to be five feet in height as to have judgment at the age of ten. Indeed, of what use would reason be to him at that age? Reason is the check to strength, but the child has no need of this check.*

In attempting to convince your pupils of the duty of obedience, you add force and threats to this pretended persuasion, or, still worse, flattery and promises. In this way, then, baited by interest or constrained by force, they pretend to be convinced by reason; they see very clearly that obedience is very advantageous to them, and rebellion harmful, the moment you become aware of either. But as you exact nothing of them which is not disagreeable, and as it is always painful to obey the wills of others, they secretly gratify their own wishes, persuaded that they are doing right as long as their disobedience is unknown, but ready to acknowledge that they have done wrong if they are found out, for fear of a greater evil. The ground of duty not being within the compass of their years, there is not a man living who can succeed in making them truly conscious of it; but the fear of punishment, the hope of

* Rousseau's error at this point evidently consists in giving to the word reason too narrow a meaning. Later on he makes a similar mistake in the use of the word memory. Children are certainly capable of reasoning; they can "deduce inferences justly from premises"; but as compared with men the compass of their reason is small. Rousseau is often too systematic; he draws hard and fast lines which his beloved and revered "Nature" repudiates.—(P.)

pardon, importunity, and embarrassment at replying, draw from them all the confessions that are exacted; and we fancy that they have have been convinced when they have only been wearied or intimidated.

What follows? In the first place, by imposing on them a duty which they do not feel, you arm them against your tyranny; then you teach them to become insincere, deceitful, untruthful, in order to extort rewards or to escape punishments; and, finally, accustoming them always to cover a secret motive with an apparent motive, you yourselves furnish them the means of imposing on you constantly, of depriving you of the knowledge of their true character, and on occasion of satisfying you and others with empty words. The laws, you will say, though obligatory on the conscience, also employ restraint in the case of grown men. This I grant; but what are these men but children who have been spoiled by education? This is precisely what we must prevent. Employ force with children and reason with men; for such is the order of Nature. The wise man has no need of laws.

Treat your pupil according to his age. On the start put him in his place, and hold him there so firmly that he will no longer be tempted to leave it. Then, before knowing what wisdom is, he will practice the most important of its lessons. Never command him to do anything whatever, not the least thing in the world.* Never

* With equal consistency Rousseau might have said that a commanding general should give no orders to his soldiers. In order to interpret such a statement as this we must recollect again that the writer was an extremist, fond of paradox and rhetorical display. When discounted at a proper rate, this astonishing statement doubtless means that we should be sparing in our commands in order that the child may learn how to become a law unto himself in the art of right conduct.—(P.)

allow him even to imagine that you assume to have any authority over him. Let him know merely that he is weak and that you are strong; that by virtue of his condition and your own he is necessarily at your mercy. Let him know this, let him learn it, let him feel it; and at an early hour let him feel on his proud head the harsh yoke which Nature imposes on man, the heavy yoke of necessity under which every finite creature must bend. Let him see this necessity in things, but never in the caprice * of men. Let the rein which holds him be force, and not authority. Do not forbid him to do what he ought to abstain from doing; but prevent him from doing it without explanation and without argument. Whatever you allow him to do, allow him to do it at the first suggestion, without solicitation, especially without entreaty and without conditions. Give your assent with cheerfulness, and never refuse save with reluctance; but let all your refusals be irrevocable. Let no importunity shake your resolution; but, once pronounced, let it be a brazen wall against which he will not have exhausted his strength a half-dozen times before he gives up trying to overthrow it.

It is in this way that you will make the child patient, calm, resigned, peaceable, even when his wishes have not been gratified; for it is in the nature of man to endure patiently the necessity of things, but not the ill-will of others.

It is very strange that, so long as men have concerned themselves with the education of children, they have devised no other instrument for managing them than emu-

* We may be sure that the child will regard as a caprice every will which is contrary to his own, and of which he does not see the reason. Now, a child sees no reason in anything which opposes his own whims.

lation, jealousy, envy, vanity, covetousness, and debasing fear, all of them passions of the most dangerous sort, the most prompt to ferment and the most fit to corrupt the soul, even before the body is formed. With each item of precocious instruction which we would cause to enter their heads, we plant a vice in the depth of their hearts. Senseless instructors think they are doing marvels while making their pupils bad in order to teach them what goodness is; and then they gravely tell us, *such is man!* Yes, such is the man whom you have made.

You have tried all instruments save one, the only one which can succeed—well-regulated liberty. We should not undertake the education of a child unless we know how to conduct him where we will, simply by the laws of the possible and the impossible. The sphere of each being equally unknown, we extend it or contract it about him as we will. We enchain him or urge him forward or hold him back with nothing but the restraint of necessity, without a murmur on his part; and we make him supple and docile through the mere force of things, without giving occasion for any vice to germinate in him; for the passions are never aroused so long as they are of no effect.

Do not give your pupil any sort of verbal lesson, for he is to be taught only by experience. Inflict on him no species of punishment, for he does not know what it is to be in fault. Never make him ask your pardon, for he does not know how to offend you. Divested of all morality in his actions, he can do nothing which is morally wrong, and which merits either chastisement or reprimand.*

* This declaration assumes that actions have no intrinsic ethical quality, that experience alone determines this quality; and children

I see that the reader, already dismayed, is judging of this child by his own. But he is mistaken. The perpetual restraint under which you hold your pupils irritates their spirits; and the more they are held in constraint under your eyes, the more turbulent they become the moment they regain their liberty. They must needs compensate themselves, when they can, for the harsh constraint in which you hold them. Two pupils from the city will do more mischief in the country than the youth of a whole village. Shut up a little gentleman and a little peasant in the same room, and the first will have overturned and broken everything before the second has stirred from his place. Why is this, unless the one is in haste to abuse a moment of license; while the other, always sure of his liberty, is never in haste to make use of it? And yet, village children, often humored or thwarted, are still very far from the condition in which I would have them kept.

Shall I venture to state, at this point, the most important, the most useful rule, of all education? It is not to gain time, but to lose it. Ye ordinary readers, pardon my paradoxes, for they must be uttered by any one who reflects; and, whatever you may say to it, I would much rather be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices. The most dangerous period in human life is the interval between birth and the age of twelve. It is the time when errors and vices germinate, and when, as yet, there is no instrument to destroy them; and when the instrument comes, the roots have gone down so deep that the time has passed for pulling them out. If children leaped at a

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have no innate sense of right and wrong—assumptions which most moralists deny. I try to discover some vestige of truth in Rousseau's extremest statements, but my good-will and vigilance fail me here. —(P.)

single bound from the state of nurslings to the age of reason, the current education might be the best for them; but in accordance with natural progress they require an education of a totally different sort. They must do nothing with their soul until it has all its faculties; for it is impossible for the soul to perceive the torch which you present to it while it is blind, and to follow in the boundless field of ideas a route which the reason traces so faintly even for the sharpest eyes.*

The first education, then, ought to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth, but in shielding the heart from vice, and the mind from error. If you could do nothing and allow nothing to be done; if you could bring your pupil sound and robust to the age of twelve years without his being able to distinguish his right hand from his left—from your very first lessons the eyes of his understanding would be open to reason. With-

* This doctrine has been formulated in a so-called "Pestalozzian principle," as follows: "First form the mind and then furnish it." This is very much like saying, "First form the body and then feed it"; as though either mind or body could be formed save through a process of nurture.

For the photographer's use, glass surfaces which have been made sensitive to light by chemical means will preserve this quality indefinitely if kept in darkness; but when exposed to light they become instantly responsive to the actinic element that is in it. It seems to be Rousseau's thought that by sequestering a child from society his soul can be kept void of all positive impressions up to the age of twelve; and that, when the right moment comes, with all its acquired powers as yet untried, but with the whole apparatus of feeling, perception, memory, and judgment in a state of perfect readiness and expectancy, it will be instantly and perfectly responsive to its environment. It seems to have been forgotten that such complete isolation is impossible even if it were desirable, and that the soul has already been affected to its very depths through heredity.—(P.)

out prejudice and without habit, he would have nothing in him which could counteract the effect of your endeavors. Ere long he would become in your hands the wisest of men; and, while beginning with doing nothing, you will have produced a prodigy of education.

Take the very reverse of the current practice, and you will almost always do right.* As the purpose is not to make of a child a child, but a master of arts, parents and teachers have lost no time in rebuking, correcting, reprimanding, humoring, threatening, promising, instructing, and talking reason. You should do better than this. Be reasonable, and do not reason at all with your pupil, especially to make him approve of what is displeasing to him; for to be always lugging reason into disagreeable things is but to make it wearisome to the child, and at once to bring it into discredit with a mind which is not yet in a condition to listen to it. Exercise his body, his organs, his senses, and his powers, but keep his soul lying fallow as long as you possibly can. Be on your guard against all feelings which precede the judgment that can estimate their value.

Another consideration, which confirms the utility of this method, is that of the particular genius of the child, which must be known in order to determine what moral *régime* is adapted to him. Each mind has its own form according to which it must be governed; and for the success of our undertaking, it is necessary that it should be governed by this form and not by another. If you are a prudent man, you will watch nature for a long time, and will carefully observe your pupil before addressing the

* This will have a familiar sound to all readers who are acquainted with the utterances of modern educational reformers. Pestalozzi thought it was his mission to "stop the car of European progress, and set it going in a new direction."—(P.)

first word to him. At first leave the germ of his character at perfect liberty to unfold itself, and put no constraint whatever upon him, in order that you may the better see him in his completeness. Do you think that this period of liberty is lost to him? On the very contrary, it will be time the best employed; for it is in this way that you will learn not to lose a single moment of a time that is more precious. Otherwise, if you begin to act before knowing what should be done, you will act at random; and, liable to fall into error, you will be obliged to retrace your steps, and will be further from your purpose than if you had been in less haste to attain it. Therefore, be not like the miser who loses much through his desire to lose nothing. In infancy, sacrifice time which you will regain with interest at a later period. The wise physician does not recklessly give a prescription at the first sight of his patient; but he previously studies his temperament before prescribing for him; he begins late in treating him, but he cures; while the physician who is in overhaste, kills.

Recollect that before presuming to form a man you must have become a man yourself; you must needs find in yourself the example which you are to propose for others. While the child is still without knowledge, there is time to prepare whatever is to come before him, so that nothing shall engage his early attention save objects which it is proper for him to see. Render yourself worthy the respect of every one, and make yourself loved, so that all will try to please you. You will not be the child's master unless you control all that surrounds him, and this authority will never be sufficient unless it is founded on respect for your goodness. It is not necessary to empty your purse and scatter your money by handfuls; for I have never observed that money makes

any one loved. It is not necessary that you be avaricious and unfeeling, nor content merely to pity the wretchedness you might relieve; but it will be in vain for you to open your coffers, for, if you do not open your heart also, the hearts of others will forever remain closed to you. It is your time, your care, your affections, and yourself, that you must give.

Here is another reason why I would bring up Émile in the country, far from the rabble of valets, far from the foul manners of cities which are made seductive and contagious for children by the varnish which covers them; whereas, the vices of peasants, without anything to make them attractive and unrelieved of their grossness, are more likely to repel than to seduce, when one has no interest in imitating them.

In the village, a tutor will have much more control over the objects which he would present to the child. His reputation, his conversation, and his example will have an authority which they could not have in the city. Being useful to everybody, each one will be eager to oblige him, to be esteemed by him, and to appear as a pupil just what the master would have him actually be; and if there is no reformation from vice, there is at least no participation in scandal, and this is all that is required for our purpose.

Cease to blame others for your own faults. The evil which children see corrupts them less than the evil which you teach them. Always preaching, always moralizing, always playing the pedant, for one idea which you give them in the belief that it is good, you give them at the same time twenty others which are worth nothing. Full of what is passing in your own head, you do not see the effect which you are producing in theirs. In that long stream of words with which you are incessantly tiring

them, do you think there is not one which is thus wrongly apprehended? Do you think that they do not comment in their way on your diffuse explanations, and that they do not find in them material for constructing a system of their own, which they will find occasion to set up against you?

Listen to a little fellow whom you have just indoctrinated: let him chatter, ask questions, and run on at his ease; and you will be surprised at the strange turn your arguments have taken in his mind. He confounds all you have said, perverts your entire meaning, puts you out of patience, and sometimes dismays you by unforeseen objections. He reduces you to silence or causes you to silence him; and what can he think of that silence on the part of a man who has such love for talking? If he once carries off this advantage and becomes conscious of it, farewell to education. From this moment there is nothing more to be done; he seeks no longer to be instructed, but searches for opportunities to refute your arguments.

Zealous teachers, be simple, discreet, reserved, and never be in haste to act save to prevent others from acting. I shall never cease to repeat: discard, if it be possible, a good system of instruction, for fear of giving one that is bad. On this earth where Nature has made the first paradise of man, beware of acting the part of the tempter by trying to give to innocence the knowledge of good and evil. Not being able to prevent the child from being instructed by examples from without, limit all your vigilance to impressing these examples on his mind in a form best adapted to him.

Your headstrong child spoils everything he touches; but do not be angry with him; put out of his reach whatever he can injure. If he breaks the furniture which he

uses, be in no haste to give him more, but let him feel the disadvantage of its loss. If he break the windows of his room, let the wind blow on him night and day, without caring for the cold he may take; for it is much better for him to have a cold than to be a fool. Never complain of the inconveniences he causes you, but let him be the first to feel them. Finally, you cause the windows to be repaired, but always without saying anything. If he break them again, change your method, say to him plainly, but without anger: "These windows are mine; they have been put there by my orders, and I shall protect them from injury." You then shut him up in a room where it is dark, in a room without windows. At this new procedure he begins to cry and storm, but no one hears him. He soon becomes tired of this, and changes his tune, and whines and moans. The servant appears and he begs him to let him out. Without seeking a pretext for not interfering in the case, the servant replies, "*I also have windows to take care of*," and goes away. Finally, after the child has remained there for several hours, long enough to become weary of his confinement and to remember it, some one suggests to him to propose to you an agreement whereby you shall set him at liberty if he will break no more windows. He will ask nothing better, he will send for you to come and see him. You go, and he states to you his proposition, which you accept instantly, while saying to him: "This is a very happy thought on your part, and we shall both be the gainers by it. Why did not this fine idea occur to you sooner?" And then, without requiring of him either a declaration or a confirmation of his promise, you embrace him with joy and take him back at once to his room, regarding this agreement as sacred and inviolable as though confirmed by an oath. What idea do you think

he will form from this procedure of the sacredness of agreements and of their utility? I am mistaken if there is in the world a single child, not already spoiled, who is proof against this mode of procedure, and will dare after this to break a window on purpose.*

I have now said enough to make it appear that punishment must never be inflicted on children as a punishment, but that it ought always to come to them as the natural consequence of their bad acts. Thus you will not preach against lying, nor punish them just because they have lied; but when they have lied you will heap on their heads all the effects of falsehood, as not being believed when they have spoken the truth, and being accused of evil which they have not done and which they have denied.

For myself, who give my pupils only practical lessons, and would much rather have them good than wise, I do not exact of them the truth, for fear they may conceal it, and I require them to make no promises which they may be tempted not to keep. If some mischief is done in my absence, and I do not know the author of it, I shall forbear to accuse Émile of it, or to say to him, Did you do it?† For in this case what else would I do than to teach

* This is the "doctrine of consequences," which plays so large a part in Mr. Spencer's chapter on Moral Education. Rousseau is wiser and more considerate than Mr. Spencer, for he does not so completely hand over the child to the heartless discipline of "Nature"; by the adroit intervention of human foresight and human affection "Nature" is thwarted in her effort to vindicate the majesty of her broken laws, and the erring child is saved. Under prudent safeguards children may sometimes be allowed to experience the natural consequences of their wrong-doing; but to make this the standard and type of school and family discipline is inhuman and therefore unnatural.—(P.)

† Nothing is more unwise than such a question, especially when the child is guilty; for then, if he believes you know what he has

him to deny it? And if his willful disposition ever compels me to make some agreement with him, I shall move with such precaution that the proposal shall always come from him and never from me; that when he has made a compact he may always have a present and obvious interest in fulfilling his agreement; and that, if he ever breaks it, this breach of faith may bring upon him evils which he knows proceed from the very nature of things and not from the revenge of his tutor. But, far from having need to resort to such cruel expedients, I am almost certain that Émile will not learn until very late what it is to lie, and that in learning it he will be very much astonished, not being able to conceive what advantage there is in falsehood. It is very clear that, the more I make his welfare independent either of the wills or of the judgments of others, the more I curtail in him all interest in lying.

It is to be observed that we cause children to give away only things of whose value they are ignorant, such as pieces of metal which they carry in their pocket, and which serve them no purpose but this. The child would sooner give away a hundred guineas than a cake. But interest this prodigal dispenser in giving away the things which are dear to him—his playthings, his sweetmeats, his delicacies—and we shall soon know whether you have made him truly liberal. Another expedient has been devised for this purpose, and this is to restore at once to the child what he has given, so that he becomes accustomed to give whatever he is well assured will be returned to him. These two kinds of generosity are almost the only ones

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done, he will see that you are trying to entrap him, and this belief can not fail to prejudice him against you. If he does not believe this, he will say to himself, Why should I discover my fault? And so the direct effect of your imprudent question is his first temptation to falsify.

I have observed in children; they either give what has no value to them, or they give what they are sure will be returned to them. Proceed in such a way, says Locke, that they may be convinced by experience that he who is most liberal is always the best provided for. This is to make a child liberal in appearance, but avaricious in fact. He adds that children will thus contract the habit of liberality. Yes, of a usurious liberality which gives an egg to gain an ox, but, when it comes to giving in earnest, adieu to habit; when we cease to restore what they have given, they will soon cease to give. We must consider the habit of the soul rather than that of the hands. All the other virtues which we teach children resemble this. And it is in preaching to them these solid virtues that we wear away their young years in dreariness! Is not this a beautiful education!

Rattle-headed children become commonplace men. I know of no observation more general and more certain than this. Nothing is more difficult than to distinguish, in infancy, real stupidity from that apparent and deceptive stupidity which is the indication of strong characters. It seems strange, at first sight, that the two extremes should have the same signs, and yet this must needs be so; for, at an age when the man has as yet no real ideas, all the difference that exists between him who has genius and him who has it not, is that the latter gives admittance only to false ideas, while the former, finding no others, gives admittance to none. In so far, then, as one is capable of nothing, and nothing is befitting the other, both appear to be stupid. The only sign that can distinguish them depends on chance, which may offer to the last some idea within his comprehension, whereas the first is always and everywhere the same. During his infancy the younger Cato seemed an imbecile in the

family. He was taciturn and obstinate, and this was all the judgment that was formed of him. It was only in the antechamber of Sylla that his uncle learned to know him. If he had not gone into that antechamber, perhaps he would have passed for a dolt till the age of reason. If Cæsar had not lived, perhaps men would always have treated as a visionary that very Cato who penetrated his baleful genius, and foresaw all his projects from afar. Oh, how liable to be deceived are they who are so precipitate in their judgments of children! They are often the more childish. I myself have seen a man* somewhat advanced in age, who honored me with his friendship, who was regarded by his family and his friends as lacking in intelligence; but this was a superior mind maturing in silence. All at once he has shown himself a philosopher; and I doubt not that posterity will assign him a distinguished and honorable place among the best reasoners and the most profound metaphysicians of his age.

Respect childhood, and do not hastily judge of it either for good or for evil. Allow a long time for the exceptions to be manifested, proved, and confirmed, before adopting special methods for them. Allow Nature to act in her place, for fear of thwarting her operations. You know, you say, the value of time and do not wish to waste it. You do not see that to make a bad use of time is much more wasteful than to do nothing with it; and that a poorly taught child is further from wisdom than one who has not been taught at all. You are alarmed at seeing him consume his early years in doing nothing! Really! Is it nothing to be happy? Is it nothing to jump, play, and run, all the day long? In no other part of his life will he be so busy. Plato, in his *Republic*,

* The Abbé de Condillac.

which is deemed so austere, brings up children only in festivals, games, songs, and pastimes. It might be said that he has done all when he has really taught them how to enjoy themselves; and Seneca, speaking of the ancient Roman youth, says they were always on their feet, and were never taught anything which they could learn while seated.* Were they of less value for this when they reached the age of manhood? Be not at all frightened, therefore, at this so-called idleness. What would you think of a man who, in order to turn his whole life to profitable account, would never take time to sleep? You will say that he is a man out of his senses; that he does not make use of his time but deprives himself of it; and that to fly from sleep is to run toward death. Reflect, therefore, that this is the same thing, and that childhood is the slumber of reason.

The apparent facility with which children learn is the cause of their ruin. We do not see that this very facility is the proof that they are learning nothing. Their smooth and polished brain reflects like a mirror the objects that are presented to it; but nothing remains, nothing penetrates it. The child retains words, but ideas are reflected. Those who hear these words understand them, but the child who utters them does not.

Although memory and reasoning are two essentially

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* *Nihil liberos suos docebant, quod discendum esset jacentibus.* Epist. 88. This same passage is found in Montaigne, liv. ii, chap. xxi.

"It is wonderful," he says again (liv. i, chap. xxv), "what attention Plato gives in his Laws to the amusements and pastimes of the youth of his city; and what care he bestows on their races, sports, songs, leaps, and dances. He indulges in a thousand maxims for his gymnasia, while to the learned sciences he devotes but very little time."

different faculties, yet the first is not truly developed save in conjunction with the second. Before the age of reason a child does not receive ideas, but images; and there is this difference between them: images are but the faithful pictures of sensible objects, while ideas are notions of objects determined by their relations. An image may exist alone in the mind which forms the representation of it; but every idea supposes others. When we imagine, we do no more than see; but when we conceive, we compare. Our sensations are purely passive, whereas all our perceptions or ideas spring from an active principle which judges.

I say, then, that children, not being capable of judgment, have no real memory.* They retain sounds, forms,

* The degradation of memory in the scale of the intellectual powers forms a curious and instructive chapter in the history of education. From a superstitious use of the memory in the old education we have come to a period when a studious mistrust of the memory has become a common superstition. Rousseau's narrow construction of memory has already been alluded to. To "retain sounds, forms, and sensation" *is* real memory, and is peculiarly the memory of children; and to retain "ideas and their combinations" is also memory, but is peculiarly the memory of the trained adult.

In the face of the current and authorized superstition, it is venturesome to state the heterodox view of this subject, but I make the venture. With respect to reason and judgment, and what may be called the higher life of the mind, the memory is a subsidiary and subordinate faculty, but a faculty without which these higher activities can not be maintained. The very possibility of education is dependent on memory. We must not only remember what we have understood, but we must remember in order that we may understand; the memory must hold not only the finished products of thought, but also the crude materials for thinking; for the elaborative process is impossible save as aliment is held within the range of the mind's disintegrating and assimilative powers. The memory necessarily precedes the intelligence; we must apprehend and hold

sensations, but rarely ideas, and still more rarely their combinations. The objection that they learn some elements of geometry is thought to be a proof that I am wrong; but, directly to the contrary, it is a proof in my favor. It is shown that, far from knowing how to reason for themselves, they can not even retain the reasonings of others; for if you follow these little geometricians in their recitations you will at once see that they have retained only the exact impression of the figure and the terms of the demonstration. If you interpose the least unforeseen objection to the argument, or if you reverse the figure they are following, they are at once disconcerted. All their knowledge is in sensation, and nothing has penetrated the understanding. Their memory itself is hardly more perfect than their other faculties, since they must almost always learn over again, when grown, the things which they learned by rote in childhood.

I am very far from thinking, however, that children

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in order that we may comprehend and keep. This mental grasp may be articulate and definite, as in sights and sounds and verbal statements; or it may be inarticulate and vague, as in reverie and "trains of thought." It is in these two senses that we remember the text and remember the sermon. Facility in elaboration is dependent on a grasp that is definite and firm, whether this grasp be verbal or sensitive. When and to what extent this grasp should be of the articulate type is the disputed question.

The memory may be charged without stimulating the elaborative process, and this is doubtless a traditional pedagogic vice, but this is a vice of administration; the teaching process was only half accomplished. The mind that merely memorizes becomes satisfied with storing, and its higher powers are left unemployed, just as a man may become absorbed in merely gaining without exercising the higher virtues of benevolence and liberality.

May a child commit to memory what at the time he does not understand? Certainly. May he not see and remember natural phenomena that at the time he does not understand?—(P.)

are incapable of any kind of reasoning.* On the contrary, I see that they reason very well on whatever they know, and on whatever is related to their present and obvious interests. But it is with respect to their knowledge that we are deceived. We give them credit for knowledge which they do not have, and make them reason on matters which they can not comprehend. We are deceived, moreover, in trying to make them attentive to considerations which in no wise affect them, as that of their prospective interest, of their happiness when grown to be men, or of the esteem in which they will be held when they have become great—talk which, addressed to creatures deprived of all foresight, has absolutely no significance for them. Now, all the premature studies of these unfortunates relate to objects entirely foreign to their minds; and we may judge of the attention which they can give to them.

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* It has occurred to me a hundred times while writing that it is impossible in a long work always to give the same sense to the same words. There is no language rich enough to furnish terms, turns, and phrases enough to equal the possible modifications of our ideas. The method of defining all the terms, and of constantly substituting the definition in place of the thing defined, is very well, but it is impracticable; for how shall we avoid running in a circle? The definitions might be good if we did not employ words in making them. Notwithstanding this, I am persuaded that one can be clear, even in the poverty of our language, not by always giving the same acceptation to the same words, but by proceeding in such a way that whenever a given word is employed the acceptation given it shall be sufficiently determined by the ideas which are connected with it, and that each sentence where this word is found shall be, so to speak, its definition. At one time I say that children are incapable of reasoning, and at another I make them reason with considerable acuteness. In doing this I do not think I contradict myself in my ideas, but I can not deny that I often contradict myself in my expressions.

The pedagogues who make such a great display of the subjects which they teach their disciples are paid to speak of this matter in different terms; but we see by their own course of action that they think exactly as I do. For what do they really teach their pupils? Words, words, nothing but words. Among the different sciences which they boast of teaching, they are very careful not to choose those which are really useful to them, because they are the sciences of things, and they would never succeed in teaching them; but they prefer the sciences which we seem to know when we have learned their terminology—such as heraldry, geography, chronology, the languages, etc.—all of them studies so remote from man, and especially from the child, that it would be a marvel if a single item of all this could be useful* to him once in the course of his life.

It will seem surprising to some that I include the study of languages among the inutilities of education; but it will be recollected that I am speaking here only of primary studies; and that, whatever may be thought of it, I do not believe that, up to the age of twelve or fifteen years, any child, prodigies excepted, has ever really learned two languages.

I grant that if the study of languages were but the study of words—that is, of the forms or the sounds which express them—it might be suitable for children; but languages, by changing the symbols, also modify the ideas

* The reader will note the narrow sense in which the term useful is employed. In this sense geography is of very little use in the way of what Mr. Spencer calls "guidance"; and the same may be said of astronomy, history, and literature; but on the assumption that we are to *be* something as a necessary condition of *doing* something, these subjects serve higher uses than any which seem to have been in Rousseau's mind.—(P.)

which they represent. Languages have their several and peculiar effects in the formation of the intellectual faculties—the thoughts are tinged by their respective idioms. The only thing common to languages is the reason. The spirit of each language has its peculiar form, and this difference is doubtless partly the cause and partly the effect of national characteristics. This conjecture seems to be confirmed by the fact that, among all the nations of the earth, language follows the vicissitudes of manners, and is preserved pure or is corrupted just as they are.

Use has given one of these different forms of thought to the child, and it is the only one which he preserves to the age of reason. In order to have two of these forms, he must needs know how to compare ideas; and how can he compare them when he is hardly in a condition to conceive them? Each thing may have for him a thousand different symbols; but each idea can have but one form. Hence, he can learn to speak but one language. Nevertheless, we are told that he learns to speak several. This I deny. I have seen such little prodigies that thought they were speaking five or six languages. I have heard them speak German in terms of Latin, French, and Italian, respectively. In fact, they used five or six vocabularies, but they spoke nothing but German. In a word, give children as many synonyms as you please, and you will change the words they utter, but not the language; they will never know but one.

It is to conceal their inaptitude in this respect that they are drilled by preference on dead languages, since there are no longer judges of those who may be called to testify. The familiar use of these languages having for a long time been lost, we are content to imitate the remains of them which we find written in books; and this is what we call speaking them. If such is the Greek and Latin

of the teachers, we may imagine what the Greek and Latin of children is! Scarcely have they learned by heart the rudiments of these languages, of which they understand absolutely nothing, when they are taught, first to turn a French discourse into Latin words; and then, when they are more advanced, to tack together in prose, sentences from Cicero, and in verse, scraps from Virgil. Then they think that they are speaking Latin, and who is there to contradict them?

In any study whatever, representative signs are of no account without the idea of the things represented. The child, however, is always restricted to these signs without ever being made to comprehend any of the things which they represent. We imagine that we are teaching him a description of the earth, but we are merely teaching him to know maps. We teach him the names of cities, countries, and rivers, but he conceives them as existing nowhere save on the paper where they are pointed out to him. I recollect having somewhere seen a geography which began in this wise: *What is the world? It is a globe of pasteboard.* This is precisely the geography of children. I dare assert that, after studying cosmography and the sphere for two years, there is not a single child of ten who, by the rules which have been given him, can go from Paris to Saint Denis. I dare assert that there is not one who, from the plan of his father's garden, can follow its winding paths without becoming lost. These are the doctors that know exactly where Pekin, Ispahan, and Mexico are, and all the countries of the earth!

I hear it said that children should be occupied with studies where only eyes are needed. This might be, if there were such a study; but I know of none such.

By a still more ridiculous mistake, they are made to study history; and history is supposed to be within their

reach because it is merely a collection of facts. But what do we understand by this word facts? Is it presumed that the relations which determine historical facts are easy to grasp, and that ideas are formed from them without difficulty in the minds of children? Is it supposed that real knowledge of events is separable from that of their causes and effects; and that the historical is so little dependent on the moral that one can be known without the other? If you see in human actions only external and purely physical movements, what do you learn from history? Absolutely nothing; and this study, divested of all interest, gives you no more pleasure than instruction. If you would estimate these actions by their moral relations, try to make these relations understood by your pupils, and you will then see whether history is adapted to their age.*

Readers, always bear in mind that he who speaks to you is neither a scholar nor a philosopher, but a plain man, a friend of truth, attached to no system or party; a recluse, who, living little among men, has fewer occasions for being imbued with their prejudices, and more time for reflecting on what strikes him when he associates with them. My arguments are founded less on principles than on facts; and I imagine I can not better put you in a condition to judge of them than by frequently reporting to you some instance of the observations which have suggested them to me.

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* The same objection would lie against teaching facts of any sort. The relation of fact to fact may be more important than the facts themselves, but how can this relation be discovered unless the facts are previously learned? It is enough that the child learn historical facts, events, and narrations. For him this is history. Neither geography, literature, nor history can be taught on the experimental plan, and very naturally Rousseau has a small opinion of their value.—(P.)

I once spent a few days in the country at the house of a lady who took great interest in the education of her children. One morning as I was present at the lesson of the eldest, his tutor, who had very thoroughly instructed him in ancient history, calling up the story of Alexander, dwelt on the well-known incident of his physician Philip, which has often been represented on canvas, and is surely well worth the trouble.* The tutor, a man of worth, made several reflections on the intrepidity of Alexander which did not please me, but which I refrained from combating in order not to discredit him in the estimation of his pupil. At table, according to the French custom, there was no lack of effort to make the little fellow chatter with great freedom.

After dinner, suspecting from several indications that my young savant had comprehended nothing whatever of the history that had been so finely recited to him, I took him by the hand and we made the tour of the park together. Having questioned him with perfect freedom, I found that he admired the boasted courage of Alexander more than any other one of the company; but can you imagine in what particular he saw his courage? It was merely in the fact of having swallowed at a single draught a disagreeable potion without hesitation, without the least sign of disgust. The poor child, who had been made to take medicine not a fortnight before, and who had swallowed it only after infinite effort, still had the taste of it in his mouth. In his mind, death and poisoning passed

* See Quintus Curtius, lib. iii, chap. vi. The same incident is thus related by Montaigne: "Alexander having been informed by a letter from Parmenion that Philip, his most esteemed physician, had been bribed by Darius to poison him, at the same moment that he gave to Philip Parmenion's letter to read, drank the beverage which he had presented to him" (liv. i, chap. xxiii.)

for disagreeable sensations, and he could conceive no other poison than senna. However, it must be acknowledged that the firmness of the hero had made a strong impression on his young heart, and that he had resolved to be an Alexander the very first time he should find it necessary to swallow medicine. Without entering into explanations which were evidently beyond his capacity, I confirmed him in these laudable intentions, and I returned laughing in my sleeve at the exalted wisdom of parents and teachers who think that they can teach history to children.

It is easy to put into their mouths the words *kings*, *empires*, *wars*, *conquests*, *revolutions*, *and laws ;* but when it comes to attaching definite ideas to these words, there will be a long distance between all these explanations and the conversation with Robert the gardener.

Unless words alone can convey a science, there is no study adapted to children. If they have no real ideas, there is no real memory ; for I do not call such, that which retains only sensations. Of what good is it to inscribe in their heads a catalogue of signs which represent nothing to them ? In learning things will they not also learn signs ? Why give them the useless trouble of learning them twice ? And yet, with what dangerous prejudices do we not begin to inspire them when we make them accept for science words which have no meaning for them ! It is with the first word which a child accepts without caring for its meaning, and with the first thing that he learns on the authority of others without seeing its utility for himself, that he begins to sacrifice his judgment ; and he will have a long time to shine in the eyes of fools before he can repair such a loss.*

* Most scholars are such after the manner of children. Their vast erudition results less from a multitude of ideas than from a

No; if Nature gives to a child's brain that plasticity which renders it capable of receiving all sorts of impressions, it is not for the purpose of engraving upon it the names of kings, dates, terms in heraldry, astronomy, and geography, and all those words without any meaning for his age, and without any utility for any age whatever, with which his sad and barren infancy is harassed; but it is in order that all the ideas which he can conceive and which are useful to him, all those which relate to his happiness, and are one day to enlighten him as to his duties, may be traced there at an early hour in ineffaceable characters, and may serve him for self-conduct during his whole life in a manner adapted to his being and to his faculties.

Without studying books, the kind of memory which a child may have does not on this account remain unemployed. All that he sees and hears attracts his notice, and he remembers it. He keeps within himself a register of the actions and conversations of men; and all that surrounds him is the book from which, without thinking of it, he is continually enriching his memory while waiting till his judgment can derive profit from it. It is in the choice of these objects, and in the care of presenting

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multitude of images. Dates, proper names, places, all objects isolated or divested of ideas, are retained, simply through the memory of signs, and it is rare that any one of these things is recalled without seeing, at the same time, the right or the left of the page where it has been read, or the figure under which it was seen for the first time. Such was about the science in fashion in the last century. That of our century is something else. We no longer study, we no longer observe; we dream, and for philosophy we are given the dreams of some bad nights. I shall be told that I am also dreaming. I grant this, but what others have not refrained from doing, I give my dreams for dreams, leaving the reader to inquire whether there is something in them useful to people who are awake.

to him without cessation those which he may know, and of concealing from him those of which he ought to be ignorant, that consists the real art of cultivating in him this primary faculty; and it is in this way that the effort must be made to form within him a store-house of knowledge which may contribute to his education during his youth, and to his conduct during the whole of life. This method, it is true, does not produce little prodigies, and does not reflect glory on governesses and tutors; but it forms judicious and robust men, sound in body and in understanding, who, without making themselves admired while young, make themselves honored when grown.

Émile shall never learn anything by heart, not even fables, and not even those of La Fontaine, artless and charming as they are; for the words of fables are no more fables than the words of history are history. How can one be so blind as to call fables the morals of children, without reflecting that the apologue, while amusing them, also deludes them; that, while seduced by the fiction, they allow the truth to escape them; and that the effort made to render the instruction agreeable, prevents them from profiting by it? Fables may instruct men, but children must be told the bare truth; for the moment we cover truth with a veil, they no longer give themselves the trouble to lift it.

All children are made to learn the fables of La Fontaine, but there is not one of them who understands them. Even if they were to understand them it would be still worse; for the moral in them is so confused, and so out of proportion to their age, that it would incline them to vice rather than to virtue. These are mere paradoxes, you say. Possibly; but let us see whether they are not true.

I say that a child does not understand the fables that he is made to learn, because, whatever effort is made to

render them simple, the instruction which we wish to draw from them necessarily brings into them ideas which he can not comprehend, and the poetical form, while making them easier to retain, itself makes them more difficult for him to understand; so that entertainment is purchased at the expense of clearness.

Observe children as they are learning these fables, and you will see that when they come to make an application of them they almost always adopt one contrary to the intention of the author; and that, instead of becoming conscious of the fault of which they are to be cured, or from which they are to be preserved, they are inclined to love the vice which turns the faults of others to profitable account. In the fable of the *Crow and the Fox*, children despise the crow, but they all form a liking for the fox; and in the fable of the *Ant and the Cricket* you fancy you are giving them the cricket * for an example, but you are greatly mistaken: it is the ant that they will choose. No one likes to be humiliated. They will always take the part of the most dashing character; this is the choice of self-love, and it is perfectly natural. Now, what a horrible lesson this is for children! The most odious of all monsters would be an avaricious and unfeeling child, deliberating between request and refusal. The ant does still more: she teaches the child to add insult to refusal.

In thus relieving children of all their school-tasks, I take away the instruments of their greatest misery, namely, books. Reading is the scourge of infancy, and almost the sole occupation which we know how to give them. At the age of twelve, Émile will hardly know what a book is. But I shall be told that it is very necessary that he know how to read. This I grant. It is necessary that he

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Cigale, of course, means the cicada or tree-locust.—P.

know how to read when reading is useful to him. Until then, it serves only to annoy him.

If we ought to exact nothing from children through obedience, it follows that they can learn nothing of which they do not feel the actual and present advantage, either on the score of pleasure or of utility; otherwise, what motive would induce them to learn it? The art of speaking to those who are absent and of hearing them speak in turn, the art of communicating to them at a distance and without the intervention of another, our feelings, our wishes, and our desires, is an art whose utility may be made sensible to people of every age. Through what wonder-working has an art so useful and so agreeable become a torment to infancy? It is because children have been constrained to apply themselves to it against their wills, and because it has been turned to uses which they do not at all comprehend. A child is not very anxious to perfect the instrument with which he is being tormented; but make this instrument contribute to his pleasures, and he will at once apply himself to it in spite of you.

A great ado has been made about finding the best methods of teaching children to read. Cabinets and charts have been invented, and the child's apartment has been turned into a printing-office. Locke would have him learn to read by means of dice. Was not that a happy invention? What useless effort! A surer means than all these, and the one which is always forgotten, is the desire to learn. Give the child this desire, and you may lay aside your cabinets and dice. Every method will be a good one.

Present interest is the grand motive power, the only one which leads with certainty to great results. Émile sometimes receives from his parents, relatives, or friends, notes

of invitation for a dinner, a walk, a boat-ride, or to see some public entertainment. These notes are short, clear, concise, and well written. Some one must be found to read them to him, and this person is either not always to be found at the right moment, or he is as little disposed to accommodate the child as the child was to please him the evening before. In this way the moment passes, and the occasion is lost. Finally, the note is read to him, but it is too late. Ah! if one could read for himself! Other notes are received. How short they are! How interesting the matter is! The child would make an attempt to decipher them, and at one time finds some help and at another meets with refusal. Finally, after a great effort, the half of one note is deciphered, and it speaks of going out to eat cream to-morrow; but where or with whom, no one knows. What an effort is now made to read the rest of the note! I do not believe that Émile has need of a cabinet. Shall I speak at present of writing? No; I am ashamed to spend my time with such nonsense in a treatise on education.

I will add this one remark which constitutes an important maxim—viz., we usually obtain very surely and very quickly what we are in no haste to obtain. I am almost certain that Émile will know how to read and write perfectly before the age of ten, precisely because I care but very little whether he learns these things before the age of fifteen. I would much rather he would never know how to read than to buy this knowledge at the price of all that can make it useful. Of what use would reading be to him after he had been disgusted with it forever?

If, in accordance with the plan I have begun to trace, you follow rules directly contrary to those which are in use; if, instead of transporting the mind of your pupil

to a distance; if, instead of incessantly leading him astray in other places, in other climates, in other centuries, to the extremities of the earth, and even into the heavens, you make it your study to make him always self-contained and attentive to whatever immediately affects him —then you will always find him capable of perception, of memory, and even of reasoning: this is the order of Nature. In proportion as a sensitive being becomes active, he acquires a discernment proportional to his powers; and it is only with the power which is in excess of what is needed for self-conservation that there comes to be developed in him the speculative faculty suitable for employing that excess of power for other uses. If, then, you would cultivate the intelligence of your pupil, cultivate the power which it is to govern. Give his body continual exercise; make him robust and sound in order to make him wise and reasonable; let him work, and move about, and run, and shout, and be continually in motion; let him be a man in vigor, and soon he will be such by force of reason.

You will stultify him by this method, it is true, if you are always directing him, always saying to him, Go, come, stop, do this, do not do that. If your head is always directing his arms, his own head will become useless to him. But bear in mind our agreement; if you are but a pedant, it is not worth your while to read this book.

It is a very deplorable error to imagine that the exercise of the body is injurious to the operations of the mind; as if these two activities were not to proceed in concert, and the second were not always to direct the first!

Subject in everything to an authority that is always teaching, your pupil does nothing except at the word of command. He does not dare eat when he is hungry, laugh when he is pleased, weep when he is sad, present

one hand for the other, or move his foot, save as he has been ordered to do it; and very soon he will not dare breathe save according to your rules. To what purpose do you desire to have him think if you do all his thinking for him? Assured of your foresight, what need has he of any? Seeing that you charge yourself with his conservation and well-being, he feels himself relieved from this anxiety. His judgment reposes on yours; whatever you do not forbid him to do he does without reflection, well knowing that he does it without risk. What need has he of learning to foretell rain? He knows that you observe the clouds for him. Why should he determine the length of his walk? He has no fear that you will let him pass the dinner-hour. So far as you do not forbid him to eat, he eats; he no longer listens to the advice of his stomach, but to your commands. It is in vain for you to soften his body in inaction, for by this means you will not render his understanding the more flexible. Directly to the contrary, you will succeed in discrediting his reason by making him use the little he has of it on the things which seem to him most useless. Never seeing the worth of it, he finally comes to the conclusion that it is good for nothing. The worst that can happen to him from his bad reasoning is to be worsted in argument, and this happens to him so often that he scarcely thinks of it; the danger that is so common no longer frightens him.

As for my pupil, or rather the pupil of Nature, early trained to rely on himself as much as possible, he is not in the habit of constantly resorting to others, and still less of displaying to them his great learning. On the other hand, he judges, foresees, and reasons on everything which is directly related to him. He does not prate, but he acts; he does not know a word about

what is going on in the world, but he knows very well how to do whatever is proper for him to do. As he is incessantly active, he is forced to observe many things and to know many effects. He early acquires a large experience. He receives his lessons from Nature, and not from men. He learns the more rapidly, from the fact that he nowhere sees any intention to instruct him. Thus his body and his mind are called into exercise at the same time. Always acting in accordance with his own thought, and not according to that of another, he is continually uniting two processes; the stronger and the more robust he renders himself, the more sensible and judicious he becomes. This is the means of finally possessing two things which are thought incompatible, but which are found together in almost all great men, strength of body and strength of mind, the reason of a sage and the vigor of an athlete.

Youthful instructor, I am preaching to you a difficult art, that of governing without precept, and of doing all while doing nothing. This art, I allow, is not adapted to your age; it is not calculated to give your talents a brilliant display at first, nor to make you popular with parents; but it is the only one calculated to succeed. You will never succeed in making scholars if you do not at first make rogues. This was the education of the Spartans; instead of being made to pore over books, they were first taught to steal their dinner. Were the Spartans, when grown, more boorish on this account? Who does not know the force and wit of their repartees? Always in readiness to conquer, they crushed their enemies in every sort of conflict, and the babbling Athenians stood as much in awe of their sayings as of their blows.

In the most carefully conducted education the teacher commands and fancies that he governs; but, in fact, it is

the child who governs. He makes use of what you exact of him in order to obtain from you what is pleasing to himself; and he can always make you pay for one hour of assiduity by eight days of compliance. At each instant you must make compacts with him. These treaties which you propose in your way, and which he executes in his own, always turn to the gratification of his humors, especially when you are so unskillful as to put within his power what he is very sure of obtaining whether he fulfill or not his part of the agreement. Ordinarily, the child reads the mind of his teacher much better than the teacher reads the heart of the child. And this is to be expected; for all the sagacity which the child, left to himself, would have employed in providing for the preservation of his person, he employs in saving his natural liberty from the chains of his tyrant; whereas the latter, not having such a pressing interest in penetrating the heart of his pupil, sometimes finds it more to his advantage to leave him in the enjoyment of his idleness or his vanity.

Take an opposite course with your pupil. Let him always fancy that he is the master, but let it always be yourself that really governs. There is no subjection so perfect as that which preserves the appearance of liberty; in this way, the will itself is held captive. Is not the poor child who knows nothing and can do nothing wholly at your mercy? So far as he is concerned, have you not the disposition of everything which surrounds him? Have you not the authority to affect him as you please? His employments, his sports, his pleasures, his sorrows—is not everything in your hands without his knowing it? Doubtless he ought to do only what he chooses; but he ought to choose only what you will to have him do. He ought not to take a step which you have not foreseen; he

ought not to open his mouth unless you know what he is going to say.

Under these conditions the child may freely indulge in the physical exercises which his age demands without brutalizing his mind; instead of sharpening his craftiness to evade a distasteful system of domination, you will see him occupied solely in drawing from all that surrounds him whatever is best adapted to promote his actual well-being; and you will be astonished at the aptness of his inventions for appropriating all the objects which are within his reach, and for really enjoying things without borrowing the opinions of others.

In leaving him thus the master of his purposes, you will not foment his caprices. By never doing anything which is not pleasing to himself, he will very soon do only that which he ought to do; and though his body is in a state of constant activity, so long as his present and obvious interest is at stake, you will see all the reason of which he is capable developing itself much better, and in a manner very much better adapted to him, than in studies of pure speculation.

Thus, seeing that you are not bent on thwarting him, never distrusting you, and having nothing to conceal from you, he will never deceive you, and will never lie to you; he will show himself just as he is, without fear; and you may study him wholly at your ease, and arrange around about him lessons which you wish to give him, without his ever suspecting that he is being taught.

You reproach the child with being capricious; but you are wrong. The caprice of children is never the work of Nature, but results from bad training. It is because they have obeyed or have commanded; and I have said a hundred times that they must do neither. Your pupil, then, will have only those caprices which you have given him;

and it is just that you should suffer the consequences of your faults.

These continual exercises, thus left wholly to the direction of Nature, not only do not brutalize the mind while fortifying the body, but, on the contrary, they form within us the only species of reason of which childhood is susceptible, and the most necessary at any and all periods of life. They teach us thoroughly to understand the use of our powers, the relations between our own bodies and surrounding bodies, and the use of the natural instruments which are within our reach and which are adapted to our organs. Is there any stupidity like that of a child reared wholly in the house and under the eyes of his mother, who, ignorant of what weight and resistance are, would pull up a large tree or lift a rock? The first time I went out of Geneva I attempted to follow a galloping horse, and threw stones at the mountain of Salève which was two leagues away. The laughing-stock of all the children in the village, I was a veritable idiot in their sight. At eighteen, we learn from physics what a lever is; but there is no little peasant of twelve who does not know how to use a lever better than the first mechanician of the Academy. Lessons which scholars learn from each other in a college-yard are a hundred times more useful to them than all that will ever be told them in the class-room.

The first natural movements of man being to measure himself with all that surrounds him, and to test in each object which he perceives all the sensible qualities which are capable of affecting him, his first study is a sort of experimental physics relative to his own preservation, from which he is turned aside by speculative studies before he has recognized his place here below. While his delicate and flexible organs can adjust themselves to the bodies on which they are to act; while his senses, still unimpaired,

are exempt from illusions, it is time to put both in action on the functions which are appropriated to them, and the time to ascertain the sensible relations which things have with us. As all that enters the human understanding comes there through the senses, the first reason of man is a sensuous reason; and it is this which serves as a basis for the intellectual reason. Our first teachers of philosophy are our feet, our hands, and our eyes. To substitute books for all these is not to teach us to reason, but to teach us to use the reason of others; it is to teach us to believe much and never to know anything.

In order to practice an art, it is necessary to begin by procuring the instruments used in it; and in order to be able to employ these instruments usefully, they must be made strong enough to sustain the use made of them. In order to learn to think, we must then exercise our limbs, our senses, and our organs, which are the instruments of our intelligence; and in order to derive all the advantage possible from these instruments, it is necessary that the body which furnishes them should be robust and sound. Thus, so far is it from being true that the reason of man is formed independently of the body, it is the happy constitution of the body which renders the operations of the mind facile and sure.

The limbs of a growing child should have plenty of room in their clothing. Nothing should impede their movements or their growth; nothing should fit so closely as to pinion the body. French dress, uncomfortable and unhealthy for men, is especially injurious for children. The sluggish humors, arrested in their circulation, stagnate in a repose intensified by an inactive and sedentary life, become corrupted, and produce the scurvy, a disease which is every day becoming more common among us, but which was almost unknown among the ancients, who

were preserved from it by their manner of dress and life. The hussar style of dress, far from remedying this inconvenience, really increases it, for, in order to relieve children of some ligatures, it keeps their whole body in a kind of press. A better plan is to let them wear short skirts for as long a time as possible, then to give them a very loose dress, and to take no pride in showing off their form, a thing which serves only to deform it. Almost all their defects of body and mind come from the same cause —we wish to make men of them before their time.

There should be little or no head-dress at any time of the year. The ancient Egyptians always went bareheaded, while the Persians covered the head with high tiaras, and they still wear high turbans, whose use, according to Chardin, is made necessary by the climate of the country. In another place * I have mentioned the distinction made by Herodotus on a field of battle between the skulls of Persians and those of Egyptians. As it is important that the bones of the head become harder, more compact, less fragile, and less porous, in order the better to protect the brain, not only against wounds, but also against colds, inflammations, and all the variations of temperature, accustom your children to go bareheaded summer and winter, day and night. But, if for cleanliness and for keeping their hair in order, you would give them a head-dress for the night, let it be a light cap of open-work, like the net in which the Basques bind up their hair. I am well aware that most mothers, more affected by the observation of Chardin than by my reasons, will think the air of Persia is found everywhere; but, as for me, I have not chosen my European pupil in order to make an Asiatic of him.

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* Lettre à M. d'Alembert sur les Spectacles.

In general, children are too warmly clothed, especially in infancy. They should be inured to cold rather than to heat. Great cold never disturbs them when they are exposed to it from early life; but the tissue of their skin, still too tender and too loose, leaving too free a passage for perspiration, exposes them through an extreme heat to an inevitable exhaustion. Thus, it is observed that more children die in the month of August than in any other month. Moreover, it appears to be an established fact, from a comparison between the people of the North and those of the South, that an excess of cold is more favorable to robustness than an excess of heat. But in proportion as the child grows and his fibers strengthen accustom him, little by little, to brave the rays of the sun. Proceeding by degrees, you will inure him without danger to the ardors of the torrid zone.

In the midst of the manly and sensible precepts which Locke gives us, he falls into contradictions which we should not expect from so exact a reasoner. This very man, who would have children in summer bathe in cold water, would not have them drink cool water when they are warm, nor lie down on the ground in damp places.* But since he would have the shoes let in water at all seasons, will they leak the less when the child is warm? And may we not require him to make the same inductions from the body with respect to the feet that he makes from the feet with respect to the hands and from the body with respect to the face? If, I would say to

* As if little peasants selected very dry ground on which to sit or to lie, and as if one had ever heard say that the dampness of the earth had ever made one of them ill! To hear the doctors on this subject, one would fancy that all savages are impotent with rheumatism.

him in reply, you would have a man be all face, why do you blame me for wishing him to be all feet?*

Children require a long period of sleep, because their physical activity is extreme. One serves as a corrective for the other, and we thus see that they have need of both. Night is the season for repose, as is indicated by Nature. It is a common observation that sleep is the more tranquil and sweet while the sun is below the horizon, and that when the air is warmed by its rays it does not tend to maintain our senses in a state of such great calmness. Thus, it is certainly the most wholesome habit to rise and to lie down with the sun. Whence it follows that in our climate, as a general rule, men and animals need to sleep longer in winter than in summer. But civilized life is not so simple, natural, and exempt from revolutions and accidents as to justify us in accustoming man to this uniformity to such a degree as to make it necessary for him. Doubtless we must subject ourselves to rules; but it is of the first importance to break them without risk when necessity requires it. Therefore, do not commit the indiscretion of enervating your pupil by a continuous and peaceful sleep which is never to be interrupted. At first surrender him without restraint to the law of Nature; but do not forget that, in the present state of society, he ought to be above this law—that he should be able to go to bed late, to rise early, to be abruptly awakened, and to sit up all night, without being disturbed thereby.

It is important early to accustom ourselves to indiffer-

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* All this may be very well for savages, but if any enthusiastic disciple of Rousseau or of Locke should apply this hardening process to the children of civilized parents, the result would be like that which followed Peter the Great's attempt to habituate his naval cadets to drinking sea-water. — See Compayré, History of Pedagogy, English tr., p. 198.—(P.)

ent lodgings, for by this means we shall no longer find poor beds. In general, a life of endurance, once converted into habit, multiplies our agreeable sensations, while a life of ease prepares for a countless number of unpleasant sensations. People too delicately reared no longer find sleep save on a bed of down; while people accustomed to sleep on boards find it everywhere. No bed is hard for one who falls asleep the moment he lies down.

The best bed is that which brings us the best sleep. It is such a bed that Émile and I prepare for ourselves during the day. We do not need to be furnished with Persian slaves to make our beds; for while tilling the earth we are shaking up our mattresses.

I shall sometimes awaken Émile, less from the fear that he may form the habit of sleeping too long than for the purpose of accustoming him to everything, even to being abruptly awakened. Besides, I should be poorly qualified for my employment if I could not force him to awaken of himself, and to get up, so to speak, at my command, without my saying a single word to him.

If he does not sleep enough, I allow him to foresee for the following day a tedious morning; and he will regard as a clear gain whatever part of it he can devote to sleep. If he sleep too much, I show him on rising an amusement which he likes. If I wish him to waken at a given moment, I say to him: "To-morrow morning at six o'clock we will go a-fishing, or we will take a walk to such a place; would you like to go?" He consents and begs me to awaken him; I promise, or do not promise, to do so, as seems best; but if he awakens too late, he finds me gone. It will be unfortunate if he does not soon learn to awake of himself.

How shall we proceed with our pupil in regard to

the danger from small-pox? Shall we have him inoculated for it in infancy, or shall we wait for him to take it in the natural way? The first course, more in conformity with our practice, shields from peril the age when life is most precious, at the risk of that age when life is of the least account—if indeed we can give the name risk to inoculation wisely administered.

But the second course is more in accord with our general principles—of giving to Nature a complete *laisser faire* in the attentions which she loves to give alone, and which she abandons the moment man attempts to interfere. The man of Nature is always prepared. Let him be inoculated by this tutor, for she will choose better than we can the moment that is best.

Do not draw the conclusion from this that I censure inoculation, for the grounds on which I exempt my pupil from it would be very wrong with respect to yours. Your education entirely prevents them from escaping from the small-pox whenever they are exposed to it; and if you allow it to come whenever it will, it is probable that they will die of it. I observe that, in different countries, inoculation is more violently opposed in those places where it becomes the more necessary, and it is easy to see the reason of this. So I shall hardly stop to discuss this question for my Émile. He shall be inoculated, or he shall not be, as time, place, and circumstance may determine—it is to him almost a matter of indifference. If he take the small-pox through inoculation, we shall have the advantage of foreseeing his disease and of knowing what to expect, and this is something; but if he take it naturally, we shall have saved him from the doctor, and this is even more.

We fear a child may drown while learning to swim; but whether he drowns while learning, or from not having

learned, it will be in all cases your own fault. It is vanity alone which makes us rash; we are not foolhardy when no one is observing us; and Émile would not be so though the whole universe were looking on. As exercise does not consist in taking risks, while swimming in a canal of his father's park he might learn to cross the Hellespont. But he must be familiarized with peril in order that he may not be affected by it, and this is an essential part of the apprenticeship of which I spoke just now. Moreover, careful to proportion the danger to the powers at his command, and always to share it with him, I shall hardly have any imprudence to fear when I regulate my care for his preservation by that which I owe to my own.

To exercise the senses is not merely to make use of them, but it is to learn how to judge by them; and it is also, so to speak, to learn how to feel, for we neither know how to touch, nor to see, nor to hear, save as we have been taught.*

There is an exercise purely natural and mechanical which serves to render the body robust without giving any hold on the judgment.† Swimming, running, jumping, spinning a top, throwing stones, are all very well; but have we only arms and legs? Have we not also eyes

* This remark is especially true with respect to the discernment of harmony and beauty. It is the business of education to reveal and to interpret. The world is a *κόσμος* only to those who have been taught the art of æsthetic discernment.—(P.)

† When so much is said about the intellectual value of manual training, it is well to recollect the truth of this observation. The only way to train the mind is to call it into exercise, and the moment any form of labor becomes automatic, as it speedily does and must, it ceases to make any demands on the intelligence, and therefore ceases to have an education value. The best intellectual training will always be found not among those who use their hands most, but among those who use their brains most.—(P.)

and ears? And are these organs superfluous with respect to the use of the first? Therefore do not exercise the child's strength alone, but call into exercise all the senses which direct it. Draw from each of them all the advantage possible, and then employ one to verify the impression made by another. Measure, count, weigh, compare, and do not employ force till after having estimated the resistance. Always proceed in such a way that an estimate of the effect shall precede the use of means. Teach the child never to make insufficient or superfluous efforts. If you accustom him thus to foresee the effect of all his movements, and to correct his errors by experience, is it not clear that the more he acts the more judicious he will become?

If, in undertaking to move a mass, he take too long a lever, he will employ too much motion; and if the lever be too short, he will not have power enough. Experience will thus teach him to choose the fulcrum that is necessary. This wisdom is not above his age. If a burden is to be carried, and he wishes to take one as heavy as he can carry, but not to try one he can not lift, will he not be compelled to estimate its weight at sight? If he can compare masses of the same material, but of different sizes, let him choose from among masses of the same size, but of different material; and he must necessarily undertake to compare their specific weights. I once knew a young man, very well educated, who would not believe, until after a trial, that a pail full of large oak-chips was lighter than the same pail filled with water.

If you are shut up in a building, in the middle of the night, clap your hands and you will perceive by the resound whether the space is large or small, and whether you are in the middle of the room or in a corner. At the distance of half a foot from a wall, the air, less free

and more resisting, will bring a different sensation to your face. Stand still and turn in all directions, and if there is an open door a slight current of air will indicate the fact. If you are in a boat, you will know by the way in which the air strikes your face not only in what direction you are going, but whether the current is carrying you forward slowly or rapidly. These observations, and a thousand others like them, can not well be made save at night. However attentive we might wish to be to them in broad daylight, we are aided or distracted by the sight, and they will escape us. And still we are not yet aided in this either by hands or oars. How much ocular knowledge we may acquire through the sense of touch, even without touching anything!

Children should have many sports by night. This advice is more important than it seems. The night naturally frightens men, and sometimes animals. Reason, knowledge, intelligence, courage, relieve but few people from paying this tribute. I have seen logicians, strong-minded men, philosophers, and soldiers, who were intrepid by day, tremble at night like women at the rustling of a leaf. We attribute this affright to the tales told by nurses, but we are mistaken; it has a natural cause. What is this cause? The same which makes the deaf distrustful and the people superstitious—ignorance of the things which surround us and of what takes place about us. Accustomed to perceive objects at a distance, and to foresee their impressions in advance, how, no longer seeing anything of that which surrounds me, should I not imagine that there are a thousand beings and a thousand movements which may harm me, and against which it is impossible for me to protect myself? It is to no purpose that I am secure in the place where I happen to be, for I can never know it as well as though I actually saw it; and so

I always have a subject of fear which I did not have in broad daylight. I know it is true that a foreign body can hardly act upon my own without announcing itself by some noise; and so my sense of hearing is always on the alert. At the least sound, whose cause I can not discern, anxiety for my safety makes me at once imagine everything that is most suitable for keeping me on my guard, and consequently everything which is most likely to frighten me.

We have a key to the remedy of an evil when we have found its cause. In all cases habit destroys imagination; it is only new objects which excite it. In those which we see every day, it is no longer the imagination which is at work, but the memory; and in this fact we have an explanation of the axiom *ab assuetis non fit passio*, for it is only from the fire of the imagination that the passions are kindled. Therefore do not reason with one whom you would cure of the horror of darkness; but take him often into dark places, and you may be sure that this practice is worth more than all the arguments of philosophy. Tilers on roofs do not become dizzy, and no one who is accustomed to being in darkness is any longer afraid of it.

Here, then, is an additional argument for our sports by night; but in order that these sports may be successful, I can not too strongly recommend that they may be full of glee. Nothing is so cheerless as darkness. Never shut up your child in a black-hole. Let him laugh as he goes into the darkness, and let him laugh again when he comes out of it; so that, while he is in it, the thought of the amusements which he has left, and of those which he is going to renew, may protect him from the fantastic imaginations which might come to haunt him there.

I have known people who would resort to surprises in

order to accustom children not to be frightened at anything in the night. This is a very bad method, for it produces an effect directly contrary to the one intended, and serves only to make them always the more timorous. Neither reason nor habit can overcome the idea of a present danger of which we can know neither the degree nor the kind, nor the fear of surprises which have often been experienced. Nevertheless, how can you make sure of always keeping your pupil exempt from such accidents? The best advice I can give for preserving him from them is the following: Your case, I will say to my Émile, seems to be that of a just defense; for the aggressor does not allow you to judge whether he intends to do you harm or to frighten you; and as he has the advantage of you, you can not escape even by flight. Then boldly lay hold of whatever surprises you in the night, it matters not whether man or beast. Close with him and pinion him with all your strength. If he fights, strike him, and be not sparing of your blows; and whatever he may say or do, never let him go till you fully know what the object is. The clearing up of the mystery will doubtless show you that there was not much to fear; but this manner of treating jokers ought to discourage them from repeating their tricks.

Always arm men against unforeseen accidents. Let Émile spend his mornings in running barefoot in all seasons around his chamber, up and down stairs, and through the garden. Far from scolding him for this, I shall imitate him; only I shall take care to remove broken glass. I shall presently speak of his employments and manual recreations. However, let him learn to make all the steps which favor the evolution of the body, and in all his attitudes to take an easy and firm position. Let him learn to make jumps, now long, now high; to climb a tree,

to leap a wall. Let him always find his equilibrium; and let all his movements and gestures be regulated according to the laws of gravity, long before the science of statics intervenes to explain them to him. From the manner in which his foot rests on the ground, and his body on his leg, he should feel whether the position is good or bad. A secure position is always graceful, and the firmest postures the most elegant. Were I a dancing-master, I would not perform all the tricks of Marcel,* though well enough for the country where he teaches them; but instead of occupying my pupil forever with gambols, I would take him to the base of a rock and there show him what attitude he must take, how he must carry his body and his head, what movement he must make, and how he must place first his foot and then his hand, in order to follow nimbly the steep, rugged, and uneven pathways, and to spring from point to point both in ascending and in descending. I would make of him the rival of a roe-buck rather than the dancer of the opera.

Whatever gives movement to the body without putting restraint upon it, is always easy to obtain from children. There are a thousand ways of interesting them in measuring, ascertaining, and estimating distances. Here is a very tall cherry-tree: how shall we proceed in order to pick cherries from it? Will the ladder in the barn answer the purpose? Here is a very wide brook: how shall we cross it? Will one of the planks in the yard reach from bank to bank? From our windows we would fish in the moat that surrounds the castle: how many feet long shall our line be? I would make a swing between these two trees: will a rope twelve feet long answer the purpose? I am told that in the other house our chamber will be twenty-

* A celebrated dancing-master of Paris.

five feet square: do you think it will suit us? Will it be larger than this? We are very hungry: which of these two villages could we the sooner reach for dinner?

It was once my duty to train in running an indolent and sluggish child who had no inclination for that exercise or for any other, although he was destined for the life of a soldier. He had become convinced—I do not know how—that a man of his rank ought neither to do anything nor to know anything, and that his nobility ought to serve him instead of arms and legs, as well as of every species of merit. The skill of Chiron himself would hardly suffice to make of such a gentleman a light-footed Achilles. The difficulty was so much the greater because I had resolved to enjoin absolutely nothing upon him. I had excluded all resort to exhortations, promises, threats, emulation, and the desire to excel. How could I give him a desire to run without saying anything to him? To run myself might be a means somewhat uncertain, and subject to difficulties. Moreover, it was a further purpose of mine to draw from this exercise some object of instruction for him, in order to accustom the operations of the machine and those of the judgment to move always in concert. This is the plan that occurred to me—that is, to him who speaks in this example. On going out to walk with him in the afternoon I sometimes put in my pocket two cakes of a kind that he liked very much. Each of us ate one of these during the walk, and we returned well pleased. One day he noticed that I had three cakes. He could have eaten six without inconvenience, and promptly dispatched his own, only to demand of me the third. No, I said to him; I could eat it very well myself, or we might divide it; but I prefer to see those two little boys yonder run a race for it. I called them, showed them the cake, and stated the terms. They asked nothing better.

The cake was placed on a large stone which served as the goal; the course was marked off, and we took our seats. At a given signal the little boys started; the victor seized the cake and ate it without pity before the eyes of the spectators and the vanquished comrade.

This amusement was worth more than the cake; but it did not succeed in the first instance, and produced nothing. I was neither discouraged nor in a hurry. The instruction of children is a business in which we must know how to lose time in order to gain it. We kept up our walks, often taking three cakes, and sometimes four; and from time to time there was one, and sometimes two, for the runners. If the prize was not great, those who contested for it would not be ambitious. Hence he who carried it off was commended and honored; everything was done with due formality. To give variety to the entertainment, and to increase the interest in it, I marked off a longer course and allowed several contestants to enter it. They had hardly begun the race when all the passers-by stopped to see them. The cheers, the shouts, the clapping of hands, lent them animation. I sometimes saw my little fellow give a start, rise to his feet and shout when one of the contestants was on the point of overtaking or passing another. For him, these were the Olympic games.

The contestants, however, sometimes resorted to foul play: they held each other back, or threw each other down, or put stones in each other's way. This gave me occasion to separate them, and to make them start from different points, although equally distant from the goal. The reason of this foresight will soon appear; for I must treat this important affair in great detail.

Constantly annoyed at seeing eaten before his very eyes the cakes which he coveted, my young knight finally

began to suspect that to be a good runner might be worth something; and seeing that he also had two legs, he began to make a trial of them in secret. I was careful to observe nothing of this, but I saw clearly that my stratagem had succeeded. When he believed himself sufficiently prepared, and after I had been able to divine his thoughts, he pretended to importune me for the remaining cake. I refused him, but he persisted, and at last said to me with a spiteful air: "Very well! Put the cake on the stone, mark off the ground, and we shall see!" "Good!" I laughingly said to him; "can a nobleman really run? You will have a better appetite, but not the wherewithal to satisfy it." Stimulated by my banter, he does his best, and carries off the prize—all the more easily because I had made the course very short, and had taken care to exclude the best runner. This first point having been gained, it will be understood how easy it was for me to keep up his interest. He soon acquired such a taste for this exercise that, unfavored, he was almost sure to beat my ragamuffins in running, however long the course might be.

This advantage having been gained, it produced another which I had not suspected. As long as he carried off the prize only rarely, he almost always ate the cake alone, just as his competitors did; but as he became accustomed to victory he became generous, and often shared the prize with those he had defeated. This furnished me a moral observation, and I learned from it what the true principle of generosity is.

In continuing to mark with him, in different places, the bounds whence each was to start at the given signal, without his perceiving it I made the distances unequal, so that one, having a greater distance to run than another in order to reach the same goal, had an obvious disad-

vantage; but though I left the choice to my disciple, he did not know how to take advantage of it. Without being troubled about the distance, he always preferred the finest route; so that, easily foreseeing his choice, it was almost wholly within my power to make him lose or gain the cake as I might desire; and this scheme was also useful in more than one way. Meanwhile, as my purpose was to make him take notice of the difference in distance, I tried to make it sensible to him; but, though indolent in his ordinary state, he was so excited in his sports, and was so little distrustful of me, that I had all the trouble in the world to make him see that I was cheating him. I finally succeeded in spite of his heedlessness, and he reproached me for my deceit. I said to him: "What have you to complain about? In bestowing a gift of my own choice, may I not make my own conditions? Who compels you to run? Did I promise to make the courses of equal length, and are you not free to choose? No one prevents you from taking the shortest. How is it that you do not see that it is yourself that I favor, and that the inequality of which you complain is wholly to your advantage if you know how to make use of it?" This was clear; he saw the situation, and in order to make a choice it was necessary to look at the matter more closely. At first he proposed to count the steps; but to measure the steps of children is a slow and uncertain process. Moreover, I took it into my head to provide several races for the same day; and then, the sport becoming a sort of passion, it was with regret that time was lost in measuring distances which should have been employed in running them. The vivacity of infancy is poorly adapted to these delays; and so an effort was made to see better, and better to estimate a distance by sight. Then I had but little trouble in extending and

nourishing this taste. Finally, after months of trial and corrected errors, his compass of sight was so trained that when I placed before him, in thought, a cake on some distant object, his eye was almost as sure as the chain of a surveyor.

As the sight is the sense which is the most intimately connected with the judgments of the mind, it requires a long time to learn to see. Sight must have been compared with touch for a long time in order to accustom the first of these two senses to make a faithful report of forms and distances; without the sense of touch, without progressive movement, the most piercing eyes in the world could not give us an idea of extension. To the oyster, the entire universe must appear only as a mere point; and were this oyster to be informed by a human soul, the world would seem nothing more. It is only by walking, feeling, numbering, and measuring dimensions that we learn to estimate them; but also, if we were always measuring, the eye, reposing on the instrument, would acquire no accuracy. Nor must the child pass at a bound from measuring to estimating; but it is necessary at first that, continuing to compare by parts what can not be compared at a single glance, he should substitute, for definite measurements, measurements by estimate; and that, instead of always applying the measure with the hand, he become accustomed to apply it only with the eyes. However, I would have him verify his first attempts by real measurements, in order that he may correct his errors, and that, if the sense retains any false appearance, he may learn to rectify it by a better judgment. We have natural measures which are nearly the same in all places, as the foot of a man, the length of his arm, or his stature. When the child estimates the height of a room, his tutor may serve him as a *toise* or yard-stick. If he estimate the height

of a steeple, let him take a house as his unit of measurement; if he wishes to know the length of a road in leagues, let him count the hours he has been traveling; and, above all, let nothing of all this be done for him, but let him do it for himself.

We could not learn to judge correctly of the volume and height of bodies without learning also their forms, and even to reproduce them; for, at bottom, this reproduction is absolutely dependent on the laws of perspective; and we can not estimate the volume from its appearance, unless we have some notion of these laws. Children, who are great imitators, all try their hand at drawing. I would have my pupil cultivate this art, not exactly for the art itself, but for rendering the eye accurate and the hand flexible; and, in general, it is of very little consequence that he understand such or such an exercise, provided he acquire the perspicacity of sense, and the correct habit of body, which are gained from that exercise. I shall take great care, therefore, not to give him a drawing-master who will give him only imitations to imitate, and will make him draw only from drawings. He shall have no master but Nature, and no models but objects. He shall have before his eyes the very original, and not the paper which represents it; he shall draw a house from a house, a tree from a tree, a man from a man, so as to become accustomed to observe bodies and their appearances correctly, and not to take false and conventional imitations for real imitations. I shall discourage him even from tracing anything from memory in the absence of objects, until, by frequent observations, their exact figures are firmly impressed on his imagination; for fear that, substituting odd and fantastic forms for the truth of things, he lose the knowledge of proportions and the taste for the beauties of Nature.

I am well aware that in this way he will scrawl for a long time without making anything that is recognizable; that he will be late in catching the elegance of contours, and the light touch of designers, and perhaps never a discernment of picturesque effects and good taste in drawing; but by way of compensation he will certainly contract a juster glance of the eye, a steadier hand, a knowledge of the true relations of volume and form existing in animals, plants, and natural bodies, and the more ready use of the play of perspective. This is precisely what I wish to do, and my intention is not so much to have him imitate objects as to know them. I prefer to have him show me the plant acanthus, even though he be less skillful in tracing the foliage of a capital.

Besides, in this exercise, as in all the others, I do not intend that my pupil shall have the enjoyment of it all to himself. I wish to make it still more agreeable to him by always sharing it with him. I do not wish him to have any other rival than myself; but I shall be his rival without respite and without risk; and this will put interest into his occupations without causing jealousy between us. In holding the pencil, I should follow his example; and at first I shall use it as awkwardly as he does. Were I an Apelles, I would appear to be no more than a dauber; I shall begin by tracing a man just as lackeys trace them on walls—a stroke for each arm, a stroke for each leg, and the fingers larger than the arms. After a very long time we shall both take note of this disproportion; we shall observe that a leg has thickness, and that this thickness is not the same throughout; and that the arm has its determinate length with respect to the body, etc. In this progress I shall do no more than keep up with him, or I shall advance so little beyond him that it will always be easy for him to overtake me, and

often to surpass me. We shall have paints and brushes; and we shall try to imitate the colors of objects and their whole appearance, as well as their form. We will color, we will paint, we will daub; but in all our daubings we shall not cease to watch Nature; we shall do nothing save under the eyes of the master.

We were in want of ornaments for our chamber; but now we find all we want. I have our drawings framed and put under glass, so that no further touches may be given them, and that, seeing them remain in the state in which we put them, each one may have an interest in not neglecting his own. I arrange them in order about the chamber, each drawing repeated twenty or thirty times, and showing by each copy the progress of the author, from the moment when the house is hardly more than a formless square, until its façade, its side view, its proportions, and its shadows are represented with the greatest exactness. These gradations in finish can not fail to offer us numberless pictures interesting to ourselves and surprising to others, and always to excite our emulation more and more. On the first of these, on the coarser of our drawings, I put very bright and nicely gilded frames, which set them off to advantage; but when the imitation becomes more exact, and the drawing is really good, I give it nothing better than a very simple black frame; for it needs no other ornament than itself, and it would be a pity to have the frame divide the attention which is merited by the object itself. Thus, each of us aspires to the honor of a simple frame; and when any one would slight the drawing of another he condemns it to a gilt frame. Some day, perhaps, these gilt frames will become a byword among us; and we shall wonder that so many men think to do themselves justice by framing their pictures in this manner.

I have said that geometry is not within the comprehension of children; but this is our fault. We do not perceive that their method is not ours, and that what becomes for us the art of reasoning ought to be for them only the art of seeing. Instead of giving them our method, it would be better for us to borrow theirs; for our way of learning geometry is as much a matter of imagination as of reasoning. When the proposition has been announced, we must imagine its demonstration—that is, we must ascertain from what proposition already learned this one is to be the consequence, and from all the consequences which may be drawn from this given proposition to choose precisely the one which is required.

In this way the most exact reasoner, if he has not the gift of invention, must remain at a standstill. What follows? Instead of making us find the demonstrations, they are dictated to us; instead of teaching us to reason, the teacher reasons for us and exercises only our memory.

Draw exact figures, combine them, superimpose them, and examine their relations. You will find the whole of elementary geometry by advancing from one observation to another, without the need of definitions, problems, or of any other form of demonstration than simple superposition. For myself, I do not profess to teach geometry to Émile, but it is he who will teach it to me. I will look for relations, and he will find them; for I will look for them in a way to make him find them. For example, instead of using a compass to trace a circle, I will trace it with a point at the end of a thread turning about a centre. After this, when I would compare the radii of a circle, Émile will laugh at me, and will give me to understand that the same thread, while stretched tight, can not have traced unequal distances.

If I wish to measure an angle of sixty degrees, I describe from the vertex of this angle not an arc but an entire circle; for, with children, there must be nothing unexpressed. I find that the part of a circle included between the two sides of the angle is the sixth part of the circle. After this I describe from the same vertex another and larger circle, and I find that this second arc is still the sixth part of its circle. I describe a third concentric circle on which I make the same experiment; and so I go on with new circles, till Émile, shocked at my stupidity, informs me that every arc, large or small, intercepted by the same angle, will always be the sixth part of its circle, etc. Thus early we have learned the use of a protractor.

Accuracy in drawing geometrical figures is neglected; they are assumed to be correct, and the whole thought is given to the demonstration. With us, on the contrary, the question of demonstration will never be raised. Our more important business will be to draw lines that are perfectly straight, perfectly accurate, perfectly equal; to make a square that is perfectly regular, and to trace a circle that is perfectly round. To verify the accuracy of the figure, we will examine it in all its sensible properties; and this will give us daily occasion to discover new ones. We will fold the two semicircles along the diameter, and the two halves of the square along the diagonal. We will compare our two figures in order to discover the one whose edges match the most exactly, and which, consequently, is the better made; and we will discuss whether this equality of division ought always to take place in parallelograms, trapeziums, etc. Sometimes we will try to foresee the success of the experiment; before making it, we will endeavor to find reasons for it.

For my pupil, geometry is but the art of making good

use of the rule and compass;* and he ought not to confound it with drawing, where he will employ neither of these instruments. The rule and compass shall be kept under lock and key, and he shall be granted the use of them only very rarely, and for a little time, in order that he may not become accustomed to slovenly drawing; but we shall sometimes take our figures with us while out for a walk, and talk of what we have done or of what we propose to do.

I shall never forget a young man I saw at Turin, who in his infancy had been taught the relations between contours and surfaces, by allowing him each day to make a choice of isoperimetric cakes cut into various geometrical forms. The little glutton had exhausted the art of Archimedes in order to find in which figure there was the most to eat.†

When a child plays at shuttle-cock he trains his eye and arm in accuracy; when he whips a top he increases his strength by using it, but without learning anything. I have sometimes asked why we do not offer children the same games of skill which men have, such as tennis, fives, billiards, bow and arrow, foot-ball, and musical instruments. I have been told, in reply, that some of these sports are beyond the strength of children, and that their limbs and organs are not sufficiently de-

* Rousseau must have been too wise to believe that any system of measurements, however exact, could take the place of mathematical demonstration. No experimental process can ever establish the general truth that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. We should not confound "geometrical recreations" with geometrical science.—(P.)

† Isoperimetric figures are those whose contours or circumferences are equal in length. Now, of all these figures it is proved that the circle is the one which contains the greatest surface. Hence the child has to choose cakes in the form of a circle.

veloped for the others. I find these reasons bad. A child has not the stature of a man, and is not allowed to wear a coat made like his. I do not mean that he shall play with our maces on a table three feet high; I do not mean that he shall knock the balls in our tennis-courts, nor that his little hands shall be made to hold the racket of an expert; but that he shall play in a hall whose windows are protected; that, at first, he use only soft balls; that his first rackets shall be of wood, then of parchment, and finally of catgut stretched to accord with his progress. You prefer the shuttle-cock because it is less fatiguing and less dangerous; but you are wrong in both these reasons. Shuttle-cock is a game for women; but there is not one of them who can not be made to run by a moving ball. Their white skin is not to be hardened to bruises, and their faces are not expected to suffer contusions. But do we imagine that we who are intended to be vigorous can become so without trouble? And of what defense shall we be capable if we are never attacked? We always play games indolently in which we can be unskillful without risk. A falling shuttle-cock does harm to no one; but nothing invigorates the arms like having to protect the head with them, and nothing makes the sight so accurate as having to protect the eyes from blows. To spring from one end of the hall to another, to estimate the bound of a ball still in the air, and to send it back with a strong and steady hand, such sports do not befit a man but they serve to train a youth.

Whatever has been done can be done again. Now, nothing is more common than to see dexterous and sprightly children whose limbs have the same agility as those of a man. At almost all the fairs we see them performing feats of balancing, walking on the hands, jumping, and rope-dancing. For how many years have not troops

of children attracted spectators to the Italian comedy by their ballet-dances! Who is there who has not heard the pantomime troop of the celebrated Nicolini spoken of in Germany and in Italy? Has any one ever noticed in these children movements less perfect, attitudes less pleasing, an ear less accurate, and a dance less airy, than in the dancers of mature age? Though the fingers at first may be thick, short, and stiff, and the hands plump and incapable of grasping anything, does this prevent multitudes of children from knowing how to write and draw at an age when others can not yet hold the pencil or pen? All Paris still recollects the little English girl of ten who performed prodigies on the harpsichord. On one occasion, at the house of a magistrate, I saw his son, a little fellow of eight years, put on the table, at dessert, like a statue in the midst of the table-service, and there play on a violin almost as large as himself, and surprise even the artists present by his execution.

All these examples, and thousands like them, prove, as it seems to me, that the inaptitude attributed to children for manly exercises is imaginary; and that, if they are not successful in some of them, it is because they have never been trained to them.

I shall be told that, with respect to the body, I am here falling into the mistake of that premature intellectual culture which I censure in children. The difference in the two cases is very great; for, in one, the progress is only apparent, while in the other it is real. I have proved that the intelligence which they seem to have, they do not have; whereas, they really do all they seem to do. Moreover, we ought always to recollect that all this is, or ought to be, but play, the facile and voluntary direction of the movements which Nature demands of

them, the art of varying their amusements in order to make them more agreeable, without the least appearance of that constraint which turns them into labor; for, in short, what amusements shall they have from which I can not draw material for their instruction? And when this can not be done, provided they amuse themselves without inconvenience, and the time passes, their progress in any given direction is of no importance, so far as the present is concerned; whereas, when they must necessarily be taught this or that, as things now go, it is always impossible to attain the end without constraint, without vexation, and without *ennui*.

Man has three kinds of voice: namely, the speaking or articulated voice, a singing or melodious voice, and the impassioned or modulated voice, which serves as a language for the passions, and which gives animation to song and speech. The child, like the man, has these three kinds of voice without knowing how to combine them as he does. Like us, he resorts to laughter, to cries, to wailing, to exclamations, and to groans, but he does not know how to mingle their inflections with the two other voices.

A perfect music is that which best unites these three voices. Children are incapable of this music, and their singing never has soul. So also, in the speaking voice, their language has no accent; they cry, but they do not modulate; and as there is little accent in their conversation, there is little energy in their voice. The speech of our pupil will be more uniform and still more simple, because his passions, not yet being awakened, will not mingle their language with his own. Therefore, do not make him recite parts in tragedy, or in comedy, nor attempt to teach him, as the phrase is, to declaim. He will have too much sense to know how to give tone to things

which he can not understand, and expression to sentiments which he will never experience.

Teach him to speak simply and clearly, to articulate correctly, to pronounce accurately and without affectation, to know and to follow grammatical accent and prosody, always to employ voice enough to be heard but never more than is necessary — a common fault in children brought up in colleges; and in everything have him avoid whatever is superfluous.

And so, in singing, make his voice accurate, uniform, flexible, sonorous; and his ear sensitive to measure and harmony, but nothing more than this. Imitative and theatrical music is not adapted to his age; and I would not even have him sing words if he wished to sing them, but would try to compose songs expressly for him, interesting for his age, and as simple as his ideas.

It might reasonably be supposed that, being in such little haste to teach him to read writing, I should be in no great hurry to teach him how to read music. Let us save his brain all attention that is too laborious, and be in no haste to fix his mind on conventional signs. This, I acknowledge, seems to present a difficulty; for if the knowledge of notes does not, at first, seem more necessary for knowing how to sing than that of letters for knowing how to talk, there is, however, this difference—that in speaking we render our own ideas, while in singing, we do hardly more than render the ideas of others. Now, in order to render them, we must be able to read them.

But in the first place, instead of reading them, we can hear them, and a song is translated by the ear still more faithfully than by the eye. Moreover, in order to know music well, it does not suffice to render it; it is necessary to compose it, and one should be learned along with the other, for except in this way music is never very well

learned. At first, drill your little musician in composing very regular and well-cadenced phrases; then in uniting them by a very simple modulation; and, lastly, in marking their different relations by a correct punctuation, which is done by a wise choice of cadences and rests. Above all, never introduce into singing what is odd or strange, and never indulge in the pathetic or the expressive; but choose a melody that is always harmonious and simple, always springing from the essential chords of the piece, and always indicating the bass in such a way that the child may easily perceive and accompany it; for, in order to train the voice and the ear, he ought never to sing save with the harpsichord.

We should die of hunger or poison if we were compelled to wait in order to choose the food that is best for us, till experience had taught us to know and to choose it; but the Supreme Goodness which has caused the pleasure of sensitive beings to be the instrument of their conservation shows us, from what pleases our palate, what is best for our stomach. Naturally, there is no safer physician for a man than his own appetite, and, taking him in his primitive condition, I doubt not that the food which he found most agreeable was also the most wholesome.

The farther we depart from the state of Nature the more we lose our natural tastes; or, rather, habit becomes to us a second nature, which we substitute so completely for the original that none of us longer know what our original is.

Those who say that children must be accustomed to the aliments which they will use when grown, do not seem to me to reason correctly. Why ought their nurture to remain the same while their manner of living is so different? A man exhausted by labor, care, and trouble,

needs succulent food, which brings new energy to the brain; while the child who has just been playing, and whose body is growing, needs a copious diet which produces an abundance of chyle. Moreover, the grown man already has his station in life, his occupation and his home; but who of us can be sure of what Fortune has in reserve for the child? In no particular let us impose on him so determinate a form that it will cost him too much to change it when necessity requires. Let us not cause him to die of hunger in foreign countries, if he does not keep a French cook with him wherever he goes, nor to say, one day, that people know how to eat only in France. This, by the way, is a fine compliment! For myself I would say, on the contrary, that it is only the French who do not know how to eat, since such a peculiar art is required in order to render their food palatable.

Gluttony is the vice of natures which have no substance in them. The soul of a glutton is all in his palate —he is made only for eating; in his stupid incapacity, he is himself only at table, he is able to judge only of dishes. Leave him to this employment without regret; both for ourselves and for him, this employment is better for him than any other.

The fear that gluttony may take root in a child of any capacity is a narrow-minded precaution. The child thinks of nothing but eating; but in adolescence we no longer think of it; for everything tastes good, and we have many other things to occupy our thoughts. However, I would not have an indiscreet use made of so low a motive, nor support the honor of doing a noble deed on the promise of some toothsome morsel. But as the whole of childhood is, or ought to be, devoted only to sports and gay amusements, I see no reason why exercises purely corporeal should not have a material and sensible reward. When a

little Majorcan,* seeing a basket on the top of a tree, brings it down by the use of his sling, is it not very proper that he should profit by the feat? When a young Spartan, at the risk of a hundred blows of the whip, cleverly slips into a kitchen and there steals a live fox, and while carrying him off in his frock is scratched, bitten, and covered with blood; and when, for fear of being caught, the child allows his bowels to be lacerated without a scowl and without uttering a single cry—is it not just that he finally profit by his booty, and that he eat it, after having been eaten by it? A good dinner never ought to be a reward; but why should it not sometimes be the effect of the pains we have taken to procure it? Émile never regards the cake which I put on the stone as a reward for having run well; he knows merely that the only means of getting the cake is to be the first to reach it.

This does not at all contradict the maxims which I lately stated concerning simplicity of diet; for, in order to sharpen the appetite of children, it is not necessary to excite their gustatory pleasure but only to satisfy their hunger; and this will be accomplished by the most common things in the world if we do not set ourselves at work to refine their taste. Their continual appetite, excited by the need of growth, is a sure condiment which takes the place of many others. Fruits, milk, some piece of cookery more delicate than ordinary bread, and, above all, the art of dispensing all this with moderation—this is the way to lead armies of children through the world without giving them a taste for exciting savors or running the risk of blunting their palates.

Whatever diet you give your children, provided you

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* The Majorcans have abandoned this custom for many centuries; it was in force during the celebrity of their slingers.—(P.)

accustom them only to common and simple dishes, let them eat, run, and play as much as they please, and you may be sure that they will never eat too much, and will never be troubled by indigestion; but if you starve them half the time, and they find the means of escaping your vigilance, they will make up for what they have lost with all their might: they will eat to repletion, almost to bursting. Our appetite is inordinate only because we give it other rules than those of Nature; always regulating, prescribing, adding and retrenching, we do nothing save with the balance in hand; but this balance is governed by our fancies and not by our stomachs. I am always recurring to my illustrations. Among peasants the cupboard and the fruit-room are always open, and neither children nor men know what indigestion is.

If it should happen, however, that a child eat too much—a thing which I do not believe possible, according to my method—it is so easy to distract him with amusements which he likes that we might finally exhaust him with inanition without his thinking of it. How is it that means so sure and easy escape all our teachers? Herodotus * relates that the Lydians, sore pressed by an extreme famine, bethought themselves of inventing games and other amusements, by which they diverted attention from their hunger and passed whole days without thinking of eating. Your wise tutors have perhaps read this passage a hundred times without seeing the application that might be made of it to children. Some of them will say to me that a child does not willingly leave his dinner in order to study his lesson. Master, you are right. I was not thinking of that sort of amusement.

Supposing, then, that my method is that of Nature,

* Book I, chap. xciv.

and that I am not deceived in its application, we have led our pupil across the regions of the sensations up to the confines of juvenile reason. The first step that we are going to take beyond this ought to be the step of a man; but before entering on this new course let us look back for a moment on that which we have just traversed. Each age, each period of life, has its proper perfection, a sort of maturity which is all its own. We have often heard mention made of a grown man; but let us now consider a grown child. This spectacle will be something newer for us, and perhaps not less agreeable.

The existence of finite beings is so poor and so contracted, that when we see only that which is, our emotions are not excited. It is fancy which lends ornament to real objects, and if the imagination does not add a charm to that which strikes our attention, the sterile pleasure which we receive from it is limited to the organ of sense, and always leaves the heart cold. The earth, adorned with the treasures of autumn, displays riches which the eye admires; but this admiration is not affecting; it comes more from reflection than from feeling. In the spring, the fields, almost bare, are still without adornment; the woods afford no shade, and the verdure is only beginning to appear; but the heart is touched at the sight. In seeing Nature thus return to life, we feel ourselves reanimated; we are encompassed by the imagery of pleasure. Those companions of pleasure, those gentle tears always ready to accompany every delicious emotion, are ready to fall from our eyes; but however animated, lively, and agreeable the sight of the vintage may be, we always look on it with tearless eyes.

Why this difference? It is because to the splendor of spring the imagination adds that of the seasons which are to follow; because, to those tender buds which the eye

perceives, it adds flower, fruit, shadow, and sometimes the mysteries which they may conceal. The imagination unites in a single point successive periods of time, and sees objects less as they shall be than as she desires them to be, since it depends on her to choose them. In autumn, on the contrary, we see nothing more than that which actually exists. If we wish to pass on to the spring-time, the winter stops us, and the chilled imagination dwells on the snow and the hoar-frost.

Such is the source of the charm we find in contemplating a beautiful infancy rather than the perfection of mature age. When is it that we experience a real pleasure in seeing a man? It is when the memory of his actions causes us to go back over his life—rejuvenates him, so to speak, in our eyes. If we were compelled to consider him as he is, or to imagine him as he will be in his old age, the idea of declining nature destroys all our pleasure. There is no pleasure in seeing a man advancing at long strides toward the tomb, and the image of death disfigures everything.

But when I represent to myself a child from ten to twelve years old, healthy, vigorous, and well formed for his age, he does not excite in me an idea which is not agreeable, either for the present or for the future. I see him impetuous, sprightly, animated, without corroding care, without long and painful foresight, wholly absorbed in his actual existence, and enjoying a plenitude of life which seems bent on reaching out beyond him. I look forward to another period of life, and I see him exercising the senses, the mind, and the powers which are being developed within him from day to day, and of which he gives new evidences from moment to moment. I contemplate the child, and he pleases me; I imagine the man, and he pleases me more; his ardent blood seems to add

warmth to my own; I seem to live with his life, and his vivacity makes me young again.

The clock strikes, and what a change! In a moment his eye grows dull and his mirth ceases; adieu to joy, adieu to frolicsome sports. A stern and angry man takes him by the hand, says to him gravely, "*Come on, sir!*" and leads him away. In the room which they enter I discover books. Books! What cheerless furniture for one of his age! The poor child allows himself to be led away, turns a regretful eye on all that surrounds him, holds his peace as he goes, his eyes are swollen with tears which he dares not shed, and his heart heavy with sighs which he dares not utter.

O thou who hast nothing like this to fear—thou for whom no period of life is a time of weariness and unrest—thou who seest the day come without anxiety and the night without impatience, and countest the hours only by thy pleasures, come, my happy, my lovable pupil, and by thy presence console me for the departure of this unfortunate youth. Come! He comes, and at his approach I am conscious of an emotion of joy which I see that he shares with me. It is his friend, his comrade, his playfellow whom he approaches. On seeing me he is very sure that he will not remain long without amusements. We are never dependent on each other, but we are always in accord, and are never so content as when we are together.

His form, his bearing, and his countenance bespeak self-assurance and contentment. A glow of health is on his face; his firm step gives him an air of vigor; his complexion, still delicate without being insipid, has no trace of effeminate softness—the air and the sun have already placed on it the honorable imprint of his sex; his features, still rounded, begin to exhibit some marks of devel-

oping character of their own; his eyes, which the warmth of feeling does not yet animate, have at least all their native serenity; long sorrows have not dimmed them, and endless tears have not furrowed his cheeks. In his prompt but sure movements you may see the vivacity of his age, the firmness of independence, and the experience coming from his multiplied activities. His manner is open and free, but neither insolent nor vain. His face, which has not been glued down to books, does not rest on his stomach, and there is no need of telling him to hold up his head. Neither shame nor fear has ever made him bow it.

Let us make room for him in the midst of an assembly. Examine him, gentlemen; interrogate him without reserve, and be in no apprehension either of his importunities, his babble, or his indiscreet questions. Have no fear that he will take possession of you, that he will presume to engross your whole attention, and that you will no longer be able to shake him off.

Nor should you expect from him agreeable small-talk, nor that he tell you things which I have dictated to him. Expect from him only the truth, artless and simple, without ornament, without affectation, and without vanity. He will tell you whatever wrong he has done or thought, just as freely as he will the good, without feeling embarrassed in any way by the effect which his utterances will produce on you. The speech that he will employ will have all the simplicity of its primitive institution.

We are fond of forming happy predictions of children, and we always feel regret for that stream of absurdities which almost always comes to overthrow the hopes that we have founded on some happy witticism which has chanced to fall from their lips. If my pupil rarely furnishes such hopes, he will never occasion this regret; for he never speaks a useless word, and does not exhaust himself on

babble which he knows receives no attention. His ideas are limited, but they are clear; if he knows nothing by heart, he knows much by experience; if he reads less than other children in our books, he reads better in the book of Nature; his mind is not in his tongue, but in his head; he has less memory than judgment; he knows how to speak but one language, but he understands what he says; and if he does not speak as well as others, he has the merit of doing better than they do.

He does not know what routine, usage, and habit are. What he did yesterday has no influence on what he does to-day.* He follows no formula, yields neither to authority nor to example, and neither acts nor speaks save as it seems best to him. So expect from him neither formal conversation nor studied manners, but always the faithful expression of his ideas, and the conduct which springs from his inclinations.

You will find in him a small number of moral notions which relate to his actual condition, but none bearing on the relative condition of men. And of what use would these be to him, since a child is not yet an active member of society? Speak to him of liberty, of property, and even of convention, and he can understand you so far. He knows why that which belongs to him is his own, and

* The charm of habit comes from the indolence natural to man, and this indolence increases as we abandon ourselves to it. We do more easily what we have already done; the route having been marked out, it becomes the easier to follow. Thus it is observed that the power of habit is very great in old men and indolent people, and very small in the young and in active people. This power is good only for weak natures, and it enfeebles them more and more from day to day. The only habit useful to children is to subject themselves without trouble to the necessity of things, and the only habit useful to men is to subject themselves without trouble to reason. Every other habit is a vice.

why that which does not belong to him is not his own; but beyond this he knows nothing. Speak to him of duty, or of obedience, and he does not know what you mean. Command him to do something, he will not understand you; but say to him, "Do me this favor, and I will do the same for you when I have an opportunity," and instantly he will make haste to please you, for he asks nothing better than to extend his authority, and to acquire rights over you which he knows to be inviolable. Perhaps he is not even averse to holding a place, to making up a number, and to be counted for something; but if he has this last motive, he has already departed from Nature, and you have not properly closed in advance all the avenues of vanity.

On his part, if he needs any assistance he will ask it indifferently of the first one he meets; he would ask it of the king just as he would of his servant; for in his eyes all men are still equal. By his manner of asking, you see that he feels that no one owes him anything; he knows that what he asks is a favor. He knows also that men are inclined to grant these favors. His expressions are simple and laconic. His voice, his looks, and his movements are those of a being equally accustomed to compliance and to refusal. It is neither the cringing and servile submission of a slave, nor the imperious tone of a master, but a modest confidence in a fellow-creature; it is the noble and touching sweetness of a free but sensitive and feeble being, who implores the assistance of one who is free, but strong and beneficent. If you grant his request, he will not thank you, but will feel that he has contracted a debt. If you refuse him, he will not complain nor insist, for he knows that this will be useless. He will not say that he has been refused, but that what he asked could not be granted; for, as I have

already said, we rarely rebel against a well-recognized necessity.

Leave him to himself in perfect liberty, and observe what he does without saying anything to him; consider what he will do and how he will go about it. Having no need of being assured that he is free, he never does anything thoughtlessly, or simply to exhibit his power over himself. Does he not know that he is always master of his own conduct? He is alert, quick, agile; his movements have all the vivacity of his age, but you do not see one which has not a purpose. Whatever he chooses to do, he will never undertake anything which is beyond his powers, for he has fairly tested them and knows them. The means he employs will always be adapted to his designs, and he will rarely act without being assured of success. He will have an attentive and discerning eye, and will never go about foolishly interrogating others concerning everything he sees; but he will examine it himself, and will leave no effort untried to find out what he wishes to know before soliciting it from others. If he falls into unforeseen difficulties, he will be less disturbed than another; and if there is risk to run, he will also be less dismayed. As his imagination still remains inactive, and as nothing has been done to stimulate it, he sees only what is real, estimates dangers for only what they are worth, and always maintains his composure. He has too often felt the pressure of necessity to be still kicking against it; he has felt its yoke from his birth, and has become fully accustomed to it; he is always ready for whatever may happen.

Whether he is at work or at play, he is content with either; his sports are his occupations, and he feels no difference between them. Into whatever he does he throws an interest which excites cheerfulness and a

liberty which gives pleasure; and this exhibits both his turn of mind and the range of his knowledge. Is it not a charming and grateful sight to see a pretty child, with bright and merry eye, with pleased and placid mien, with open and smiling countenance, doing the most serious things under the guise of play, or profoundly occupied with the most frivolous amusements?

Do you now wish to judge of him by comparison? Put him among other children and let him act. You will soon see which is the most truly educated, which most nearly approaches the perfection of their age. Among city children, there is none more dexterous than he, but he is stronger than any other. Among the young peasantry, he equals them in strength and surpasses them in skill. In everything which is within the compass of infancy, he judges, reasons, and foresees better than any one else. As to working, running, jumping, moving bodies, lifting masses, estimating distances, inventing amusements, and gaining prizes, it might be said that Nature is at his command, so easy is it for him to make everything bend to his will. He is made for guiding and governing his equals. Talent and experience serve him instead of law and authority. It matters little what dress or name you give him; he will everywhere take precedence, will everywhere become the chief of others. They will always feel his superiority over them. Without wishing to command, he will always be their master; and without thinking of obedience, they will always obey.

Émile has arrived at the end of the period of infancy, has lived the life of a child, and has not bought his perfection at the cost of his happiness. On the contrary, they have lent each other mutual aid. While acquiring all the reason suited to his age, he has been as happy and as free as his constitution permitted him to be. If the

fatal scythe has come to cut down in him the flower of our hopes, we shall not have to mourn at the same time his life and his death, nor to intensify our griefs by the recollection of those which we have caused him; and we can say to ourselves that he has at least enjoyed his childhood, and that we have caused him to lose nothing of all that Nature had given him.

The great disadvantage of this primary education is that none but clear-sighted men take account of it, and that, in a child educated with such care, vulgar eyes see nothing but a vagabond. A teacher thinks of his own interest rather than that of his pupil. He endeavors to prove that he does not waste his time, and that he earns the money which is paid him; and so he furnishes the child with acquisitions capable of easy display, and which can be exhibited at will. Provided it can easily be seen, it matters not whether what he learns is useful. He stores his memory with this rubbish, without discernment and without choice. When the time comes for examining the child, he is made to display his wares; he brings them out, and we are satisfied; then he ties up his bundle and goes his way. My pupil is not so rich; he has no bundle to display, and has nothing to show but himself. Now, a child can no more be seen in a moment than a man. Where are the observers who can seize at the first glance the traits which characterize him? There are such, but they are few; and out of a hundred fathers not one of this number will be found.

Too many questions weary and disgust people in general, and especially children. At the end of a few minutes their attention flags; they no longer hear what a persistent questioner requires of them, and no longer reply save at random. This manner of examining them is vain and pedantic. It often happens that a random word portrays

their mind and heart better than a long discourse could do; but care must be taken that this word is neither dictated nor fortuitous. We must have good judgment ourselves in order to appreciate the judgment of a child.

I once heard the late Lord Hyde relate an anecdote concerning one of his friends, who, having returned from Italy after an absence of three years, wished to examine the progress of his son, a boy nine or ten years of age. In company with the child and his tutor, they were walking one afternoon where pupils were engaged in the sport of flying their kites. As they were going along, the father said to his son, "Where is the kite whose shadow we see yonder?" Without hesitating or raising his head, the child replied, "On the highway." And in fact, added Lord Hyde, the highway was between us and the sun. At this reply the father embraced his son, and, finishing the examination at that point, continued his walk without saying a word. The next day he sent the tutor a life-pension in addition to his salary.

What a man that father was! And what a son was promised him!* The question was precisely adapted to the child's age. The reply was very simple; but observe what accuracy of childish judgment it supposes. It is thus that Aristotle's pupil† tamed the celebrated steed‡ which no horseman could subdue.

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* A letter of Rousseau to Madame Latour de Franqueville, September 26, 1762, informs us that this young man was the Count de Gisors. He will be mentioned again in Book V.

† Alexander the Great.

‡ Bucephalus. The horse was frightened only at his shadow. The young Alexander discovered the cause and the remedy.

BOOK THIRD.

ÉMILE FROM TWELVE TO FIFTEEN—THE PERIOD OF INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.

ALTHOUGH the whole course of life up to adolescence is a period of weakness, there is a point in the course of this first stage of life when, growth in power having surpassed the growth of needs, the growing animal, still absolutely weak, becomes relatively strong. All his needs not being developed, his actual powers are more than sufficient to provide for those which he has. As a man he would be very weak, but as a child he is very strong.

Whence comes the weakness of man? From the inequality which exists between his strength and his desires. It is our passions which make us weak, because we need more strength than Nature gives us in order to satisfy them. Therefore, to diminish our desires is the same as to augment our powers. He whose strength exceeds his desires has some power to spare; he is certainly a very strong being. This is the third stage of childhood, and the one of which I have now to speak.

At the age of twelve or thirteen the strength of the child is developed much more rapidly than his needs. The most violent, the most terrible, has not yet made itself felt in him. But slightly sensitive to the bad effects of air and weather, he braves them without danger; the growing warmth of his body takes the place of clothing; his appetite serves him instead of condiments; whatever

can nourish him satisfies one of his age; if he is sleepy, he stretches himself on the ground and sleeps. He sees himself surrounded on all sides by everything that is necessary for him; no imaginary need torments him; he is unaffected by opinion; his desires reach no further than his arms. He is not only able to find a sufficiency in himself, but he has strength in excess of his needs; and this is the only time in his life when he will be in this condition.

I foresee an objection. I shall not be told that the child has more needs than I ascribe to him, but it will be denied that he has the power that I attribute to him. People will not reflect that I am speaking of my own pupil, and not of those walking dolls for whom it is a journey to go from one room to another, who are so boxed up as to labor for breath, and carry about burdens of pasteboard. I shall be told that manly strength manifests itself only at the period of manhood; and that the vital forces, elaborated in special organs and distributed through the whole body, can alone give to the muscles that consistency, activity, tone, and spring which are needed to produce real strength. This is the philosophy of books, but I appeal to experience. Out in your fields I see large boys tilling the earth, dressing vines, holding the plow, handling a cask of wine, and driving a wagon, just as their father would. They would be taken for men if the sound of their voices did not betray them. Even in our cities, young artisans, such as blacksmiths, sledge-tool makers, and farriers, are almost as robust as their masters, and would be hardly less skillful if they had been properly trained. If there is any difference—and I grant that there is—it is much less, I repeat, than that between the vehement desires of a man and the moderate desires of a child. Moreover, it is not simply a question of physical strength,

but especially of that strength and capacity of mind which supplies and directs it.

This interval when the power of the individual is greater than his desires, although it is not the period of his greatest absolute strength, is, as I have said, the period of his greatest relative strength. It is the most precious period of life, a period which comes but once; it is very short, and all the shorter, as we shall subsequently see, because it is the more important that it be well employed.

What, then, shall our pupil do with that surplus of faculties and powers which he has on hand at present, but which he will stand in need of at a subsequent period of life? He will endeavor to employ it in tasks which may profit him when the occasion comes; he will project into the future, so to speak, that which is superfluous for the time being. The robust child will make provisions for the feeble man; but he will place these stores neither in coffers which can be stolen from him, nor in barns which are not his own. In order that he may really appropriate his acquisitions to himself, it is in his arms, in his head, and in himself, that he will lodge them. This, then, is the period of labor, of instruction, and of study; and observe, it is not I who have arbitrarily made this choice, but it is Nature herself who indicates it.

Human intelligence has its limits; and not only is man unable to know everything, but he can not even know completely the little that other men know. Since the contradictory of every false proposition is a truth, the number of truths is as inexhaustible as the number of errors. There is, then, a choice in the things which ought to be taught, as well as in the time which is fit for learning them. Of the knowledges which are within our reach, some are false, some are useless, and others serve to nour-

ish the pride of him who has them. The small number of those which really contribute to our well-being are alone worthy the pursuit of a wise man, and consequently of a child whom we wish to render such. It is not at all necessary to know everything, but merely that which is useful.

From this small number we must still subtract the truths which require, for being comprehended, an understanding already formed; such as those which suppose a knowledge of the relations of man to man, which a child can not acquire; or those which, while true in themselves, dispose an inexperienced mind to think falsely on other subjects.

We are thus reduced to a circle which is very small with respect to the existence of things; but yet what an immense sphere this circle forms with respect to the mind of a child! What rash hands shall dare to touch the veil which darkens the human understanding? What abysses I see dug by our vain sciences about this young unfortunate! O thou who art to conduct him in his perilous paths, and to draw from before his eyes the sacred curtain of Nature, tremble! In the first place, make very sure of his head and your own, and have a fear lest either or both become giddy. Beware of the specious attractions of falsehood and of the intoxicating fumes of pride. Remember, ever remember, that ignorance has never been productive of evil, but that error alone is dangerous, and that we do not miss our way through what we do not know, but through what we falsely think we know.

His progress in geometry may serve you as a certain test and measure for the development of his intelligence; but as soon as he can discern what is useful and what is not, it is important to use much tact and skill to interest him in speculative studies. If you wish, for example, to

have him find a mean proportional between two lines, begin in such a way as to make it necessary for him to find a square equal to a given rectangle. If two mean proportionals are required, we must first interest him in the problem of the duplication of the cube, etc. Observe how we are gradually approaching the moral notions which distinguish good from evil. Up to this time we have known no law save that of necessity; we now have regard to that which is useful; and we shall soon come to what is proper and good.

The same instinct animates the different faculties of man. To the activity of the body, which seeks to develop itself, succeeds the activity of the mind, which seeks to be instructed. At first, children are merely restless, then they are curious; and this curiosity, well directed, is the motive power (mobile *) of the age which we have now reached. Let us always distinguish the inclinations which come from Nature from those which come from opinion. There is an ardor for knowledge which is founded merely on the desire to be esteemed wise; but there is another which springs from a curiosity natural to man for all that can interest him from near or from far. The innate desire for well-being, and the impossibility of fully satisfying this desire, cause him to seek without intermission means for contributing to it. Such is the first principle of curiosity—a principle natural to the human heart, but the development of which takes place only in proportion to the growth of our passions and our intelligence. Imagine a philosopher banished to a desert isle with his instruments

* By *mobile*, according to Jouffroy, is meant the element of feeling, which is one factor in action. The term *motif* is used to designate the rational element in action. Maternal affection is a *mobile*, while a cool consideration of duty is a *motif*. See Marion's Psychologie appliquée à l'éducation, p. 127.—(P.)

and his books, sure of spending there in solitude the rest of his days; he will hardly occupy himself longer with the solar system, with the laws of attraction, or with the differential calculus. Perhaps he will not open a single book during the remainder of his life; but he will never refrain from visiting his isle, even to the remotest corner, however great it may be. Let us then likewise reject from our primary studies those branches of knowledge for which man has not a natural taste, and let us limit ourselves to those which instinct leads us to pursue.

The earth is the isle of the human race; and the object which strikes our eyes the most forcibly is the sun. The moment we begin to go beyond ourselves, our first observations will naturally fall on these two objects. Thus the philosophy of almost all savage peoples is occupied wholly with the imaginary divisions of the earth and the divinity of the sun.

"What a leap!" some one will possibly say. A moment ago we were occupied simply with what touches us, with what immediately surrounds us; but all at once we are scouring the globe, and leaping to the extremities of the universe. This sudden transition is the effect of our progress in power, and of our mental inclinations. In our state of feebleness and insufficiency, the care of self-preservation wraps us up within ourselves; while in our state of potency and strength, the desire to give extension to our being carries us out of ourselves and makes us reach out as far as it is possible for us to go; but, as the intellectual world is still unknown to us, our thought goes no farther than our eyes, and our understanding widens only with the space which it measures.

Let us transform our sensations into ideas, but let us not jump abruptly from sensible objects to intellectual

objects; for it is through the first that we are to reach the second. In the first movements of the mind, let the senses always be its guides; let there be no book but the world, and no other instruction than facts. The child who reads does not think—he merely reads; he is not receiving instruction, but is learning words.

Make your pupil attentive to natural phenomena, and you will soon make him curious; but, in order to nourish his curiosity, never be in haste to satisfy it. Ask questions that are within his comprehension, and leave him to resolve them. Let him know nothing because you have told it to him, but because he has comprehended it himself; he is not to learn science, but to discover it.* If you ever substitute in his mind authority for reason, he will no longer reason; he will be but the sport of others' opinions.

You wish to teach this child geography, and you go in search of globes, spheres, and maps. What machines! Why all these representations? Why not begin by showing him the object itself, so that he may know, at least, what you are talking about!

On a fine evening you go out to walk in a favorable place where the horizon, happily unclouded, allows a full view of the setting sun, and you observe the objects which

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* The spirit of this precept is good; the child should be "curious to learn and never satisfied"; but the teacher can not proceed far on the hypothesis that learning is a process of rediscovery, and that knowledge is synonymous with personal experience. Mr. Bain rightly calls such an assumption a "bold fiction." Rediscovery is impossible in history, and impracticable, save to a limited extent, even in science. Rousseau's denunciation of authority is well enough as a protest and a warning against a servile dependence on it; but no sane man can renounce authority if he would, and would not if he could.—(P.)

make it possible to recognize the place of his setting. On the morrow, in order to take an airing, you return to the same place before the sun has risen. You see his coming announced from afar by flashes of fire which he shoots forth before him. The conflagration increases; the east seems all in flames. From their brightness we expect the sun long before he comes to view; at each moment we think we see him approaching, but at last he comes. A brilliant point darts forth like lightning and at once fills all space; the veil of shadows is effaced and falls. Man recognizes his place of sojourn and finds it embellished. During the night the verdure has acquired new vigor; the rising day which illumines it, and the early rays which gild it, show it covered with a brilliant tracery of dew which reflects light and colors to the eye. The birds unite in chorus, and salute in concert the father of life. At this moment not one is silent; their chirping, still feeble, is slower and sweeter than in the rest of the day, as if feeling the languor of a peaceful awakening. The concourse of all these objects brings to the senses an impression of freshness which penetrates even to the soul. This has been a half-hour of enchantment which no man can resist; a spectacle so grand, so beautiful, so delicious, leaves no one with a heart untouched.

Full of the enthusiasm which he has experienced, the teacher wishes to communicate it to the child. He fancies he can move him by making him attentive to the sensations by which he himself has been moved. Pure folly! The living spectacle of Nature is in the heart of man; and to see it, it must be felt. The child perceives objects; but he can not perceive the relations which unite them, and can not hear the sweet harmony of their concert. He needs an experience which he has not acquired, and emotions which he has not experienced,

in order to feel the composite impression which results at once from all these sensations. If he has not long traversed arid plains, if hot sands have not burned his feet, if the stifling reflections of the sun's rays from the rocks have never oppressed him, how will he enjoy the fresh air of a beautiful morning? How will the perfume of flowers, the charm of the verdure, the humid vapor of the dew, and the soft and peaceful step on the lawn enchant his senses? How will the song of birds cause him a rapturous emotion, if the accents of love and pleasure are still unknown to him? With what transports will he see the dawn of a beautiful day, if his imagination can not paint for him those with which it may be filled? Finally, how will he be affected by the beautiful spectacle of Nature, if he does not know the hand that has taken care to adorn it?

Do not address to the child discourses which he can not understand. Let there be no descriptions, no eloquence, no figures of speech, no poetry. Neither sentiment nor taste is now at stake. Continue to be simple, clear, and dispassionate; the time will come, only too soon, for assuming a different language.

Educated in the spirit of our maxims, and accustomed to derive all his instruments from himself, and never to resort to another until after having recognized his own insufficiency, he examines each new object which he sees for a long time without saying anything. He is thoughtful, but asks no questions. Be content, then, with presenting to him suitable objects; and then, when you see his curiosity sufficiently excited, address to him some laconic question which will put him in the way of resolving it.

On the occasion just stated, after having attentively contemplated with him the rising sun — after having

caused him to observe in the same direction the mountains and other neighboring objects—after having allowed him to talk of these things wholly at his ease, keep silent for a few moments, like a man who is dreaming, and then say to him : " I think that last evening the sun set yonder, and that he rose at another place this morning; how can you account for this? " Add nothing more. If he addresses questions to you, do not reply to them, but speak of something else. Leave him to himself, and you may be sure that he will set himself to thinking.

In order that a child may accustom himself to being attentive, and that he may be thoroughly impressed with some sensible truth, it is necessary that it give him some days of unrest before he discover it. If he does not form a proper conception of it in this way, there is a means of making it still more obvious to him, and this is to repeat the question in a different form. If he does not know how the sun goes from his setting to his rising, he knows, at least, how he goes from his rising to his setting; his eyes alone teach him this. Elucidate the first question by the second; and your pupil is either absolutely stupid, or the analogy is too clear to escape him. This is his first lesson in astronomy.

As we always proceed slowly from one sensible idea to another, as we familiarize ourselves for a long time with the same thing before passing to another, and, finally, as we never force our pupil to be attentive, it is a long distance from this first lesson to the knowledge of the revolution of the sun and the shape of the earth; but as all the apparent movements of the celestial bodies depend on the same principle, and as the first observation leads to all the others, it requires less effort, though more time, to pass from the earth's diurnal revolution to the calculation of eclipses, than to form a proper conception of day and night.

We have seen the sun rise on St.-John's-day, and we shall also see him rise on Christmas-day, or some other fine day of winter; for it is known that we are not indolent, and that it is a pastime for us to brave the cold. I take care to make this second observation in the same place where we had made the first; and by means of some tact in order to prepare the way for the remark, one or the other of us will not fail to exclaim: "Oh, oh! This is strange! The sun no longer rises in the same place! Here are our old records; and now the sun rises yonder. There is, then, one place of rising in summer, and another for winter." Youthful teacher, you are now on the right route. These examples ought to suffice you for teaching the sphere with great clearness, while taking the world for the world and the sun for the sun.

In general, never substitute the sign for the thing itself save when it is impossible to show the thing; for the sign absorbs the attention of the child and makes him forget the thing represented.

The armillary sphere seems to me a machine badly arranged, and constructed in false proportions. This confusion of circles and fantastical figures which are traced on it give it the air of a conjuring book, which scares the minds of children. The earth is too small and the circles too large and too numerous; some of them, as the colures, are perfectly useless—each circle is wider than the earth; the thickness of the pasteboard gives them an appearance of solidity which causes them to be taken for really existing circular masses; and when you tell the child that these circles are imaginary, he does not know what he sees, and no longer understands anything.

We never know how to put ourselves in the place of children; we do not enter into their ideas, but we ascribe to them our own; and always following our own modes

of reasoning with series of truths, we cram their heads only with extravagances and errors.

It is a disputed question whether we shall resort to analysis or to synthesis * in the study of the sciences; but it is not always necessary to make a choice. Sometimes we can resolve and compose in the same researches, and may guide the child by the method of instruction when he fancies he is merely analyzing. Then, while employing both at the same time, they serve each other mutually in the way of tests. Starting at the same moment from two opposite points, without thinking of traversing the same route, he will be wholly surprised at the unexpected meeting, and this surprise can not fail to be very agreeable. For example, I would begin the study of geography from these two starting-points, and connect with the study of the revolutions of the globe the measurements of its parts, starting from the place where the child lives. While the child is studying the sphere, and is thus transported into the heavens, recall his attention to the divisions of the earth, and show him at first the spot where he lives.

His first two starting-points in geography will be the city where he lives and the country-seat of his father. After these will come the intermediate places, then the

* By *synthesis*, in the study of geography, Rousseau seems to mean the process which begins with the immediate surroundings of the child, and, by successive additions of territory, finally rises to the conception of the globe as a whole; and by *analysis*, the counter-process which, starting with a conception of the globe as a whole, or, it may be, with the solar system, descends by successive division to the child's immediate neighborhood. The ancient method was analytic, but the modern, in obedience to the supposed requirements of *intuition*, has been synthetic, though there is now a partial returning toward the older, and, I venture to say, the better and more philosophical method.—(P.)

neighboring rivers, and lastly the observation of the sun, and the manner of finding one's way. This is the point of reunion. Let him make for himself a map of all this. This map will be very simple, and composed, at first, of only two objects; but to these he will gradually add the others as he ascertains or estimates their distance and position. You already see what advantage we have procured for him in advance by causing him to use his eyes for a compass.

Notwithstanding all this, it will doubtless be necessary to guide him somewhat; but only a very little, and without seeming to guide him. If he makes mistakes, let him do it; do not correct his errors, but wait in silence till he is in a condition to see them and to correct them for himself; or, at most, on a favorable occasion introduce some procedure which will make him conscious of them. If he were never to make mistakes, he would not learn so well. Moreover, it is not proposed that he shall know the exact topography of the country, but the means of gaining this knowledge for himself. It is of little importance for him to carry maps in his head, provided he has a clear conception of what they represent, and a definite idea of the art which serves for constructing them. You already see the difference there is between the learning of your pupils and the ignorance of mine! They know the maps, but he makes them. These are new ornaments for his chamber.

Always recollect that the spirit of my system is not to teach the child many things, but never to allow anything to enter his mind save ideas which are accurate and clear. Though he learn nothing, it is of little importance to me provided he is not deceived; and I furnish his head with truths only to protect him from errors which he would learn in their place. Reason and judgment come slowly;

but prejudices rush forward in flocks, and it is from these that he must be preserved. But if you make knowledge your sole object, you enter a bottomless and shoreless sea, everywhere strewn with rocks, and you will never extricate yourself from it. When I see a man smitten with the love of knowledge allow himself to be seduced by its charm, and to run from one subject to another without knowing how to stop, I fancy I see a child upon the sea-shore gathering shells. At first, he loads himself with them; then, tempted by those he sees beyond, he throws them away and picks up others, until, weighed down by their number, and not knowing what to select, he ends by throwing all away and returns empty-handed.

During the period of infancy the time was long, and we sought only to lose it, for fear of making a bad use of it. It is now the very reverse of all this, and we have not time enough in which to do all that is useful. Reflect that the passions are approaching, and that the moment they knock at the door your pupil will no longer be attentive save to them. The peaceful epoch of intelligence is so short, it passes so rapidly, it has so many necessary uses, that it is folly to imagine that it suffices to make a child wise. It is not proposed to teach him the sciences, but to give him a taste for them, and methods for learning them, when this taste shall be better developed. Without doubt this is the fundamental principle of all good education.

This is also the time for accustoming the pupil, little by little, to give consecutive attention to the same subject; but it is never constraint, but always pleasure or desire, which should produce this attention. Great care should be taken that attention does not become a burden to him, and that it does not result in *ennui*. Therefore keep a watchful eye over him, and, whatever may happen,

abandon everything rather than have his tasks become irksome; for how much he learns is of no account, but only that he does nothing against his will.*

If he asks you questions, reply just enough to stimulate his curiosity, but not enough to satisfy it. Above all, when you see that, instead of asking questions for instruction, he undertakes to beat the bush and to annoy you with silly questions, stop on the instant, for you may then be sure that he no longer cares for the thing itself, but merely to subject you to his interrogations. You must have less regard to the words which he pronounces than for the motive which prompts him to speak. This caution, hitherto less necessary, becomes of the utmost importance the moment the child begins to reason.

There is a chain of general truths by which all the sciences hold to common principles and are developed in logical succession. This chain is the method of the philosophers; but in this place we are not at all concerned with it. There is a totally different one, by means of which each individual object brings forward another, and always points out the one which follows it. This order, which through a continual curiosity stimulates the attention required of us, is the one which most men follow, and is especially the one required by children.

We had observed for a long time, my pupil and I, that amber, glass, wax, and other bodies, when rubbed, attracted straws, and that others did not attract them. By chance we found one which has a property still more

* In the actual conduct of life the path of duty often crosses that of inclination, and Émile will have a sorry preparation for living if he does not learn to bend his neck to the yoke of authority. This is a fundamental and fatal vice in Rousseau's ethical system, and he is here following the bias of his own disordered life.—(P.)

singular—that of attracting at some distance, and without being rubbed, filings and other bits of iron. How many times this quality amused us without our being able to see anything more in it! At last we discover that it is communicated even to iron magnetized by a certain process. One day we went to the fair, where we saw a juggler attract with a piece of bread a wax duck floating in a basin of water.* We were greatly surprised, but we did not say that the man was a sorcerer, for we did not know what a sorcerer was. Continually impressed by effects of whose cause we were ignorant, we were in no hurry to come to any conclusion, and we quietly reposed in our ignorance until we found occasion to escape from it.

On reaching home we continued to talk of the duck at the fair, and so took it into our heads to imitate it. We took a good needle, well magnetized, and surrounded it with white wax, which we did our best to mold into the form of a duck in such a way that the needle traversed the body, and with its eye formed the beak of the bird. We placed the duck on the water, brought a key near the beak, and saw, with a joy easy to comprehend, that our duck followed the key precisely as the one at the fair followed the piece of bread. At another time we might have observed in what direction the duck turns his head when left on the water in a state of repose; but at that moment,

* I can not resist laughing while reading a spirited criticism of M. de Formey on this little story: "This juggler," he says, "who takes pride in competing with a child, and gravely lectures his instructor, is an individual living in a world of Émiles." The witty M. de Formey can not suppose that this little scene was prearranged, and that the juggler had been instructed in the part he was to play; for this, in fact, is what I have not said. But how many times, let me remind him, have I declared that I did not write for people who needed to have everything told to them!

wholly occupied with our object, we had no further purpose in view.

That same afternoon we returned to the fair with prepared bread in our pockets; and as soon as the juggler had performed his trick, my little doctor, who could scarcely contain himself, said to him that the trick was not difficult, and that he could do it just as well himself. He was taken at his word. He at once took from his pocket the bread in which a piece of iron was concealed. With beating heart he approached the table, and with trembling hand presented the bread. The duck came forward and followed, the child shouting and trembling with joy. At the clapping of hands and the cheers of the crowd, his head was turned and he was beside himself. The juggler, though confounded, came forward to embrace and congratulate him, and begged the honor of his presence for the morrow, adding that he would do his best to bring together still more people to applaud his cleverness. My little philosopher, puffed up with pride, was bent on prating; but I at once shut his mouth and took him away, loaded with praises.

With an uneasiness that was laughable the child counted the minutes until the next morning. He invited everybody he met, and would have the whole human race witness his glory. He awaited the hour with impatience, and anticipated it by rushing off to the place of assembly, which he found already crowded. On entering, his young heart expanded. Other sports were to precede; the juggler surpassed himself, and executed surprising feats. The child saw nothing of all this, but was nervous, in a state of perspiration, and scarcely breathed. He spent his time in handling with impatience the piece of bread which he carried in his pocket. At last his turn came, and he was formally presented to the public. He stepped for-

ward, somewhat abashed, and took the bread from his pocket. A new vicissitude in human affairs! The duck, yesterday so tame, had become wild to-day, and instead of presenting his beak he turned tail and sailed away. He refused the bread and the hand that offered it with as much care as he had previously followed them. After a thousand useless attempts, which were always greeted with hoots, the child complained, said that he had been deceived, that it was another duck which had been substituted for the first, and dared the juggler to attract this one.

The juggler, without making any reply, took a piece of bread and presented it to the duck, which instantly followed the bread, and approached the hand which drew it back. The child took the same piece of bread; but far from succeeding better than before, he saw the duck make fun of him, and execute pirouettes all around the basin. He finally withdrew, covered with confusion, and no longer dared expose himself to the hoots and jeers.

Then the juggler took the piece of bread which the child had brought, and used it with as much success as he did his own. He drew out the piece of iron in the presence of the audience, and there was another laugh at our expense; and then with this bread alone he attracted the duck as before. He did the same thing with another piece of bread cut in the presence of the audience by a third hand. He did the same with his glove, and with the tip of his finger. Finally he withdrew to the middle of the room, and, with a pompous tone peculiar to these people, declaring that his duck would obey his voice no less than the movement of his hand, he spoke to it and the duck obeyed. He told it to go to the right, and it went to the right; to come back, and it came; to turn, and it turned; the movement was as prompt as the order.

The redoubled plaudits were so many affronts for us. We slipped out without being observed, and shut ourselves up in our chamber, without going to relate our success to everybody, as we had intended.

The next morning some one knocked at our door. I opened it, and there was the juggler. He modestly complained of our conduct. What had he done to us to make us willing to discredit his feats and to take away from him his livelihood? What was there so wonderful in the art of attracting a wax duck as to make us willing to buy this honor at the expense of the subsistence of an honest man? "On my honor, gentlemen, if I had some other talent for making a living I would hardly plume myself on this one. You may well believe that a man who has spent his life in working at this sorry trade knows much more about it than you who have been occupied with it for only a few minutes. If I did not at first show you masterpieces of my art, it was because it was not necessary to be in haste to make a foolish exhibition of what one knows. I have always taken care to save my best tricks for special emergencies, and besides what I showed you I have still others to arrest the attention of young inconsiderates. Finally, gentlemen, I have cheerfully come to teach you the secret which has caused you so much trouble, praying you not to use it to my disadvantage, and hereafter to be more discreet."

Then he showed his machine, and we saw with the utmost surprise that it consisted merely of a strong magnet, well mounted, which a child concealed under the table caused to move without being detected.

The man put up his machine, and, after having expressed our thanks and our excuses, we wished to make him a present, but he refused it. "No, gentlemen, you have not sufficiently commended yourselves to my favor

to permit me to accept your gifts; and against your will I leave you under obligations to me. This is my only revenge. Learn that there is generosity in men of all conditions; I receive pay for my tricks, not for my lessons."

All the details of this example are more important than they seem. How many lessons in this single one! How many mortifying consequences follow the first movement of vanity! Youthful teacher, carefully watch this first movement. If you can thus draw from it humiliation and disgrace, you may be sure that it will be a long time before a second instance will occur. What preparations! you will say. I grant it, and all for the sake of making a compass to serve us instead of a noon-mark.

Having learned that the magnet acts through other bodies, we have nothing else to do than to make a machine similar to that which we have seen—a hollow table, a very shallow basin adjusted to this table and filled with a few inches of water, a duck made with a little more care, etc. Often directing our attention to the basin, we finally observe that the duck in repose always affects nearly the same direction. We repeat this experiment, examine this direction, and find that it is from south to north. Nothing more is necessary. Our compass is found, or something equally good, and we are now ready for physical science.

On the earth there are different climates, these climates have different temperatures. The seasons vary more sensibly as we approach the pole; all bodies are contracted by cold and are expanded by heat; this effect is more measurable in liquids, and more sensible in spirituous liquors. Hence the thermometer. The wind strikes the face; the air is then a body, a fluid; we feel it, although we have no means of seeing it. Invert a glass in water, and the water will not fill it unless you leave a place for the air to

escape; the air is then capable of resistance. Press the glass farther down and the water will gain on the air but can not wholly replace it; the air is then capable of compression up to a certain limit. A ball filled with compressed air has greater elasticity than if filled with any other matter; the air is then an elastic body. While lying in your bath, lift your arm horizontally from the water, and you will feel it loaded with a terrible weight; the air is then a heavy body. By putting the air in equilibrium with other fluids we can measure its weight. Hence the barometer, the siphon, the air-gun, and the pneumatic engine. All the laws of statics and hydrostatics are discovered by experiments which are just as rude. I would not have one enter a laboratory of experimental physics for anything of this kind. All this parade of instruments and machines displeases me. The scientific atmosphere kills science. All these machines either frighten the child, or their appearance divides and absorbs the attention which he owes to their effects.

I wish we might make all our own apparatus; and I would not begin by making the instrument before the experiment; but, after having caught a glimpse of the experiment, as by hazard, I would invent, little by little, the instrument which is to verify it. I prefer that our instruments should be less perfect and accurate, and that we should have more exact ideas of what they ought to be, and of the operations which ought to result from them. For my first lesson in statics, instead of hunting for balances, I put a stick crosswise on the back of a chair and measure the length of the two parts of the stick in equilibrium, and I add weights to both sides, sometimes equal and sometimes unequal, and drawing back or extending the stick as it may be necessary, I finally discover that equilibrium results from a reciprocal propor-

tion between the amount of the weights and the length of the levers. Here is my little physicist already capable of rectifying balances before having seen any.

Without doubt we derive much clearer and much more accurate notions of things which we learn for ourselves than of those which we gain from the instruction of others; and besides, not accustoming our reason to submit slavishly to authority, we become more ingenious in discovering relations and in associating ideas, than when, accepting all this just as it is given us, we allow our mind to become weighed down with indifference, just as the body of a man who is always dressed and attended by his servants and carried about by his horses finally loses the strength and use of his limbs. Boileau boasted of having taught Racine to rhyme with much difficulty. Among so many admirable methods for abridging the study of the sciences, it is very necessary that some one give us a method for learning them with effort.

The most obvious advantage of these slow and laborious investigations is to maintain, in the midst of speculative studies, the body in activity, the limbs in their flexibility, and the ceaseless training of the hands to labor and to employments useful to man. So many instruments invented to guide us in our experiments and to supply the place of accurate sense-perception cause us to neglect the exercise of it. The graphometer relieves us from estimating the size of angles; the eye which measured distances with precision relies on the chain which measures them for it. The steelyard relieves me from estimating by the hand the weight which I was accustomed to ascertain by it. The more ingenious our instruments are, the blunter and more clumsy our organs become By collecting machines about us we no longer find them within ourselves.

But when we bestow on the manufacturer of these machines the skill which supplied their place, when we employ in making them the sagacity which was needed for doing without them, we gain without losing anything —we add art to nature, and we become more ingenious without becoming less dextrous. Instead of making a child stick to his books, if I employ him in a workshop, his hands labor to the profit of his mind; he becomes a philosopher, but fancies he is only a workman. Finally, this exercise has other uses, of which I shall speak hereafter; and we shall see how from the recreations of philosophy we may rise to the real functions of a man.

I have already said that purely speculative knowledge is hardly adapted to children, even when they have approached adolescence; but, without carrying them very far into systematic physics, proceed in such a way that all their experiments may be connected through some sort of deduction, so that by the aid of this chain they may place them in order in their mind, and recall them when occasion requires; for it is very difficult to hold isolated facts, or even trains of reasoning, for a very long time in the memory when we have no hold by which to recall them.

In your search for the laws of Nature, always begin with the most common and the most obvious phenomena, and accustom your pupil not to take these phenomena for reasons, but for facts. I take a stone and pretend to set it in the air; I open my hand, and the stone falls. I look at Émile, who is attentive to what I am doing, and say to him, Why did that stone fall? What child would stop short at this question? No one, not even Émile, unless I had taken great pains to prepare him for not knowing how to reply to it. All will say that the stone falls because it is heavy. And what is it to be heavy?

It is that which makes a body fall. Then the stone falls because it falls! Here my little philosopher stopped in earnest. This is his first lesson in systematic physics, and whether or not it may be profitable in this way, it will always be a lesson in good sense.

In proportion as the child advances in intelligence, other important considerations oblige us to be more careful in the choice of his occupations. As soon as he comes to have sufficient knowledge of himself to conceive in what his welfare consists, as soon as he can grasp relations sufficiently extended to judge of what is best and what is not best for him, from that moment he is in a condition to feel the difference between work and play, and to regard the second merely as a respite from the first. Then objects of real utility may enter into his studies, and may invite him to give to them a more constant application than he gave to simple amusements. The law of necessity, always reappearing, teaches man from an early hour to do what does not please him, in order to prevent an evil which would be more displeasing. Such is the use of foresight; and from this foresight, well or badly regulated, springs all human wisdom or all human misery.

When, before feeling their needs, children foresee them, their intelligence is already far advanced, and they begin to know the value of time. It is then important to accustom them to direct its employment to useful objects, but of a utility sensible at their age and within the scope of their understanding. Whatever relates to the moral order and to the usages of society ought not to be presented to them so soon, because they are not in a condition to understand it. It is absurd to require them to apply themselves to things which are vaguely declared to be for their good, without their knowing what this good

is of which they are assured they will derive profit when grown, and without their taking any present interest in this assumed advantage which they can not comprehend.

Let the child do nothing on trust. Nothing is good for him which he does not feel to be such. In always keeping him in advance of his intelligence you think you are exercising foresight, but you are lacking in it. In order to furnish him with some vain instruments of which he will perhaps never make use, you take from him the most universal instrument of man, which is good sense; you accustom him to allow himself always to be led, and never to be anything but a machine in the hands of others. You wish him to be docile while young; but this is to wish him to be credulous and a dupe when grown. You are always saying to him: "All I require of you is for your advantage; but you are not in a condition to know it. Of what advantage is it to me whether or not you do what I require? It is for yourself alone that you are working." With all these fine speeches which you now address to him in order to make him wise, you are preparing for the success of those which a visionary, a pretender, a charlatan, a rogue, or fools of every sort, will one day address to him in order to catch him in their net, or to make him adopt their folly.

A man should know many things whose utility a child could not comprehend; but must and can a child learn all that it is important for a man to know? Try to teach a child all that is useful for one of his age, and you will discover that his time will be more than filled. Why will you, to the prejudice of studies which are adapted to him to-day, apply him to those of an age which he is so little certain to reach? But you will say: "Will there be time to learn what one ought to know when the moment shall have come to make use of it?" I can not

say; but what I do know is that it is impossible to learn it sooner, for our real masters are experience and feeling, and a man never really feels what is befitting a man save in the relations where he has found himself. A child knows that he is destined to become a man, and all the ideas which he can have of man's estate are occasions of instruction to him; but of the ideas of that state which are not within his comprehension, he ought to remain in absolute ignorance. My whole book is but a continual proof of this principle of education.

As soon as we have succeeded in giving our pupil an idea of the word *useful*, we have another strong hold for governing him; for this word makes a strong impression on him, provided he has only an idea of it in proportion to his age, and clearly sees how it is related to his actual welfare. Your children have not been impressed by this word because you have not taken care to give them an idea of it which is within their comprehension; and because, as others always take it upon themselves to provide what is useful for them, they never have occasion to think of it themselves, and do not know what utility is.

What is this good for? Henceforth this is the consecrated word, the decisive word between him and me in all the transactions of our life. This is the question which on my part invariably follows all his questions, and which serves as a check on those multitudes of foolish and tiresome questions with which children weary all those who are about them, without respite and without profit, more to exercise over them some sort of domination than to derive any advantage from them. When one has been taught, as his most important lesson, to desire nothing in the way of knowledge save what is useful, he asks questions like Socrates; he does not ask a question without

framing for himself its answer, which he knows will be demanded of him before resolving it.

As it is of little importance that your pupil learn this or that, provided he has a clear conception of what he learns and of its use, the moment you can not give him an explanation of what you have told him is good for him, give him no explanation at all. Say to him without scruple: I have no good reply to make to you; I was wrong; let it all go. If your instruction was wholly out of place, there is no harm in abandoning it wholly; if it was not, with a little care you will soon find occasion to make him conscious of its utility.

I do not like discursive explanations; young people pay little attention to them, and hardly ever retain them. Things! things! I shall never repeat often enough that we give too much power to words. With our babbling education we make nothing but babblers.

Suppose that while I am studying with my pupil the course of the sun and the manner of finding the points of the compass, he suddenly interrupts me, by asking what all this is good for. What a fine discourse I might hold with him! On how many things I might take occasion to instruct him while replying to his questions, especially if we had witnesses of our conversation!* I might speak to him of the utility of travel, of the advantages of commerce, of the productions peculiar to each climate, of the manners of different peoples, of the use of the calendar, of the computation of the return of seasons for agriculture, of the art of navigation, of the manner of making

* I have often observed that in the learned instructions which we give to children we think less of making ourselves heard by them than by the grand personages who are present. I am very certain of what I have now said, for I have observed this very thing of myself.

one's way on the sea, and of following our route with exactness without knowing where we are. Politics, natural history, astronomy, even ethics and the law of nations might enter into my explanation in such a way as to give my pupil a grand idea of all these sciences and a great desire to learn them. When I had said all, I would have made the display of a real pedant, and my pupil would not have gained a single idea. He would have a great desire to ask me, as before, what purpose it serves to find the points of the compass, but he dares not for fear of offending me. He finds it more to his advantage to feign to understand what he has been forced to hear. It is in this way that children get what is called a polished education.

But our Émile, educated in a more rustic manner, to whom we have given, with so much trouble, a dull understanding, will listen to nothing of all this. From the first word which he does not understand he runs away, goes frolicking through the room, and leaves me to hold forth all alone. Let us look for a more homely solution; my scientific apparatus is worth nothing to him.

We were observing the position of the forest at the north of Montmorency when he interrupted me by his importunate question, *Of what use is that?* You are right, I say to him; we must think of that at our leisure; and if we find that this work is good for nothing, we will not resume it, for we have no lack of useful amusements. We occupy ourselves with something else, and the question of geography is not raised for the rest of the day.

On the following morning I propose to him a walk before breakfast; he asks nothing better. Children are always ready for a ramble, and this one has good legs. We enter the forest, we stroll through the meadows, we become lost, we no longer know where we are; and when

we attempt to return we are no longer able to find our way back. Time passes, the heat increases, and we are hungry; we hurry on, we wander about to no purpose from place to place, and everywhere we find but woods, walks, plains, but no information for finding our way. Very warm, very weary, very hungry, the only purpose served by our wanderings is to lead us farther astray. We finally seat ourselves in order to rest and deliberate. Émile, whom I suppose to be educated as other children are, does not deliberate; he weeps. He does not know that we are at the gate of Montmorency, and that a simple hedge conceals it from us; but this hedge is a forest for him; a man of his stature is buried in bushes.

After a few moments' silence, I say to him with a disturbed air: "My dear Émile, how shall we proceed to get out of this place?"

Émile (*dripping with sweat and weeping bitterly*). "I know nothing about it. I am tired, hungry, and thirsty; I can do nothing more."

Jean Jacques. "Do you fancy I am in a better condition than you are, and do you think that I should fail to weep if I could dine on my tears? It is not a question of weeping, but of finding our way. Let us see your watch; what time is it?"

É. "It is noon, and I have not had my breakfast."

J. J. "That is true; it is noon, and I, too, have had nothing to eat."

É. "Oh, then you too must be hungry!"

J. J. "The misfortune is that my dinner will not come to find me here. It is noon, and it is exactly the hour when we were observing yesterday from Montmorency the position of the forest. If we could also observe from the forest the position of Montmorency? . . ."

É. "Oh, yes; but yesterday we saw the forest, and from this place we do not see the city."

J. J. "This is the difficulty. . . . If we could do without seeing it and still find its position? . . . "

É. "O my good friend!"

J. J. "Did we not say that the forest was? . . ."

É. "At the north of Montmorency."

J. J. "Consequently, Montmorency should be . . ."

É. "At the south of the forest."

J. J. "We have a means of finding the north at noon."

É. "Yes, by the direction of a shadow."

J. J. "But the south?"

É. "How shall we find it?"

J. J. "The south is opposite the north."

É. "That is true; we have only to look opposite the shadow. Oh! there is the south! There is the south! surely Montmorency is in that direction; let us look for it there."

J. J. "Perhaps you are right; let us take this path through the woods."

É. (*clapping his hands and shouting for joy*). Ah! I see Montmorency! There it is before us, in plain sight. Let us go to breakfast, let us go to dinner, let us make haste. Astronomy is good for something."

Be assured that if he does not say these last words, he will think them; it is of little importance, provided it is not I who speak them. Now, you may be sure that as long as he lives he will not forget the lesson of that day; whereas, if I had done no more than invent all this for him in his chamber, my discourse would have been forgotten by the following day. So far as possible, we must speak by actions, and tell only what can not be done.

The relations of effects to causes whose connection we

do not see, the good and the evil of which we have no idea, the needs which we have never felt, are as nothing to us; it is impossible to interest us through them in doing anything connected with them. At the age of fifteen we see the happiness of a wise man, just as at thirty we see the glory of paradise. If we have no clear conception of either we shall do but little to acquire it; and even when we form a conception of it, we shall still do but little if we do not desire it, if we do not think it good for us. It is in vain that dispassionate reason makes us approve or blame; it is only passion that can make us act; and how can we become impassioned for interests which we have not yet had?

Never direct the child's attention to anything which he can not see. While humanity is almost unknown to him, as you are not able to raise him to the state of man, lower man for him to the state of childhood. While thinking of what would be useful to him at another age, speak to him only of that whose utility he sees at present. Moreover, let there never be comparisons with other children; as soon as he begins to reason let him have no rivals, no competitors, even in running. I would a hundred times rather he would not learn what he can learn only through jealousy or through vanity. But every year I will mark the progress he has made; I will compare it with that which he makes the following year. I will say to him: "You have grown so many inches; there is the ditch which you jumped and the load which you carried; here is the distance you threw a stone and the course you ran at one breath. Let us see what you can do now." In this way I excite him without making him jealous of any one. I would have him surpass himself, and he ought to do it. I see no harm in his being his own rival.

I hate books; they merely teach us to talk of what

we do not know.* It is said that Hermes engraved on columns the elements of the sciences in order to protect his discoveries from the deluge. If he had thoroughly imprinted them in the heads of men they would have been preserved there through tradition. Well-prepared brains are the monuments on which human knowledges are most permanently engraved.

Might there not be a means of bringing together so many lessons scattered through so many books, and of reuniting them under a common object which may be easy to see, interesting to follow, and which may serve as a stimulus, even to children of this age? If we can invent a situation where all the natural needs of man are exhibited in a manner obvious to the mind of a child, and where the means of providing for these same needs are successively developed with the same facility, it is by the living and artless portraiture of this state that the first exercise must be given to his imagination.

Zealous philosopher, I see that your imagination is already excited. Do not disturb yourself; this situation has been found, has been described, and, by your leave, much better than you can describe it yourself—at least, with more truth and simplicity. Since we must necessarily have books, there exists one which, to my way of thinking, furnishes the happiest treatise on natural education. This book shall be the first which my Émile will read; for a long time it will of itself constitute his whole

* This is doubtless a rhetorical style of saying that knowledge at first hand is preferable to knowledge that comes to us through the interpretation of language. Pestalozzi and even Plato affected a contempt for books; yet they were prolific authors, and owe their immortality to their writings. There are modern instances of this self-inflicted and unconscious satire of writing books to prove that books are useless!—(P.)

library, and always hold a distinguished place in it. It shall be the text on which all our conversations on the natural sciences will serve merely as a commentary. During our progress it will serve as a test for the state of our judgment; and, as long as our taste is not corrupted, the reading of it will always please us. What, then, is this wonderful book? Is it Aristotle? Is it Pliny? Is it Buffon? No; it is Robinson Crusoe. *

Robinson Crusoe on his island, alone, deprived of the assistance of his fellows and of the instruments of all the arts, yet providing for his own subsistence and preservation, and procuring for himself a state of comparative comfort—here is an object interesting for every age, and one which may be made agreeable to children in a thousand ways. This is how we realize the desert island which first served me as a means of comparison. This, I grant, is not the condition of man as a social being, and probably is not to be that of Émile; but it is with reference to this state that we are to appreciate all the others. The surest means of rising above prejudices, and of ordering our judgments in accordance with the true relations of things, is to put ourselves in the place of an isolated man, and to judge of everything as this man must judge of it, having regard to its proper utility. This romance, divested of all its rubbish, beginning with the shipwreck of Robinson near his island, and ending with the arrival of the vessel which comes to take him away from it, will be at once the amusement and the instruction of Émile during the period now under

* Rousseau owed many of his ideas to the greater writers of ancient and modern times; but the source of his *inspiration* was Robinson Crusoe. This narrative accorded exactly with Rousseau's temperament, and afforded him an ideal gratification of his instincts.—(P.)

discussion. I would have his head turned by it, and having him constantly occupied with his castle, his goats, and his plantations, I would have him learn in detail, not in books but from things, all that he would need to know in a similar situation; I would have him think he is Robinson himself; and have him see himself dressed in skins, wearing a broad hat, a large saber, and all the grotesque equipage of the character, even to the umbrella which he will never need. I would have him, when anxious about the measures to be adopted, in case he is in want of this or that, examine the conduct of his hero, and inquire if nothing has been omitted, and whether something better might not have been done; I would have him attentively note his faults, and profit by them, so as not to fall into them himself under similar circumstances; for do not doubt that he is forming a scheme to go and set up a similar establishment. This is the real castle-building of that happy age when we know no other happiness than necessity and liberty.

What a resource this play is for a man of ability who calls it into being only to the end that he may turn it to profitable account! The child, in haste to make a storehouse for his island, will be more zealous to learn than his master to teach. He will wish to know everything that is useful, and to know only that; you will no longer need to guide him, but only to hold him back. Therefore let us make haste to establish him in his island while he finds all his happiness in it; for the day will come when, if he still wishes to live there, he would no longer live there alone, and when Friday, who now scarcely interests him, will not long suffice him.

The practice of the natural arts, for which a single man may suffice, leads to the cultivation of the industrial arts, which need the co-operation of several hands. The

first may be practiced by recluses and savages; but the others can be developed only in society which they render necessary. As long as we know only physical needs, each man suffices for himself; but the introduction of the superfluous makes indispensable the division and distribution of labor; for, while a man working alone gains merely the subsistence of one man, a hundred men working in concert will gain enough for the subsistence of two hundred. As soon, then, as a part of mankind seek repose, the united arms of those who labor are needed to supplement the idleness of those who are doing nothing.

Your greatest anxiety ought to be to divert the mind of your pupil from all the notions of social relations which are not within his comprehension; but when the relationships of knowledge compel you to show him the mutual dependence of men, instead of showing it to him on its moral side, first turn his attention to industry and the mechanic arts which make men useful to one another. In conducting him from shop to shop never suffer him to see any labor without putting his own hand to the work, nor to go away without perfectly knowing the reason of all that is done there, or at least of all that he has observed. For this purpose, labor yourself, and be an example to him in all things. In order to make him a master, be everywhere an apprentice; and count that an hour's labor will teach him more things than he will retain from a day of explanations.

"My son is made to live in the world; he will not live with sages, but with fools; he must therefore know their follies, since it is through them that they wish to be governed. The real knowledge of things may be good, but that of men and their judgments is worth still more; for in human society the greatest instrument of man is man, and the wisest is he who uses this instrument the

best. Why give children the idea of an imaginary order of things wholly contrary to that which they will find established, and according to which they must regulate their conduct? First give them lessons to make them wise, and then you will give them the means of judging in what respect others are fools."

These are the specious maxims by which the false prudence of parents strives to render their children the slaves of prejudice on which they have been nourished, and themselves the puppets of the senseless crowd whom they think to make the instruments of their passions. In order to attain to a knowledge of man, how many things must be previously learned! Man is the final study of the sage, and you presume to make of him the first study of a child! Before instructing him in our feelings, begin by teaching him to appreciate them. Is it knowing folly to take it for reason? In order to be wise we must discern what is not wise. How will your child know men if he can neither judge of their judgments nor detect their errors? It is a misfortune to know what they think when we do not know whether what they think is true or false. First teach him, then, what things are in themselves, and you will afterward teach him what they are as you see them. It is in this way that he will learn to compare opinion with truth, and to rise above the common herd; for we do not recognize prejudices when we adopt them, and we do not lead the people when we resemble them. But if you begin by instructing your child in public opinion before teaching him to estimate its value, be assured that whatever you may do, it will become his own, and that you will no longer destroy it. My conclusion is, that to render a young man judicious, we must carefully form his judgments instead of dictating to him our own.

You see that up to this point I have not spoken to my pupil of men, for he will have too much good sense to understand me; his relations with his species are not yet obvious enough for him to be able to judge of others by himself. He knows no other human being save himself, and he is even very far from knowing himself; but if he expresses few judgments of himself, at least he expresses only those that are just. He does not know what the place of others is, but he recognizes his own and keeps it. Instead of by social laws which he can not know, we have bound him by the chains of necessity. He is hardly more than a physical being; let us continue to keep him such.

It is through their sensible relations with his utility, his safety, his preservation, and his comfort, that he ought to appreciate all the bodies of nature, and all the works of men. Thus, in his eyes, iron ought to have a far greater value than gold, and glass than a diamond. So also he will honor a shoemaker or a mason much more than a Lempereur, a Le Blanc, and all the jewelers of Europe. A pastry-cook, in particular, is a very important man in his eyes, and he would give the whole Academy of Science for the smallest confectioner of Lombard Street. Goldsmiths, engravers, gilders, embroiderers, are, in his opinion, but idlers who amuse themselves at pastimes which are perfectly useless; he does not even put much value on clock-making.

I do not inquire whether it is true that industry is more important and deserves a higher recompense in the elegant arts, by which a finish is given to original materials, than in the primary labor which converts them to human use; but I do say that in all cases the art whose use is the most general and the most indispensable is incontestably the one which deserves the most esteem; and

that the one to which fewer arts are necessary deserves it still more than those more subordinate, because it is freer and nearer independence. These are the true rules for estimating arts and industries; all others are arbitrary, and depend on opinion.

The first and most respectable of all the arts is agriculture. I would place the forge in the second rank, carpentering in the third, and so on. The child who has not been seduced by vulgar prejudices will judge of them precisely in the same way. How many important reflections on this point will our Émile draw from his *Robinson Crusoe!* What will he think as he sees that the arts are perfected only by subdivision and by multiplying to infinity their respective instruments? He will say to himself: "All these people are stupidly ingenious; one would think that they are afraid that their arms and fingers may be good for something, seeing they invent so many instruments for dispensing with them. In order to practice a single art they have put a thousand others under contribution; a city is necessary for each workman. As for my companion and myself, we place our genius in our dexterity; we make for ourselves instruments which we can carry everywhere with us. All these people, so proud of their talents in Paris, would be of no account on our island, and in their turn would be our apprentices."

Reader, do not pause here to see the bodily training and manual dexterity of our pupil, but consider what direction we are giving to his childish curiosity; consider his senses, his inventive spirit, his foresight; consider what a head we are going to form for him; in everything he sees, in everything he does, he will wish to know everything, and understand the reason of everything; from instrument to instrument, he will always ascend to the

first; he will take nothing on trust; he will refuse to learn that which can not be understood without an anterior knowledge which he does not possess. If he sees a spring made, he would know how the steel was taken from the mine; if he sees the pieces of a box put together, he would know how the tree was cut; if he himself is at work, at each tool that he is using he will not fail to say to himself: "If I did not have this tool, how should I go to work to make one like it or to do without it?"

Besides, it is an error difficult to avoid, in occupations for which the teacher has a passion, always to suppose that the child has the same taste. Take care, when the amusement of labor engrosses you, lest your pupil grow tired of it without daring to notify you of it. The child ought to be wholly absorbed in the thing he is doing; but you ought to be wholly absorbed in the child—observing him, watching him without respite, and without seeming to do so, having a presentiment of his feelings in advance, and preventing those which he ought not to have, and, finally, employing him in such a way that he not only feels that he is useful in what he is doing, but that he may feel a pleasure in it from clearly comprehending that what he does has a useful purpose.

The need of a conventional standard of value by which things may be measured and exchanged has caused money to be invented; for money is but a term of comparison for the value of things of different kinds; and in this sense money is the true bond of society. But everything may be money. Formerly, cattle were money, and shells still are among several peoples; iron was money in Sparta, leather has been in Sweden, and gold and silver are with us.

Thus explained, the use of this invention is made obvious to the most stupid. It is difficult to compare

immediately things of different kinds—cloth, for example —with wheat; but when a common measure has been found, namely, money, it is easy for the manufacturer and the laborer to refer the value of the things which they wish to exchange to this common measure. If a given quantity of cloth is worth a given sum of money, and if a given quantity of wheat is also worth the same sum of money, it follows that the merchant receiving this wheat for his cloth makes an equitable exchange. Thus it is by means of money that goods of different kinds become commensurable, and may be compared.

Do not go further than this, and do not enter into an explanation of the moral effects of this institution. In everything it is important clearly to set forth its uses before showing its abuses. If you attempt to explain to children how signs cause things to be neglected, how from money proceed all the vagaries of opinion, how countries rich in money must be poor in everything else, you are treating these children not only as philosophers, but as men of wisdom; and you are attempting to make them understand what few philosophers even have clearly comprehended.

To what an abundance of interesting objects may we not thus turn the curiosity of the pupil without ever quitting the real and material relations which are within his reach or allowing a single idea to arise in his mind which he can not comprehend! The art of the teacher consists in never allowing his observations to bear on minutiæ which serve no purpose, but ever to confront him with the wide relations which he must one day know in order to judge correctly of the order, good and bad, of civil society. He must know how to adapt the conversations with which he amuses his pupil to the turn of mind which he has given him. A given question which might

not arouse the attention of another would torment Émile for six months.

We go to dine at an elegant house, and find all the preparations for a feast—many people, many servants, many dishes, and a table-service elegant and fine. All this apparatus of pleasure and feasting has something intoxicating in it which affects the head when we are not accustomed to it. I foresee the effect of all this on my young pupil. While the repast is prolonged, while the courses succeed each other, and while a thousand noisy speeches are in progress around the table, I approach his ear and say to him: "Through how many hands do you really think has passed all that you see on this table before it reaches it?" What a host of ideas do I awaken in his mind by these few words! In an instant all the vapors of delirium are expelled. He dreams, he reflects, he calculates, he becomes restless. While the philosophers, enlivened by the wine, and perhaps by their companions, talk nonsense and play the child, he philosophizes all alone in his corner. He interrogates me, but I refuse to reply, and put him off until another time; he becomes impatient, forgets to eat and drink, and longs to be away from the table in order to converse with me at his ease. What an object for his curiosity! What a text for his instruction! With a sound judgment which nothing has been able to corrupt, what will he think of luxury when he finds that all the regions of the world have been put under contribution, that twenty millions of hands, perhaps, have been at work for a long time to create the material for this feast, and that it may have cost the lives of thousands of men?

Carefully watch the secret conclusions which he draws in his heart from all these observations. If you have guarded him less carefully than I suppose, he may be

tempted to turn his reflections in another direction, and to regard himself as a personage of importance to the world, seeing there has been this vast combination of human industry for the preparation of his dinner. If you have a presentiment of this reasoning, you may easily prevent it before he forms it, or, at least, may at once efface its impression. Not yet knowing how to appreciate things save through the material enjoyment of them, he can not judge of their fitness or unfitness for him save through obvious relations. The comparison of a simple and rustic dinner, prepared for by exercise and seasoned by hunger, liberty, and joy, with a feast so magnificent and elaborate, will suffice to make him feel that as all this festal preparation has given him no real profit, and as his stomach comes just as well satisfied from the table of the peasant as from that of the banker, there was nothing at the one more than at the other which he could truly call his own.

What remains for us to do after having observed all that surrounds us? To convert to our use all of it that we can appropriate to ourselves, and to make use of our curiosity for the advantage of our own well-being. Up to this point we have provided ourselves with instruments of all sorts, without knowing which of them we shall need. Perhaps, though useless to ourselves, ours will be able to serve others; and possibly, on our part, we shall have need of theirs.. Thus we shall all find our advantage in these exchanges; but, in order to make them, we must know our mutual needs, each one must know what others have for their use, and what he can offer to them in return. Let us suppose ten men, each of whom has ten different needs. It is necessary that each one, for his own necessities, apply himself to ten sorts of labor; but by reason of difference in genius and talent one will

be less successful in one sort of work, and another in another. All, fit for different things, will do the same things and will be poorly served. Let us form a society of these ten men, and let each one apply himself, both for his own sake and for that of the nine others, to the kind of occupation to which he is best adapted. Each will profit by the talents of the others as if he alone had them all; each will perfect his own by a continual exercise; and it will come to pass that all the ten, perfectly well provided for, will still have something left for others. This is the obvious basis of all our institutions. It is not my purpose in this place to examine its consequences; this is what I have done in another treatise.*

On this principle a man who would regard himself as an isolated being, dependent on no one and sufficing for himself, would not fail to be miserable. It would be even impossible for him to subsist; for, finding the entire earth covered with *thine* and *mine*, and having nothing of his own but his body, whence would he derive the necessaries of life? By withdrawing from the state of nature, we force our fellows to withdraw from it also. No one can remain there against the will of others; and it would really be to withdraw from it to desire to remain there in the impossibility of subsisting; for the first law of Nature is the duty of self-preservation.

Thus are formed little by little in the mind of a child the ideas of social relations even before he is really able to be an active member of society. Émile sees that in order to have articles for his own use he must have some necessary for the use of others, through whom he can obtain in exchange the things which he needs, and which are in their power. I easily lead him to feel the need of

* Discours sur l'Inégalité.

these exchanges, and to put himself in a condition to profit by them.

"*Sir, it is necessary for me to live*," said an unfortunate satirical author to the minister who reproached him with the infamy of his calling—"*I do not see the necessity for it*," coldly replied the man in power. This response, well enough for a minister, would have been barbarous and false in the mouth of any one else. Every man must live. This argument, to which every one gives more or less force in proportion as he is more or less human, seems to me without reply when made by any one with reference to himself. Since, of all the aversions given us by Nature, the strongest is that for death, it follows that anything is permitted by her to any one who has no other means of living. The principle on which the virtuous man despises life and sacrifices it to his duty is very far from this primitive simplicity. Happy the people among whom one can be good without effort and just without virtue! If there is any miserable country in the world where one can not live save through evil doing, and where the citizens are rogues by necessity, it is not the criminal who should be hung, but he who compels him to become such.

As soon as Émile comes to know what life is, my first care shall be to teach him how to preserve it. So far I have not distinguished classes, ranks, or fortunes; nor shall I distinguish them scarcely more in the sequel, because man is the same in all conditions. A rich man does not have a larger stomach than a poor man, and it digests no better than his; the arms of the lord are neither longer nor stronger than those of his slave; a great man is no larger than a common man; and, finally, natural needs being everywhere the same, the means of providing for them ought everywhere to be equal. Adapt the education of man to man, and not to that which he

is not. Do you not see that in striving to educate him exclusively for one condition you are making him useless for every other? and that, if it please Fortune, you have labored only to make him unhappy? What is there more ridiculous than a man once a great lord, but now poor, who retains in his misery the prejudices of his birth? What is there more abject than an impoverished rich man, who, recollecting the contempt shown to poverty, feels that he has become the lowest of men? The sole resource of one is the trade of public cheat, and of the other that of a cringing valet with this fine phrase, "*It is necessary for me to live.*"

You place confidence in the actual state of society without reflecting that this state is subject to inevitable revolutions, and that it is impossible to foresee or to prevent that which may confront your children. The great become small, the rich become poor, the monarch becomes a subject. Are the blows of Fortune so rare that you can count on being exempt from them? We are approaching a state of crisis and a century of revolutions.* Who can answer to you for what you will then become? Whatever men have made, men may destroy; there are no ineffaceable characters save those which Nature impresses, and Nature makes neither princes, nor millionaires, nor lords. What, then, will that satrap do in his fallen state whom you have educated only for grandeur? What will that extortioner do in his poverty who knows how to live only on gold? What will that pompous imbecile do, deprived of everything, who can make no use of himself, and who employs

* I hold it to be impossible for the great monarchies of Europe to last much longer; all have achieved brilliancy, and every state in this condition is in its decline. I have for my opinion reasons more cogent than this maxim; but this is not the time to declare them, and they must be evident to all.

his existence only in what is foreign to himself? Happy he who then knows how to turn away from the station which he quits, and can remain a man in spite of Fortune! Praise as much as you will that conquered king who, in his fury, would be buried under the ruins of his throne: for myself I despise him. I see that he owes his existence solely to his crown, and that if he were not king he would be nothing at all. But he who loses his crown and does without it, is then superior to it. From the rank of king, which a craven, a villain, or a madman might occupy as well, he ascends to the state of man which so few men know how to fill. He then triumphs over Fortune and braves her; he owes nothing save to himself alone; and when all that remains to him to show is himself, he is not a cipher, but is something. Yes, I would a hundred times rather be the King of Syracuse as a schoolmaster at Corinth, and the King of Macedon as a clerk at Rome,* than an unfortunate Tarquin, not knowing what will become of him if he does not reign, or than the heir of the possessor of three kingdoms,† the puppet of whoever dares insult his misery, wandering from court to court, seeking assistance everywhere and everywhere finding affronts, all from not knowing how to do something besides the thing which is no longer in his power.

The man and the citizen, whichever he may be, has no other valuable to give to society than himself, all his other valuables being there without his will; and when a man is rich, either he does not enjoy his riches, or the public enjoys them also. In the first case, he steals from others that of which he deprives himself; and in the sec-

* Alexander [the son of Perseus, last], King of Macedonia, was the secretary of a Roman magistrate.

† The Prince Charles Edward, called the Pretender, grandson of James II, King of England, dethroned in 1688.—(P.)

ond, he gives them nothing. So the entire social debt remains with him as long as he pays only with his property. "But," you say, "my father served society while gaining this property." Be it so; he has paid his own debt, but not yours. You owe more to others than as though you were born without property; you were favored in your birth. It is not just that what one man has done for society should release another from what he owes it; for each one, owing his entire self, can pay only for himself, and no father can transmit to his son the right of being useless to his fellows; yet that is what he does, according to you, in leaving him his riches, which are the proof and reward of labor. He who eats in idleness what he himself has not earned, steals; and a land-holder whom the state pays for doing nothing does not differ from a brigand who lives at the expense of travelers. Outside of society, an isolated man, owing nothing to any one, has a right to live as he pleases; but in society, where he necessarily lives at the expense of others, he owes them in labor the price of his support; to this there is no exception. To work, then, is a duty indispensable to social man. Rich or poor, powerful or weak, every idle citizen is a knave.

Now, of all the occupations which can furnish subsistence to man, that which approaches nearest to the state of Nature is manual labor; of all the conditions the most independent of fortune and of men, is that of the artisan. The artisan depends only on his labor. He is free—as free as the husbandman is a slave; for the latter is dependent on his field, whose harvest is at the discretion of others. The enemy, the prince, a powerful neighbor, may take away from him this field; on account of it he may be harassed in a thousand ways; but wherever there is a purpose to harass the artisan, his bag-

gage is soon ready; he folds his arms and walks off. Still, agriculture is the first employment of man; it is the most honorable, the most useful, and consequently the most noble that he can practice. I do not tell Émile to learn agriculture, for he knows it. All rustic employments are familiar to him; it is with them that he began, and to them he will ever be returning. I say to him, then, Cultivate the heritage of your fathers. But if you lose this heritage, or if you have none, what are you to do? Learn a trade.

"A trade for my son! My son an artisan! My dear sir, are you serious?" More serious than you are, madam, who would make it impossible for him ever to be anything but a lord, a marquis, a prince, or perhaps, one day, less than nothing; but on my part I wish to give him a rank which he can not lose, a rank which will honor him as long as he lives. I wish to raise him to the state of manhood; and whatever you may say of it, he will have fewer equals by this title than by all those which he will derive from you.

The letter kills and the spirit makes alive. It is important to learn a trade, less for the sake of knowing the trade than for overcoming the prejudices which despise it. You say you will never be compelled to work for a living. Ah, so much the worse—so much the worse for you! But never mind; do not work from necessity, but work for glory. Condescend to the state of the artisan in order to be above your own. In order to put fortune and things under subjection to you, begin by making yourself independent of them. In order to reign by opinion, begin by reigning over opinion.

Recollect that it is not an accomplishment that I demand of you, but a trade, a real trade—an art purely mechanic, where the hands work more than the head,

which does not lead to fortune, but with which one can dispense with fortune. In families far above the danger of lacking for bread, I have seen fathers carry foresight so far as to add to the duty of instructing their children the duty of providing them with the knowledge from which, whatever may happen, they may gain the means for living. These provident fathers think they are doing a great deal; but they are doing nothing, because the resources which they fancy they are economizing for their children depend on that very fortune of which they wish to make them independent. So that with all those accomplishments, if he who has them does not chance to be in circumstances favorable for making use of them, he will perish of hunger just as soon as though he had none of them.

But instead of resorting for a livelihood to those high knowledges which are acquired for nourishing the soul and not the body, if you resort, in case of need, to your hands and the use which you have learned to make of them, all difficulties disappear, all artifices become useless; you have resources always ready at the moment of need. Probity and honor are no longer an obstacle to living. You no longer need to be a coward and a liar before the great, compliant and cringing before knaves, the base pimp of everybody, borrower or thief, which are almost the same thing when one has nothing. The opinions of others do not affect you; you have no one's favor to court, no fool to flatter, and no porter to conciliate. That rogues manage great affairs is of little importance to you; this will not prevent you in your obscure mode of life from being an honest man and from having bread. You enter the first shop whose trade you have learned: "Foreman, I am in need of employment." "Fellow-workman, stand there and go to work." Before noon comes you

have earned your dinner, and if you are diligent and frugal, before the week has passed you will have the wherewithal to live for another week; you will have lived a free, healthy, true, industrious, and just man. It is not to lose one's time to gain it in this way.

I insist absolutely that Émile shall learn a trade. "An honorable trade, at least," you will say. What does this term mean? Is not every trade honorable that is useful to the public? I do not want him to be an embroiderer, a gilder, or a varnisher, like Locke's gentleman; neither do I want him to be a musician, a comedian, or a writer of books.* Except these professions, and others which resemble them, let him choose the one he prefers; I do not assume to restrain him in anything. I would rather have him a cobbler than a poet; I would rather have him pave the highways than to decorate china. But, you will say, "Bailiffs, spies, and hangmen are useful people." It is the fault only of the government that they are so. But let that pass; I was wrong. It does not suffice to choose a useful calling; it is also necessary that it does not require of those who practice it qualities of soul which are odious and incompatible with humanity. Thus, returning to our first statement, let us choose an honorable calling; but let us always recollect that there is no honor without utility.

This is the spirit which should guide us in the choice of Émile's occupation, though it is not for us to make this choice, but for him; for, as the maxims with which he is equipped preserve in him a natural contempt for

* "You yourself are one," some one will say. I am, to my sorrow, I acknowledge; and my faults, which I think I have sufficiently expiated, are no reasons why others should have similar ones. I do not write to excuse my faults, but to prevent my readers from imitating them.

useless things, he will never wish to consume his time in work of no value, and he knows no value in things save that of their real utility. He must have a trade which might serve Robinson in his island.

By causing to pass in review before a child the productions of Nature and art, by stimulating his curiosity and following it where it leads, we have the advantage of studying his tastes, his inclinations, and his propensities, and to see glitter the first spark of his genius, if he has genius of any decided sort. But a common error, and one from which we must preserve ourselves, is to attribute to the ardor of talent the effect of the occasion, and to take for a marked inclination toward such or such an art the imitative spirit which is common to man and monkey, and which mechanically leads both to wish to do whatever they see done without knowing very well what it is good for. The world is full of artisans, and especially of artists, who have no natural talent for the art which they practice, and in which they have been urged forward from their earliest age, either through motives of expedience, or through an apparent but mistaken zeal which would have also led them toward any other art if they had seen it practiced as soon. One hears a drum and thinks himself a general; another sees a house built and wishes to be an architect. Each one is drawn to the trade which he sees practiced, when he believes it to be held in esteem.

But perhaps we are giving too much importance to the choice of a trade. Since we have in view only manual labor, this choice is nothing for Émile, and his apprenticeship is already more than half done, through the tasks with which we have occupied our time up to the present moment. What do you wish him to do? He is ready for everything. He already knows how to handle the

spade and the hoe; he can use the lathe, the hammer, the plane, and the file; the tools of all the trades are already familiar to him. All he has to do in addition is to acquire of some of these tools such a prompt and facile use as to make him equal in speed to good workmen using the same tools, and on this point he has a great advantage over all others; he has an agile body and flexible limbs, which can assume all sorts of attitudes without difficulty and prolong all sorts of movements without effort. Moreover, he has accurate and well-trained organs; all the machinery of the arts is already known to him. For the duties of master-workman all he lacks is habit, and habit is acquired only with time. To which of the trades whose choice it depends on us to make will he give sufficient time in order to make himself expert in it? This is the only question in the case.

Give to the man a trade which befits his sex, and to a young man a trade which befits his age; every sedentary and domestic profession which effeminates and softens the body is neither pleasing nor adapted to him. A young lad should never aspire to be a tailor.

Work in metals is useful, and even the most useful of all. However, unless some special reason inclines me to it, I would not make of your son a farrier, a locksmith, or a blacksmith; I would not like to see him in his shop the figure of a Cyclops. So also I would not have him a mason, and still less a shoe-maker. All trades must be practiced, but he who can choose ought to have regard for cleanliness, for this is not a matter of opinion; on this point the senses decide for us. Finally, I would have none of those stupid trades whose operatives, without ingenuity and almost automata, never exercise their hands save at one kind of labor, such as weavers, stocking-makers, and stone-cutters. Of what use is it to employ men of

sense at these trades? They are machines in charge of another machine.

All things considered, the trade which I would rather have be to the taste of my pupil is that of cabinet-maker. It is cleanly, it is useful, and it may be practiced at home; it keeps the body sufficiently exercised; it requires of the workman skill and ingenuity, and in the form of the products which utility determines, elegance and taste are not excluded. But if, perchance, the genius of your pupil is decidedly turned toward the speculative sciences, then I would not blame you for giving him a trade adapted to his inclinations; that he learn, for example, to make mathematical instruments, spy-glasses, telescopes, etc.

When Émile learns his trade I wish to learn it with him; for I am convinced that he will never learn anything well save what we learn together. We then put ourselves in apprenticeship, and we do not assume to be treated as gentlemen, but as real apprentices, who are not such for the sport of the thing. Why should we not be apprentices in real earnest? The Czar Peter was a carpenter at the bench and a drummer in his own army; do you think that this prince was not your equal by birth or by merit? You understand that I am not saying this to Émile, but to you, whoever you may be. Unfortunately, we can not spend all our time at the bench. We are not only apprenticed workmen, but we are apprenticed men; and our apprenticeship to this last trade is longer and more difficult than the other.*

* Rousseau here enunciates a cardinal doctrine in education, though he does not consistently and logically maintain it throughout his treatise, as when he gives a narrow construction to the term *useful*. As the child's prime vocation is manhood, liberal or humane studies should have precedence over technical or professional studies; they are the more useful. The pupils of an elementary

How, then, shall we proceed? Shall we have a master of the plane one hour a day, just as we have a dancing-master? No; we shall not be apprentices, but disciples; and our ambition is not so much to learn cabinet-making as to rise to the position of cabinet-maker. I am therefore of the opinion that we should go, at least once or twice a week, to spend a whole day with the master workman; that we should rise when he does; that we should be at work before he comes; that we should eat at his table, work under his orders, and that, after having had the honor to sup with his family we, if we wish, should return to rest on our hard beds. This is how we learn several trades at once, and how we employ ourselves at manual labor without neglecting the other apprenticeship.

If I have been understood thus far, it ought to be plain how, with the habitual exercise of the body and labor of the hands, I insensibly give to my pupil a taste for reflection and meditation in order to counterbalance in him the indolence which would result from his indifference for the judgments of men and from the repose of his passions. He must work as a peasant and think as a philosopher in order not to be as lazy as a savage. The great secret of education is to make the exercises of the body and of the mind always serve as a recreation for each other.

We have now returned to our theme. Here is our child on the point of ceasing to be such, and of assuming his individuality. Here he is feeling more than ever the necessity which attaches him to things. After having begun by training his body and his senses, we have trained his mind and his judgment. Finally, we have connected with the use of his limbs the use of his faculties; we have

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school may be predestined to a dozen different vocations, but their education should be essentially the same.—(P.)

made him an active and a thinking being; and nothing more is left for us in order to complete the man than to make of him a being who loves and feels—that is, to perfect the reason through the feelings. But before entering on this new order of things, let us look back on that from which we started, and see, as exactly as possible, what point we have reached.

At first our pupil had only sensations, but now he has ideas; all he did was to feel, but now he judges; for from the comparison of several successive or simultaneous sensations with the judgment which we derive from them there proceeds a sort of mixed or complex sensation which I call an idea.

The manner of forming ideas is what gives its characteristic to the human mind. The mind which forms its ideas solely on real relations is a strong mind; that which contents itself with apparent relations is a superficial mind; that which sees relations just as they are is an accurate mind; that which estimates their value imperfectly is an unsound mind; he who invents imaginary relations which have neither reality nor appearance is a lunatic; while he who does not compare at all is an imbecile. The greater or less aptitude for comparing ideas and finding their relations is that which makes the minds of men the larger or the smaller.

Simple ideas are but compared sensations. There are judgments in simple sensations as well as in complex sensations, which I call simple ideas. In sensation the judgment is purely passive; it affirms that one feels what he feels. In perception or idea the judgment is active; it brings together, it compares, it determines relations which sense does not determine. This is the whole difference, but it is great. Nature never deceives us. It is always we who deceive ourselves. I see a child eight years

old served with ice cream; he carries the spoon to his mouth without knowing what it is, and, shocked by the cold, cries out, "*Ah! that burns me.*" He experiences a very vivid sensation; he knows nothing more vivid than the heat of fire, and he thinks that it is this which he feels. Nevertheless he is mistaken; the shock of the cold hurts him, but it does not burn him. These two sensations are not similar, since those who have experienced both do not confound them. It is not, then, the sensation which deceives him, but the judgment which he derives from it.

Since all our errors come from our judgment, it is clear that if we never needed to judge we should have no need to learn; we should never be in a situation to deceive ourselves; we should be happier in our ignorance than we could be with our knowledge. Who denies that scholars know a thousand true things which the ignorant will never know? Are scholars nearer the truth on this account? Quite the contrary: they depart from truth as they advance; because the vanity of judging, ever making greater progress than knowledge, each truth which they learn brings with it a hundred false judgments. It is absolutely certain that the learned societies of Europe are but so many public schools of falsehood; and very surely there are more errors in the Academy of Sciences than in the whole tribe of Hurons.

Since the more men know the more they are deceived, the only means of shunning error is ignorance.* Do not judge and you will never be mistaken. This is the teach-

* If liability to error increases with our knowledge, the infinitely wise would also be infinitely fallible. Rousseau's declaration that ignorance is a defense against error, might well raise the question of his sanity if we did not recollect his passion for paradox and rhetoric.—(P.)

ing of Nature as well as of reason. Outside of a very small number of immediate and very obvious relations which things have with us, we have naturally only a profound indifference for everything else. A savage would not take a step to see the operation of the finest machine and all the wonders of electricity. *What is that to me?* is the phrase most familiar to the ignorant and the most appropriate to the wise.

But, unfortunately, this phrase is no longer in keeping with us. Everything concerns us, since we are dependent on everything; and our curiosity necessarily extends with our needs. This is why I have ascribed very great curiosity to the philosopher and none at all to the savage. The latter stands in need of no one; the other has need of everybody, and especially of admirers.

I shall be told that I am departing from Nature, but this I do not admit. She chooses her instruments, not according to opinion but according to necessity. Now, needs change with the situation of men. There is a wide difference between natural man living in a state of nature and natural man living in a state of society. Émile is not a savage to be banished to a desert, but a savage made to live in cities. He must know how to find his subsistence there, to derive advantage from their inhabitants, and to live, if not as they do, at least to live with them.

As he knows by experience that my most frivolous questions have some object which he does not at first perceive, he has not formed a habit of replying to them carelessly; on the contrary, he is cautious of them, gives them his attention, and examines them with great care before replying to them. He never makes me a reply with which he is not himself satisfied; and he is very hard to satisfy. Finally, neither of us is in a fret to

know the truth of things, but only not to fall into error. We should be much more unwilling to accept a reason which is not good than not to find it at all. *I do not know* is a phrase which becomes us both so well, and which we repeat so often, that it no longer costs either of us anything. But, whether some thoughtlessness escape him, or whether he shun it by our handy *I do not know*, my reply is the same: *Let us see; let us examine.*

Émile will never have dissected insects, will never have counted the spots on the sun, and will not know what a microscope or a telescope is. Your wise pupils will ridicule his ignorance, and they will not be wrong; for, before using these instruments, I intend that he shall invent them, and you are very doubtful whether this can be done so soon.

This is the spirit of my whole method so far. If the child places a little ball between two crossed fingers and thinks he feels two balls, I will not allow him to look at them until he is convinced that there is but one there.

These explanations will suffice, I think, clearly to mark the progress which the mind of my pupil has so far made, and the route by which he has followed this progress. But you are frightened, perhaps, at the quantity of things which I have made to pass before him. You fear lest I weigh down his mind under this mass of knowledge. The very contrary is true: I teach him much more to ignore these things than to know them. I show him the route to learning, easy, in truth, but long, boundless, and slow to traverse. I have made him take the first steps in order that he may recognize the entrance to it, but I shall never allow him to go far.

Compelled to learn for himself, he uses his own reason and not that of others; for in order to grant nothing to opinion, you must grant nothing to authority; and the

most of our errors come much less from ourselves than from others. From this continual exercise there should result a vigor of mind similar to that which is given the body by labor and fatigue. Another advantage is that we advance only in proportion to our strength. The mind like the body can carry no greater weight than it can support. When the understanding appropriates things before depositing them in the memory, that which it afterward draws from it is its own; whereas by overburdening the memory unwarily we run the risk of never drawing from it anything which is our own.

Émile has little knowledge, but what he has is really his own; he knows nothing by halves. Of the small number of things which he knows, and knows well, the most important is that there is much which he does not know but which he may one day know; much more that other men know and that he will never know; and an infinity of other things which no man will ever know. He has a mind that is universal, not through its knowledge, but through its facility of acquiring it; a mind that is open, intelligent, ready for everything, and, as Montaigne says, if not taught, at least teachable. It is sufficient for me that he can find the *what profits it* of everything he does, and the *why* of everything he believes. Once more, my purpose is not at all to give him knowledge, but to teach him how to acquire it when necessary, to make him estimate it exactly for what it is worth, and to make him love truth above everything else. With this method we advance slowly, but we never take a useless step and are never compelled to go back.

Émile has only natural and purely physical knowledge. He does not know even the name of history, nor what metaphysics and ethics are. He knows the essential relations of man to things, but nothing of the moral rela-

tions of man to man. He can generalize ideas but little, and can make but few abstractions. He sees qualities common to certain bodies without reasoning on these qualities in themselves. He knows abstract extension by the aid of geometrical figures, and abstract quantity by the aid of algebraic signs. These figures and these signs are the supports of these abstractions on which his senses rest. He does not seek to know things through their nature, but only through the relations which interest him. He estimates what is foreign to him only through its relation to himself; but this estimate is exact and sure. Fancy and convention play no part in it. He sets most store by what is most useful to him; and never departing from this manner of appraising, he pays no attention to opinion.

Émile is industrious, temperate, patient, firm, and full of courage. His imagination, in nowise enkindled, never magnifies dangers for him. He is sensible to few evils, and knows how to suffer with constancy because he has not learned to contend against destiny. With respect to death, he does not yet know clearly what it is; but accustomed to submit without resistance to the law of necessity, when he must die he will die without a groan and without a struggle; and this is all that Nature permits in that moment abhorred by all. To live in freedom and in but slight dependence on things human is the best means of learning how to die.

In a word, Émile has every virtue which is related to himself. In order to have the social virtues also, all he lacks is to know the relations which exact them; he lacks merely the knowledge which his mind is wholly prepared to receive.

He considers himself without regard to others, and thinks it well that others are not thinking at all of him. He exacts nothing of any one, and believes that he is in

debt to nobody. He is alone in human society, and counts only on himself. He has also a greater right than any other to count upon himself, for he is all that one can be at his age. He has no faults, or has only those which are inevitable to us; he has no vices, or only those against which no man can protect himself. He has a sound body, agile limbs, a just and unprejudiced mind, and a heart that is free and without passions. Self-love, the first and the most natural of all, is as yet scarcely excited in it. Without disturbing the repose of any one, he has lived as contented, happy, and free as Nature has permitted. Do you think that a child who has thus reached his fifteenth year has lost the years preceding?

BOOK FOURTH.

ÉMILE FROM FIFTEEN TO TWENTY—THE PERIOD OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

How swift is our passage over this earth! The first quarter of life has slipped away before we know its use, and the last quarter also slips away after we have ceased to enjoy it. At first we do not know how to live; soon we are no longer able to live; and in the interval which separates these two useless extremities three quarters of the time which remains to us is consumed in sleep, in labor, in suffering, in constraint, in troubles of every description. Life is short, less through the brevity of the time that it lasts than because, of this brief period, we have almost nothing for enjoying it. It matters not that the moment of death is far removed from that of birth, for life is always too short when this space is badly filled.

We have two births, so to speak—one for existing and the other for living; one for the species and the other for the sex.

But man in general is not made to remain always in a state of infancy. He passes out of it at a time prescribed by Nature; and this critical moment, though very short, has lasting influences.

As the tempest is announced from afar by the roaring of the sea, so this stormy revolution is foretold by the murmur of the rising passions; a rumbling agitation warns us of the approach of danger.

Here is the second birth of which I have spoken; it is here that man really begins to live, and nothing human is foreign to him. So far our cares have been but child's play; it is only now that they assume a real importance. This epoch, where ordinary education ends, is properly the one where ours ought to begin.

Our passions are the principal instruments of our conservation, and it is therefore an attempt as vain as it is ridiculous to wish to destroy them; it would be to control Nature and reform the work of God. If God were to tell man to destroy the passions which he has given him, God would and would not, he would contradict himself. But he has never given this senseless order; nothing like it is written in the human heart; and whatever God wishes a man to do he does not cause it to be told to him by another man, but he says it to him himself, he writes it in the depths of his heart.

The source of our passions, the origin and basis of all the others, the only one which is born with man and never leaves him while he lives, is the love of self. This passion is primitive, innate, anterior to every other, and of which, in some sense, all the others are but modifications. In this sense all of them, so to speak, are natural; but the most of these modifications have foreign causes without which they would never have existed, and these very modifications, far from being advantageous to us, are harmful; they change the primitive object and go counter to their purpose. It is then that man finds himself estranged from Nature and in contradiction with himself.

Love of one's self is always good and always in conformity with order. Each one being especially charged with his own conservation, the first and the most imporant of all his cares is and ought to be to guard it with

ceaseless vigilance; and how shall he do this unless he takes the greatest interest in it?

It is therefore necessary that we love ourselves in order to preserve ourselves. We must love ourselves more than anything else; and, through an immediate consequence of the same feeling, we love that which preserves us. Every child becomes attached to his nurse. Romulus must needs feel an attachment for the wolf that suckled him. Whatever favors the well-being of an individual attracts him, and whatever harms him repels him; and this is but a blind instinct. That which transforms this instinct into a feeling, attachment into love, and aversion into hatred, is the manifest intention of hurting us or of doing us good.

The first feeling of a child is to love himself, and the second, which is derived from the first, is to love those who come near him; for in the state of weakness in which he is he knows no one save through the care and assisttance which he receives. At first, the attachment which he has for his nurse and his governess is but habit. He seeks them because he has need of them and finds it well to have them; it is rather knowledge than benevolence. It requires much time for him to comprehend that they are not only useful to him, but that they wish to be so. It is then that he begins to love them.

A child is then naturally inclined to benevolence because he sees that everything which approaches him is brought to assist him, and he derives from this observation the habit of feeling favorably disposed toward his species; but in proportion as he extends his relations, his needs, and his active or passive dependencies, the feeling of his relations to others is aroused and produces that of duties and preferences. Then the child becomes imperious, jealous, deceptive, and vindictive. If he is con-

strained to obedience, not seeing the utility of what he is commanded to do, he attributes it to caprice or to the intention of tormenting him, and he rebels. If he himself is obeyed, the moment anything resists him he sees in it a rebellion, an intention of resisting him; and he beats the chair or table for having disobeyed him. The love of self (*amour de soi*), which regards only ourselves, is content when our real needs are satisfied; but self-love (*amour-propre*), which makes comparisons, is never satisfied, and could not be, because this feeling, by preferring ourselves to others, also requires that others prefer ourselves to them—a thing which is impossible.* This is how the gentle and affectionate passions spring from the love of self, while the malevolent and irascible passions spring from self-love. Thus, that which makes man essentially good is to have few needs and to compare himself but little with others; while that which makes him essentially bad is to have many needs and to pay great deference to opinion. On this principle it is easy to see how we may direct to good or to evil all the passions of children and of men. It is true that, not being able to live always alone, they will find it difficult to live always good. And this very difficulty will necessarily increase with their relations; and it is particularly in this that the dangers of society render art and care the more indispensable to us for preventing in the human heart the depravation which springs from its new needs.

The study proper for man is that of his relations.

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* Rousseau distinguishes love of self (*amour de soi*) from self-love (*amour-propre*). The first feeling is directed toward simple *well-being*, has no reference whatever to others, and is unselfish. The second feeling, on the contrary, leads the individual to compare himself with others, and sometimes to seek his own advantage at their expense. Our term *self-love* includes both meanings.—(P.)

While he knows himself only through his physical being, he ought to study himself through his relations with things, and this is the occupation of his childhood; but when he begins to feel his moral nature, he ought to study himself through his relations with men, and this is the occupation of his entire life, beginning at the point we have now reached.

As soon as man has need of a companion, he is no longer an isolated being, his heart is no longer alone. All his relations with his species, and all the affections of his soul, are born with her. His first passion soon causes the rise of others.

The instructions of nature are tardy and slow, while those of men are almost always premature. In the first case, the senses arouse the imagination; and in the second, the imagination arouses the senses and gives them a precocious activity which can not fail to enervate and enfeeble, first the individual, and then, in the course of time, the species itself. A more general and a more trustworthy observation than that of the effect of climate is that puberty and sexual power always come earlier among educated and refined people than among ignorant and barbarous people. Children have a singular sagacity in discerning through all the affectations of decency the bad manners which it conceals. The refined language which we dictate to them, the lessons of propriety which we give them, the veil of mystery which we affect to draw before their eyes, are so many spurs to their curiosity. From the manner in which we go about this, it is clear that what we feign to conceal from them is only so much for them to learn; and of all the lessons which we give them this is the one which they turn to the largest account.

If the age at which man acquires the consciousness of his sex differs as much through the effect of education as

through the action of nature, it follows that we may accelerate or retard this age according to the manner in which children are educated; and if the body gains or loses consistency in proportion as we retard or accelerate this progress, it also follows that the more we strive to retard it the greater the vigor and power which a young man will acquire. I am now speaking of purely physical effects; but we shall soon see that these are not the only ones.

From these reflections I draw the solution of this question so often agitated, whether it is best to enlighten children at an early hour on the objects of their curiosity, or whether it is not best to satisfy them with modest but false explanations. I do not think it necessary to do either. In the first place, this curiosity does not come to them unless we have paved the way for it. We must then proceed in such a way that they will not have it. In the second place, questions which we are not compelled to answer do not require us to deceive the one who asks them; it is much better to impose silence on him than to make him a reply which is false. This law will cause him little surprise if we have taken care to subject him to it in things which are indifferent. Finally, if we decide to reply to them, let it be done with the greatest simplicity, without mystery, without embarrassment, and without a smile. There is much less danger in satisfying the curiosity of the child than in exciting it.

Let your replies always be grave, short, decided, and without ever seeming to hesitate. I need not add that they ought to be true. We can not teach children the danger of lying to men without feeling, as men, the greater danger of lying to children. One single falsehood told by a teacher to his pupil, and known to be such, would forever ruin all the fruits of an education.

An absolute ignorance of certain things is perhaps what is most advisable for children; but let them learn at an early hour that which it is impossible always to conceal from them. It is necessary either that their curiosity be not awakened in any way, or that it be satisfied before the age when it is no longer a danger. In this matter your manner of treating your pupil will depend much on his particular situation, on the society in which he moves, and on the circumstances by which it is foreseen he will be surrounded. It is important in such cases to trust nothing to chance; and if you are not sure of keeping him in ignorance of the difference of the sexes up to his sixteenth year, take care that he learn it before the age of ten.

In your dealings with children I would not have you affect a language which is too refined; nor that you make long *détours*, which they perceive, in order to avoid giving to things their real names. In these matters good manners always have great simplicity; but imaginations sullied by vice make the ear fastidious, and are ever forcing us to adopt refinements of expression. Gross terms are of no consequence; it is lewd thoughts which must be shunned.

Though modesty is natural to the human species, children are naturally destitute of it. Modesty is born only with the knowledge of evil; how, then, shall children who neither have nor ought to have this knowledge have the feeling which is the effect of it? To give them lessons in modesty and honor is to teach them that there are things that are shameful and dishonorable, and to give them a secret desire to know these things. Sooner or later they succeed in this, and the first spark which touches the imagination will most certainly accelerate the conflagration of the senses. Whoever blushes is already guilty; true innocence is ashamed of nothing.

I see but one good means of preserving the innocence of children; and this is, that all those who surround them respect and love it. Without this all the prudence which we try to make use of with them comes to naught sooner or later; a smile, a wink, a chance gesture, tell them all that we seek to conceal from them; it suffices for them in order to learn it to see that we have designed to keep it from them. The nice turns of expression which genteel people use among themselves, taking for granted knowledge which children ought not to have, are wholly out of place with them; but when we truly honor their simplicity we easily adopt, in speaking to them, that simplicity of language which befits them. There is a certain artlessness of language which becomes innocence and is pleasing to it; this is the true tone which turns aside a child from a dangerous curiosity. By speaking to him of everything in simple terms, we do not allow him to suspect that there is anything more to say to him. In giving to coarse words the displeasing ideas which befit them, we smother the first fire of the imagination; we do not forbid him to pronounce these words and to have these ideas; but without his thinking of it we give him a repugnance for recalling them. And from what embarrassment would not this artless liberty save those who, drawing it from their own heart, always say that which must be said, and always say it just as they have felt it!

Your children read; and in their reading they acquire knowledge which they would not have had if they had not read. If they study, the imagination becomes inflamed and sharpened in the silence of the study chamber. If they live in the world, they hear a strange jargon and see examples by which they are strongly impressed. They have been so thoroughly persuaded that they are men, that in all that men do in their presence they at once try

to ascertain how all this may be adapted to their use: it must necessarily be that all the actions of others serve them as a model when the judgments of others serve them as a law. The domestics who are made to wait on them and who are consequently interested in pleasing them, curry favor with them at the expense of good morals; and giggling governesses address conversation to them at four years which the most shameless would not dare to hold at fifteen. These nurses soon forget what they have said, but the children never forget what they have heard. Licentious conversation leads to dissolute manners; a vile servant makes a child debauched, and the secret of one serves as a guarantee for that of the other.

Would you put order and control into the nascent passions? Lengthen the time during which they are developed, to the end that they may have the time to adjust themselves in proportion as they come into being. Then it is not man who ordains them, but Nature herself, and your only care is to let her arrange her work. If your pupil were alone you would have nothing to do: but everything that surrounds him inflames his imagination. The torrent of prejudices hurries him on, and in order to rescue him you must push him in a contrary direction. Feeling must restrain the imagination, and reason must put to silence the opinions of men. The source of all the passions is the sensibility: the imagination determines their inclination. Every being who feels his relations must be affected when these relations are altered, and when he imagines, or thinks he imagines, those which are better adapted to his nature. These are the errors of imagination which transform into vices the passions of all limited beings, even of angels, if they have passions; for they must needs know the nature of all beings in order to know what relations are most consonant with their own.

This, then, is the sum of all human wisdom in the use of the passions: 1, to feel the true relations of man both in the species and in the individual; 2, to order all the affections of the soul according to these relations. The first feeling of which a young man who has been carefully educated is susceptible is not love, but friendship. The first act of his nascent imagination is to teach him that he has fellow-creatures, and the species affects him before the sex. Here is another advantage of prolonged innocence; it is to profit by the nascent sensibility for sowing in the heart of the young adolescent the first seeds of humanity, an advantage all the more precious as it is the only time of life when the same cares can have a real success.

Would you excite and nourish in the heart of a young man the first movements of the nascent sensibility, and turn his character toward benevolence and goodness? Do not cause pride, vanity, and envy to germinate in him; through the deceptive image of the happiness of men, do not at first expose to his eyes the pomp of courts, the pageantry of palaces, and the attractions of the theatre; do not take him about in social circles and brilliant assemblies; do not show him the exterior of grand society until after having put him in a condition to form an estimate of it in itself. To show him the world before he knows men is not to form him, but to corrupt him; it is not to instruct him but to deceive him.

Men are by nature neither kings, nor grandees, nor courtiers, nor millionaires; all are born naked and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life, to chagrins, evils, needs, and sorrows of every sort; and, finally, all are condemned to death. This is what man truly is; this is that from which no mortal is exempt. Begin, then, by studying that which is most inseparable from human nature, that which most truly constitutes humanity. At the age

of sixteen the adolescent knows what it is to suffer, for he himself has suffered; but he hardly knows that other beings also suffer. To see without feeling is not to know; and, as I have said a hundred times, the child, not imagining what others feel, knows no ills save his own; but when the first development of the senses enkindles in him the fire of imagination, he begins to know himself in his fellows, to be affected by their complaints, and to suffer with their sorrows. It is then that the sad picture of suffering humanity ought to carry to his heart the first feeling of tenderness which he has ever experienced.

If this period is not easy to note in your children, whom do you blame for it? You instruct them so early to counterfeit feeling, you teach them its language so soon, that, always speaking in the same tone, they turn your lessons against you, and leave you no means to distinguish when, ceasing to pretend, they begin to feel what they say. But see my Émile. At the age to which I have conducted him he has neither felt nor feigned. Before knowing what it is to love, he has said to no one, *I love you very much.* No one has prescribed for him the countenance he is to assume on entering the sick chamber of his father, mother, or tutor; no one has shown him the art of affecting the sadness which he does not feel. He has not feigned to weep over the death of any one, for he does not know what it is to die. The same insensibility which he has in his heart is also in his manners. Indifferent to everything outside of himself, like all other children he takes an interest in no one; all that distinguishes him is that he does not wish to seem interested, and that he is not false like them.

Émile, having reflected little on sentient beings, will be late in knowing what it is to suffer and die. Complaints and cries will begin to agitate his feelings; the

sight of flowing blood will make him turn away his eyes; and the convulsions of a dying animal will give him untold agony before he knows whence these new emotions come to him. If he had remained stupid and barbarous he would not have them; if he were wiser, he would know their source. He has already compared ideas too much not to suffer, but not enough to conceive what he feels.

Thus arises pity, the first related feeling which touches the human heart according to the order of Nature. In order to become sensible and compassionate the child must know that there are beings similar to himself, who suffer what he has suffered, who feel the sorrows which he has felt, and others of which he can form an idea as being able to feel them also. In fact, how shall we allow ourselves to be moved to pity if not by transporting us outside of ourselves and identifying ourselves with the suffering animal, by quitting, so to speak, our own being, in order to assume his? We suffer only as much as we judge he suffers; and it is not in us, but in him, that we suffer. Thus no one becomes sensible save when his imagination is aroused and begins to transport him outside of himself.

In order to excite and nourish this nascent sensibility, and to guide it or to follow it in its natural course, what have we then to do save to offer to the young man objects on which may be exerted the expansive force of his heart, which will increase it and extend it over other beings, which will ever call his attention away from himself; and to avoid with care those objects which contract and concentrate the human heart and compress the springs of selfishness? In other terms, what can we do save to excite in him goodness, humanity, commiseration, beneficence, and all the attractive and gentle passions which naturally please men, and to prevent the rise of envy, covetousness, hatred, and all the repulsive and cruel passions which ren-

der, so to speak, the sensibility not only null, but negative, and are the torment of him who experiences them?

Do not accustom your pupil to look down from the summit of his glory on the afflictions of the unfortunate and the toils of the wretched; and never hope to teach him to pity them if he considers them as strangers to himself. Make him clearly understand that the lot of these unfortunates may be his own, that all their misfortunes lie before him, and that a thousand unforeseen and inevitable events may at any moment plunge him into them. Teach him to count neither upon birth, nor upon health, nor upon riches; show him all the vicissitudes of fortune; search out examples for him, always too frequent, of men who from a higher station than his own have fallen below that of these unfortunates. Whether this is through their fault or not is not now in question; only, does he even know what is meant by fault? Never encroach upon the order of his knowledge and never enlighten him save through knowledge which is within his comprehension; he need not be very wise in order to know that no human prudence can determine whether he shall be living or dying within an hour; whether the pains of colic shall not make him grind his teeth before night; whether in a month he shall be rich or poor; or whether within a year, perhaps, he shall not be rowing in the galleys of Algiers. Above all, do not tell him all this coldly, as you would his catechism; but let him see and feel human calamities. Disturb and affright his imagination with the perils by which every man is ceaselessly surrounded; let him see about him all these abysses, and as he hears you describe them, let him cling to you for fear of falling into them. We shall make him timid and cowardly, you will say. We shall see in the sequel; but for the present let us begin by making him human; this is what chiefly concerns us.

It is at this age that begins with a skillful teacher the real function of the observer and philosopher who knows the art of exploring the heart while attempting to mold it. While the young man does not yet think of disguising himself, and has not yet learned to do it, at each new object which we present to him we see in his manner, in his eyes, and in his movements, the impression which he receives from it; we see on his face all the emotions of his soul; and by watching them we come to foresee them, and finally to direct them.

I do not know whether, through not having learned to imitate conventional manners and to feign sentiments which he does not have, my young man will be the less agreeable; but with this we are not concerned in this place. I know only that he will be more affectionate, and I find it very difficult to believe that he who loves only himself can disguise himself so well as to be as pleasing as he who draws from his attachment for others a new feeling of happiness. But as to this feeling itself, I think I have said enough to guide a reasonable reader on this point, and to show that I have not contradicted myself.

I return to my method, and say: When the critical age approaches, offer to young people spectacles which hold them in check, and not those which excite them; divert their nascent imagination by objects which, far from inflaming their senses, repress their activity. Remove them from large cities, where the attire and immodesty of women hasten and anticipate the lessons of nature, and where everything presents to their eyes pleasures which they ought not to know until they can choose them wisely. Take them to their early homes, where the simplicity of country life allows the passions of their age to be developed less rapidly; or, if their taste for the arts still attaches

them to the city, prevent in them through this very taste an idleness that is full of danger. Select with care their company, their occupations, and their pleasures; show them only pictures which are touching but modest, which move without seducing, and which nourish their sensibility without exciting their senses. Recollect also that there are everywhere some excesses to fear, and that immoderate passions always do more harm than we are willing to encounter. It is not proposed to make of your pupil a nurse or a brother of charity, to afflict his sight by continual objects of sorrow and suffering, to conduct him from infirmary to infirmary, from hospital to hospital, and from La Grève * to the prisons; he must be touched but not hardened by the sight of human suffering. Long struck by the same sights, we no longer feel their impressions. Habit accustoms us to everything, and what we see too often we no longer imagine; and it is only the imagination which makes us feel the ills of others. It is thus that, through seeing people suffer and die, priests and physicians become unpitying. Then let your pupil know the lot of man and the miseries of his fellows, but do not let him too often be the witness of them. One single object, well chosen and exhibited in a suitable light, will give him tender reflections for a month. It is not so much what he sees as his reflection on what he has seen that determines the judgment which he derives from it; and the durable impressions which he receives from an object come less from the object itself than from the point of view under which it is brought to his recollection. It is thus that, by carefully managing these examples, lessons, and images, you will for a long time blunt the

* A public square in Paris where executions formerly took place. —(P.)

edge of the senses and will divert nature by following her own direction.

Teacher, be sparing of words; but learn to make a choice of times, places, and persons; then give all your lessons by examples, and you may be sure of their effect.

Teachers complain that the ardor of this age renders the young unruly, and I see that this is true. Is not this their own fault? As soon as they have allowed this ardor to take its course through the senses, are they ignorant that they no longer can give it another? Will the long and lifeless sermons of a pedant efface from the mind of his pupil the image of the pleasures which he has conceived? Will they banish from his heart the desires which torment him? Will they allay the ardor of a temperament whose use he knows? Will he not be irritated at the obstacles which oppose the only happiness of which he has an idea? And in the harsh law which we prescribe for him without being able to make him understand it, what will he see except the caprice and hatred of a man who is trying to torment him? Is it strange that he rebels, and hates him in his turn?

I well understand that by making ourselves compliant we can make ourselves more endurable and thus preserve an apparent authority. But I fail to see what purpose is served by the authority which is preserved over a pupil only by fomenting the vices which it ought to repress. It is as though a horseman, in order to pacify a mettlesome horse, should make him jump over a precipice.

So far is the ardor of youth from being an obstacle to education, that it is through it that education is completed and perfected; it is this ardor which gives you a hold on the heart of a young man when he ceases to be less strong than you are. His first affections are the reins with which you direct all his movements; he was free, but

I see him brought under subjection. As long as he loved nothing, he depended only on himself and his needs; but the moment he loves, he depends on his attachments. Thus are formed the first bonds which unite him to his species. By directing his nascent sensibility along this line, do not think that it will at first embrace all men, and that this term human species will signify anything to him. No, this sensibility will be limited at first to his fellows; and these will not be for him unknown beings, but those with whom he has relations; those whom habit has made dear or necessary to him; those whom he sees evidently having with him common ways of thinking and feeling; those whom he sees exposed to the pains he has suffered, and sensible to the pleasures he has tasted; in a word, those whom the more manifest identity of nature gives him a greater disposition to love. It will not be until after having cultivated his nature in a thousand ways, and after many reflections on his own feelings and on those which he observes in others, that he will be able to generalize his individual notions under the abstract idea of humanity, and unite with his particular affections those which may identify him with his species.

In becoming capable of attachment he becomes sensible of the attachment of others, and in the same way attentive to the symbols of this attachment. Do you see what a new empire you have acquired over him? how many chains you have thrown around his heart before he perceived them! What will be his feelings when, opening his eyes upon himself, he shall see what you have done for him, and when he shall be able to compare himself with other young men of his age and to compare you with other tutors? I say, when he shall see it. But beware of saying this to him; for if you tell him this, he will no longer see it. If you exact obedience of him in return for

the good offices you have done him, he will think that you have overreached him. He will say to himself, that in pretending to oblige him gratuitously you have presumed to charge him with a debt, and to bind him by a contract to which he has not consented. It is in vain for you to rejoin, that what you have required of him is only for his own good; but after all you make a requirement, and you do it by virtue of what you have done without his consent. When a poor wretch takes money which some one pretends to give him, and finds himself enlisted without his consent, you denounce the injustice. Are you not still more unjust when you demand of your pupil pay for the services which he has not accepted?

If gratitude is a natural sentiment, and you have not destroyed its effect by your own fault, be assured that your pupil, beginning to see the value of your services, will be sensible of them provided you yourself have not put a price on them; and that they will give you an authority over his heart which nothing will be able to destroy. But, before being well assured of this advantage, guard against losing it by magnifying yourself in his sight. To extol your services to him is to make them insupportable to him; to forget them is to make him remember them. Until it is time to treat him as a man, let there never be a question of what he owes you, but of what he owes himself. In order to render him docile, leave him in complete liberty; conceal yourself in order that he may look for you; elevate his soul to the noble sentiment of gratitude by never speaking to him save of his own interest. I have not wished to have him told that what was done was for his good, before he was in a condition to understand it; in that remark he would have seen only your dependence, and would only have taken you for his servant. But now that he begins to feel what

it is to love, he also feels what a kindly, benignant bond may unite a man to what he loves; and in the zeal which makes you devote yourself to him without respite, he no longer sees the attachment of a slave, but the affection of a friend.

We finally enter upon the moral order, and come to take a second step in manly culture. If this were the place for it, I would try to show how, from the first movements of the heart, arise the first utterances of the conscience; and how, from the feelings of love and hate, spring the first notions of good and evil. I would make it seem that *justice* and *goodness* are not merely abstract terms, pure moral creations formed by the understanding, but real affections of the soul enlightened by reason, and which are but a progress ordained by our primitive affections; that by the reason alone, independently of the conscience, we can not establish any natural law; and that the whole law of Nature is but a delusion if it is not founded on a need natural to the human heart. But I do not think I am here required to write dissertations on metaphysics and ethics, nor courses of study of any sort; it is sufficient for me to mark the order and progress of our feelings and knowledge with respect to our constitution. Others will perhaps demonstrate what I have only indicated.

My Émile having thus far regarded only himself, the first look which he throws upon his fellows leads him to compare himself with them, and the first feeling which this comparison excites within him is to desire the first place. This is the point at which the love of self changes into self-love, and where begin to arise all the passions which depend upon it. But in order to decide whether those of his passions which shall dominate in his character shall be humane and beneficent, or cruel and malev-

olent, whether they shall be passions of benevolence and commiseration, or of envy and covetousness, it is necessary to know to what place he will aspire among men, and what kind of obstacles he will think he has to overcome in order to reach the one which he wishes to occupy.

In order to guide him in this investigation, after having shown him men by the accidents common to the species, we must now show them to him by their differences. Here comes the measurement of natural and civil inequality, and the picture of the whole social order.

Society must be studied through men, and men through society; those who would treat politics and morals separately will never understand anything of either.

This is now the study that concerns us; but in order to pursue it properly we must begin by knowing the human heart.

If it were proposed merely to show to young people man through his mask, we should not need to show him to them—they will always see him more than enough; but since the mask is not the man, and it is not necessary that its varnish delude them, in painting men for them paint them just as they are, not to the end that young people may hate them, but that they may pity them and not wish to resemble them. This, to my mind, is the rational feeling which man can have respecting his species.

In this view it is important in this place to take a route opposite that which we have hitherto followed, and to instruct the young man through the experience of others rather than through his own. If men deceive him, he will hate them; if, respected by them, he sees them deceive one another, he will pity them. "The spectacle of the world," said Pythagoras, "resembles that of the Olympic games: some keep shop there, and think only of their

profits; others pay there with their persons and seek glory; still others are content to see the games, and these are not the worst."

I would have the associates of the young man chosen in such a way that he may think well of those who live with him; and that he be taught to know the world so well that he may think ill of all that is done in it. Let him know that man is naturally good; let him feel it; let him judge of his neighbors by himself; but let him see how society depraves and perverts men; let him find in their prejudices the source of all their vices; let him be inclined to esteem each individual, but let him despise the multitude; let him see that all men wear nearly the same mask, but let him know also that there are faces more beautiful than the mask which covers them.

This method, it must be admitted, has its disadvantages, and is not easy in practice; for if he becomes an observer too early, if you train him in watching the actions of others too closely, you will make him slanderous and satirical, decisive and prompt in judging; he will take an odious pleasure in looking everywhere for sinister interpretations, and in seeing in the good nothing whatever that is good. You will accustom him, at least, to the sight of vice; and, by seeing wrong-doers without horror, he will accustom himself to see the unfortunate without pity. Very soon the general perversity will serve him less as a lesson than as an excuse; and he will say to himself that if men are of this sort he need not wish to be otherwise.

In order to remove this obstacle and to place the human heart within the reach of our pupil without the risk of spoiling his own, I would show him men at a distance; show them to him in other times or in other places, and in such a way that he may see the stage without ever

being an actor on it. This is the time to begin history. It is through this study that he will read hearts without philosophical lectures; it is through it that he will see them as a simple spectator, without interest and without passion, as their judge and not as their accomplice or their accuser.

In order to know men we must see them act. In the world we hear them speak; they make a show of words and conceal their actions; but in history they are unveiled, and we judge them by their deeds. Even their sayings aid in appreciating them; for, comparing what they do with what they say, we see at once what they are and what they would seem to be; the more they disguise themselves the better we know them.

Unhappily this study has its dangers and its inconveniences of more than one kind. It is difficult to place ourselves at a point of view from which we can judge our fellow-beings with equity. One of the great vices of history is that it portrays men much more through their bad qualities than through their good. As it is interesting only as it describes revolutions and catastrophes, so long as a people grows and prospers in the calm of a peaceful government it says nothing of it; history begins to speak of a people only when, no longer able to suffice for itself, it takes part in the affairs of its neighbors or allows them to take part in its own. History makes a people illustrious only when it is already in its decline. All our histories begin where they ought to end. We have very exact histories of peoples which are in a state of decay. What we lack is an account of peoples which are growing; they are so happy and so wise that history has nothing to say of them; and, in fact, we see even in our day that the best conducted governments are those of which the least is said. We know, then, only the bad; the good hardly

forms an epoch. It is only the wicked who attain celebrity; the good are forgotten or turned to ridicule; and this is how history, like philosophy, ever calumniates the human race. Moreover, the facts described in history are very far from being the exact portraiture of facts as they really happened; they change form in the head of the historian; they are molded in accordance with his interest and take the tint of his prejudices. Who is there who can place the reader at exactly the right spot on the stage to see an event just as it happened? Ignorance or partiality disguises everything. Without altering even one historical fact, by amplifying or retrenching circumstances which are connected with it, how many different aspects can be given to it!

The worst historians for a young man are those who judge. Facts! facts! Supply him with these, and let him form his own judgments. It is in this way that he learns to know men. If the author's judgment is always guiding him, he does no more than see through the eye of another; and when this eye fails him he no longer sees anything.

Thucydides, in my opinion, is the true model for historians. He relates facts without judging them, but he omits none of the circumstances necessary for enabling us to judge of them ourselves. He places all he relates under the eye of the reader; and, far from interposing between events and readers, he steps aside, and we no longer think we are reading, but seeing. Unfortunately, he is always speaking of wars, and we see scarcely anything in his writings save what is of all the least instructive—namely, combats. The Retreat of the Ten Thousand and Cæsar's Commentaries have nearly the same wisdom and the same fault. The good Herodotus, without portraits, without maxims, but flowing, artless, and full of details

the most capable of interesting and pleasing, would perhaps be the best of historians if these very details did not often degenerate into puerile simplicities, better adapted to spoil the taste of youth than to form it. Discernment is already necessary for reading him. I say nothing of Livy—his turn will come; but he is a politician, a rhetorician, and everything not adapted to the age of our pupil.

History, in general, is defective in that it registers only the obvious and marked facts which can be fixed by names, places, and dates; but the slow and progressive causes of these facts, which can not be marked out in the same way, always remain unknown. We often find in a battle gained or lost the reason of a revolution which, even before that battle, had become inevitable. War does hardly more than make manifest events already determined by moral causes which the historians are rarely able to see.

The philosophic spirit has turned in this direction the reflections of several writers of this century; but I doubt whether truth has gained by their labors. The fury of systems having taken possession of them all, nobody attempts to see things as they are, but only so far as they are in accord with his system.

Add to all these reflections that history exhibits actions much more than men, because it grasps the latter only at certain chosen moments and on dress parade; it brings to view only the man in public who has dressed himself up to be seen; it does not follow him into his house, his study, his family, and into the society of his friends; it portrays him only when he is keeping up his dignity; and it is more his dress than his person that history paints.

I would much prefer the reading of individual lives for beginning the study of the human heart; for then it is in

vain for the man to conceal himself, for the historian pursues him everywhere; he leaves him no moment of respite, no corner where he may avoid the piercing eye of a spectator; and it is when we think ourselves the best concealed that the author makes us best known. "The writers of lives who please me most," says Montaigne, "are those who take more pleasure in counsels than in events, more in what proceeds from within than in what comes from without; and this is why in all respects my man is Plutarch." *

Plutarch excels by these very details on which we dare enter no further. He has an inimitable grace in painting great men in little things; he is so happy in the choice of his strokes that often a word, a smile, or a gesture suffices him for characterizing his hero. There are very few people in a condition to see the effects which reading, thus directed, may produce on the wholly inexperienced mind of a young man. Weighed down by books from our childhood and accustomed to read without thinking, what we read impresses us so much the less, as, already carrying within us the passions and the prejudices which fill the history and the lives of men, all that they do seems to us natural, because we have departed from nature and judge of others by ourselves. But let us picture to ourselves a young man educated according to my precepts; let us imagine my Émile, for whom eighteen years of assiduous care have had no other purpose than to preserve an unimpaired judgment and a sound heart—let us imagine him, at the raising of the curtain, gazing for the first time on the stage of the world, or rather placed back of the theatre, seeing the actors as they take on or put off their attire, and counting the ropes and pulleys with

* Book ii, chap. x.

which gross prestige abuses the eyes of the spectators. Very soon his first surprise will be succeeded by emotions of shame and disdain for his species; he will be indignant at thus seeing the whole human race, its own dupe, stooping to these puerile amusements; he will be afflicted to see his brothers tearing one another in pieces for phantoms and turning themselves into ferocious beasts for not having been able to content themselves with being men.

Certainly, with the natural disposition of the pupil, with however little prudence the teacher may select his course of reading, and however little he may put this youth in the way of reflections to be drawn from it, this exercise will be for him a course in practical philosophy, better surely, and better conceived, than all the vain speculations with which the minds of young men in our schools are perplexed.

One step more and we touch the goal. Self-love is a useful but dangerous instrument; it often wounds the hand which uses it, and rarely does good without doing evil. Émile, on considering his rank in the human species, and seeing himself so happily situated there, will be tempted to do honor to his own reason for the work of yours, and to attribute to his own merit the effect of his good fortune. He will say to himself, I am wise, and men are fools. While pitying them he will despise them, and while felicitating himself he will esteem himself the more; and feeling himself happier than they are, he will fancy that he is more worthy of being so. This is the error to be feared most, because it is the most difficult to destroy. If he were to remain in this condition, he would have gained little from all our services; and if I were to choose, I do not know whether I should not much more prefer the illusion of prejudices than that of pride.

There is no folly, save vanity, of which we can not cure

a man who is not a fool. Nothing corrects the latter save experience—if, indeed, anything can correct it. At its birth, at least, we may prevent it from growing. Do not, then, waste your strength in fine arguments to prove to a youth that he is a man like others, and subject to the same weaknesses. Make him feel this, or he will never know it. Here, again, is an exception to my own rule; it is that of voluntarily exposing my pupil to all the accidents which may prove to him that he is not wiser than we are. I would let flatterers take every advantage of him they could. If giddy heads were to entice him into any extravagance, I would let him run the risk of it. If sharpers were to beset him at play, I would hand him over to them to be made their dupe. I would allow him to be flattered, plucked, and robbed by them; and when, having stripped him of everything, they were to finish by deriding him, I would still thank them in his presence for the lessons which they had been so good as to give him. The only snares from which I would carefully guard him would be those of courtesans. The only considerations I would have for him would be to share all the dangers which I had allowed him to incur and all the affronts which I had allowed him to receive. I would endure everything in silence, without complaint or reproach, and without ever saying to him a single word on the subject; and you may be sure that with this discretion well maintained, all that he will have seen me suffer for him will make more impression on his heart than what he will have suffered himself.

I can not here avoid exposing the false dignity of tutors who, in order foolishly to play the sage, underrate their pupils, affect to treat them always as children, and always to distinguish themselves from them in whatever they make them do. Far from disparaging in this way

their young spirits, spare nothing in order to exalt their souls; make of them your equals in order that they may become such; and if they can not yet ascend to you, descend to them without shame and without scruple.

This is not saying that the pupil ought to suppose in his teacher an intelligence as limited as his own, and the same facility for allowing himself to be deluded. This opinion is good for a child, who, not knowing how to see anything nor to make any comparisons, puts all the world within his reach, and gives his confidence only to those who can actually put themselves there. But a young man of Émile's age, and as sensible as he is, is no longer foolish enough to be imposed on in this way, and it would not be well if he were. The confidence which he ought to have in his tutor is of another sort; it should be based on the authority of reason, on superior intelligence, and on advantages which the young man is in a condition to appreciate and of whose utility he is sensible. Long experience has convinced him that he is loved by his guide; that his guide is a wise and enlightened man, who, wishing his happiness, knows what can procure it for him. He ought to know that for his own interest it is best for him to listen to his advice. Now, if the master were to allow himself to be deceived like the disciple, he would lose the right to exact deference from him and to give him instruction. Still less ought the pupil to suppose that his teacher purposely allows him to fall into snares, and that he lays ambushes for his simplicity. What must be done, then, in order to shun at the same time these two difficulties? That which is the best and the most natural: Be simple and true as he is; warn him of the dangers to which he is exposed; show them to him clearly, plainly, without exaggeration or temper, without pedantic display, and especially without giving him your advice for com-

mands until they become such, and this imperious tone is absolutely necessary. Does he hold out after this, as he will often do? Then say no more to him; allow him his liberty, follow him, imitate him, cheerfully and frankly unbend yourself, and, if it is possible, amuse yourself as much as he does. If the consequences become too serious, you are always on hand to arrest them; and yet, how thoroughly must the young man, a witness of your foresight and of your kindness, be at the same time impressed by one and touched by the other! All his faults are so many bonds which he furnishes you for holding him in check when it becomes necessary. Now, that which here constitutes the greatest art of the teacher is to bring forward the occasions and to direct the exhortations in such a way as to know in advance when the young man will yield and when he will hold out, in order to surround him everywhere with the lessons of experience without ever exposing him to too great dangers.

Warn him of his faults before he falls into them; but when he has fallen into them do not reproach him with them: you would merely cause his self-love to rise in rebellion. The lesson which revolts does not profit. I know nothing more stupid than this saying, *I told you so.* The best means to make him recollect what you have said to him is to appear to have forgotten it. On the contrary, when you see him ashamed for not having believed you, mildly efface this humiliation by kind words. He will become firmly attached to you when he sees that you forget yourself for his sake, and that instead of completely crushing him you offer him consolation. But if to his chagrin you add reproaches, he will hate you, and will make it a law no longer to listen to you, as though to prove to you that he does not think as you do on the importance of your advice.

The manner of your consolation may still be a means of instruction to him, all the more useful because he will not distrust it then. In saying to him, for example, that a thousand others have committed the same faults, you will place him far above his own reckoning; you will correct him by not seeming to pity him; for, to one who believes he is of more account than other men, it is a very mortifying excuse to be consoled by their example; it is to conceive that the most that he can assume is that they are worth no more than he is.

The time of faults is the time for fables.* By censuring the wrong-doer under an unknown mask we instruct without offending him; and he then understands, through the truth whose application he makes to himself, that the apologue is not a falsehood. The child who has never been deceived by flattery understands nothing of the fable which I have previously examined;† but the heedless child who has just been the dupe of a flatterer understands wonderfully well that the crow was only a blockhead. Thus, from a fact he derives a maxim; and the experience which he would have soon forgotten becomes fixed in his judgment by means of a fable. There is no ethical knowledge which can not be acquired through the

* Rousseau now modifies somewhat his condemnation of fables, though he is manifestly wrong in thinking that their real use is in the instruction of men—their purpose is not to throw a veil over truth, but by means of comparison to bring a great moral truth within the comprehension of children. The art of the fabulist consists in giving to a general truth a concrete and attractive form, or in making it easy to infer a general truth from a concrete instance. Instruction by fable, by allegory, and by parable, is one of the most ancient and effective of teaching devices, and on all accounts is worthy of being restored to something of its ancient place of honor.—(P.)

† The Fox and the Crow.

experience of others or through one's own. In case this experience is dangerous, instead of making it ourselves we draw the lesson from history. When the trial is without consequence, it is well for the young man to remain exposed to it; then, by means of the apologue, we formulate as maxims the particular cases which are known to him.

I do not intend, however, that these maxims should be developed, or even announced. Nothing is so useless, so badly conceived, as the moral by which most fables are terminated; as though this moral was not or ought not to be developed in the fable itself, in a way to make it obvious to the reader! Why, then, by adding this moral at the end, take from him the pleasure of finding it for himself? Skillful teaching causes the learner to take delight in instruction. Now, in order that he may take delight in it, his mind must not remain so passive to all you say to him that he has absolutely nothing to do to understand you. The pride of the teacher must always allow some exercise of his own; he must be able to say: "I conceive, I discern, I act, I instruct myself." One of the things which make the Pantalon of the Italian comedy a bore is the pains he takes to interpret to the pit the platitudes which are already too well understood. I would not have a tutor be a Pantalon, and still less an author. We must always make ourselves understood, but we need not always tell everything. He who tells all tells little, for at the end we no longer listen to him. What signify those four lines which La Fontaine adds to the fable of the toad who would swell himself to the size of the ox? Was he afraid that he would not be understood? Did this great painter need to write names below the objects which he painted? Far from generalizing his moral by this process, he particularizes it, restricts it in

some sort to the example cited, and prevents its application to others. Before placing the fables of this inimitable author in the hands of a young man, I would have stricken from them all those conclusions by which he takes the trouble to explain what he has just said so clearly and agreeably. If your pupil does not understand the fable save through the aid of the explanation, you may be sure that he will never understand it even in that way.

Again, it is important to give to these fables an order more didactic and more in conformity with the adolescent's progress in feeling and intelligence. Can we conceive anything less reasonable than to follow with exactness the numerical order of the book, without regard to need or to occasion? First the crow, then the grasshopper, then the frog, then the two mules, etc. I have in mind these two mules, because I recollect having seen a child who had been educated for finance, and whose thoughts were full of the employment which he was going to take up, read this fable, learn it by heart, recite it, and repeat it hundreds and hundreds of times, without ever drawing from it the least objection to the calling to which he was destined. Not only have I never seen children make any substantial application of the fables which they learn, but I have never seen that any one cared to make this application for them. The pretext for this study is moral instruction; but the real object of mother and child is to occupy the whole company with him while he recites his fables. Thus, while growing up, and when it is no longer a question of reciting them, but of deriving profit from them, he forgets them all. Once more: It belongs only to men to be instructed by fables; and it is now time for Émile to begin.*

* At the age of eighteen.

When I see that in the age of their greatest activity young people are restricted to purely speculative studies, and that afterward, without the least experience, they are all at once sent forth into the world and into business, I find that reason, no less than nature, is shocked, and I am no longer surprised that so few people know how to get on in the world. Through what strange turn of mind is it that we are taught so many useless things, while the art of self-conduct counts for nothing? It is asserted that we are trained for society, and yet we are taught as though each of us was to spend his life in thinking alone in his cell, or in discussing idle questions with the indifferent. You fancy you are teaching your pupils to live by teaching them certain contortions of the body and certain verbal formula which have no significance. I also have taught my Émile to live, for I have taught him to live by himself, and, in addition, to know how to earn his daily bread. But this is not enough. In order to live in the world, we must know how to get on with men, and must know the instruments which give us a hold on them; we must calculate the action and reaction of individual interest in civil society, and must foresee events so accurately that we shall rarely be deceived in our enterprises, or at least shall always take the means most likely to succeed. The laws do not permit young men to transact their own business and to dispose of their own property; but of what use would these precautions be to them if up to the prescribed age they could acquire no experience? They would have gained nothing by waiting, and would be just as inexperienced at twenty-five as at fifteen. Doubtless, a young man blinded by his ignorance or deceived by his passions must be prevented from doing harm to himself; but at every age it is permissible to be beneficent; at every age,

under the direction of a wise man, protection may be given to the unfortunate whose only need is proper support.

Nurses and mothers become attached to children through the service they render them; the exercise of the social virtues fills the heart with the love of humanity. It is by doing good that we become good; I do not know of a surer process. Interest your pupil in all the good deeds which are within his reach. Let the cause of the poor always be his own; let him assist them, not only with his purse, but with his good offices; let him serve them, protect them, and consecrate to them his person and his time; let him make himself their man of business; he will never perform so noble a service during the course of his life. How many of the oppressed, whose petitions have never been heard, will obtain justice when he shall demand it for them with that intrepid firmness which is given by the exercise of virtue; when he will force open the doors of the great and the rich; and when he will go, if necessary, even to the foot of the throne, to make heard the petitions of the unfortunate, to whom every way of approach is closed by their misery, and whom the fear of being punished for wrongs which have been done them prevents even from daring to utter a word of complaint!

But shall we make of Émile a knight-errant, a redresser of wrongs, a paladin? Shall he go to meddle before public affairs, make himself the sage and defender of the laws before the great, before magistrates, before the prince, and become a solicitor before judges, and an advocate in the courts? I know nothing of all this. The nature of things is not changed by the use of banter and ridicule. He will do whatever he knows to be useful and good. He will do nothing more, and he knows that

nothing is useful and good for him which is not befitting his age. He knows that his first duty is toward himself; that young men ought to distrust themselves, to be circumspect in their conduct, respectful in the presence of older persons, reserved and discreet in speaking only on proper occasions, modest in indifferent things, but bold in well-doing, and courageous in speaking the truth. Such were those illustrious Romans who, before being admitted to office, spent their youth in punishing crime and defending innocence, with no other thought than that of improving themselves by serving justice and protecting good morals.

Émile loves neither disturbance nor quarrels, neither among men,* nor even among animals. He will never

* But if some one seeks a quarrel with him, what will he do? I reply that he will never have a quarrel; that he will never conduct himself so as to have one. But, after all, some one will rejoin: Who is there who is safe from a blow or from an insult on the part of a brute, a drunkard, or a bold rascal who, in order to have the pleasure of killing his man, begins by insulting him? This is a different thing. It is not necessary that the honor or the life of citizens should be at the mercy of a brute, a drunkard, or a bold rascal; and we can no more preserve ourselves from such an accident than from the fall of a tile. A blow and an insult received and suffered are civil consequences which no wisdom can foresee and the victim of which no tribunal can avenge. In such cases the insufficiency of the laws restores to one his independence; he then becomes sole magistrate and sole judge between the offender and himself; he is sole interpreter and minister of the law of Nature; he owes himself justice, and can alone render it; and there is no government on the earth insane enough to punish him for having justified himself in such a case. I do not say that he ought to fight, for this is folly; but I do say that he owes justice to himself, and that he is sole dispenser of it. Without so many useless edicts against duels, if I were sovereign, I guarantee that there should never be a blow or an insult given within my domains, and this

incite two dogs to fight, and will never cause a cat to be pursued by a dog. This spirit of peace is an effect of his education, which, not having fomented self-love and a high opinion of himself, has prevented him from seeking his pleasures in domination and in the misfortunes of others. He suffers when he sees suffering. This is a natural feeling. That which hardens a young man and causes him to take pleasure in seeing a sensible creature tormented is that turn of vanity which makes him regard himself as exempt from the same suffering through his wisdom or through his superiority. He who has been preserved from this turn of mind can not fall into the vice which is the consequence of it. Hence Émile loves peace. The image of happiness charms him, and when he can contribute toward producing it he has an additional means of sharing in it. I have not supposed that while seeing the unfortunate he has for them only that sterile and cruel pity which contents itself with pitying the evils which it can cure. His active benefi-

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by a very simple means, one with which courts would have nothing to do. However it may be, Émile knows in such cases the justice which he owes to himself and the example which he owes to the safety of men of honor. It does not depend on the bravest man to prevent himself from being insulted, but it does depend on him to prevent another from long boasting of having insulted him.*

* Rousseau's theory of natural right is here extended to its logical conclusion; men, on occasion, may resume the natural rights which society had extorted from them, and may punish offenders without the intervention of legal processes. Much of our Fourth-of-July oratory fosters this political heresy: This is a government of the people, for the people, by the people; and the easy inference is that when the people become dissatisfied with the protection promised them by the laws they may resume their delegated authority, and become their own court, judge, and executioner. —(P.)

cence soon gives him knowledge which, with a harder heart, he would not have acquired, or which he would have acquired much later. If he sees discord prevailing among his companions, he seeks to reconcile them; if he sees persons in affliction, he informs himself of the cause of their sorrows; if he sees two men hating each other, he wishes to know the cause of their enmity; if he sees a victim of oppression groaning under the vexations of the powerful and the rich, he seeks for ways by which these vexations may be made to cease; and in the interest which he takes in all the unfortunate, the means for curing their ills are never matters of indifference for him. What, then, have we to do to avail ourselves of these dispositions in a manner suitable to his age? To regulate his good offices and his knowledge, and to employ his zeal in augmenting them.

I do not grow weary of repeating that all the lessons of young men should be given in actions rather than in words. Let them learn nothing in books that can be taught them by experience. What an extravagant idea to train them in speaking without a topic for discussion, and to fancy that they can be made to feel, on the benches of a college, the energy of a language of the passions and all the force of the art of persuading, without being interested in some one who is to be persuaded! All the precepts of rhetoric seem but pure verbiage to one who does not see that they can be employed to his advantage. Of what importance is it to a scholar to know how Hannibal proceeded in order to prevail upon his soldiers to cross the Alps? If, in place of these magnificent harangues, you tell him how he ought to proceed in order to induce his master to grant him a leave of absence, you may be sure that he will be more attentive to your rules.

The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that

in thus putting beneficence in action and drawing from our good or bad success reflections on their causes, there is little useful knowledge which can not be cultivated in the mind of a young man; and that, with all the real knowledge which can be acquired in colleges, he will acquire a still more important science in addition, which is the application of this acquisition to the usages of life.

What grand designs I see arranged, little by little, in his mind! What sublime sentiments stifle in his heart the germ of petty passions! What clearness of judgment and what accuracy of reason I see formed in him by his cultured propensities and from the experience which concentrates the desires of a great soul within the narrow limits of the possible, and causes a man superior to others, but not able to raise them to his level, to know how to condescend to theirs! The true principles of the just, the true models of the beautiful, all the moral relations of beings, and all the ideas of order, are engraved in his understanding; he sees the place of each thing, and the cause which removes the thing from its place; he sees what can produce the good, and what prevents it. Without having experienced the human passions, he knows their illusions and their manner of acting.

Consider that, while wishing to form the man of nature, it is not proposed for this purpose to make a savage of him and to banish him to the depths of a forest; but that, confined within the social vortex, it suffices that he does not allow himself to be drawn there either by the passions or the opinions of men; that he see with his eyes and feel with his heart; and that he be governed by no authority save that of his own reason.

Locke would have us begin with the study of mind, and pass thence to the study of the body. This is the method of superstition, of prejudice, and of error, but not

that of reason, nor even of well-ordered nature; it is to close one's eyes in order to learn how to see. We must have studied the body for a long time in order to form a correct notion of mind and to suspect that it exists. The contrary order serves only to establish materialism.

I foresee that many of my readers will be surprised to see me pursue the entire primary period of my pupil's education without speaking to him of religion. At the age of fifteen he did not know that he had a soul, and perhaps at eighteen it is not yet time for him to learn it; for, if he learn it sooner than is necessary, he runs the risk of never knowing it.

Let us refrain from announcing the truth to those who are not in a condition to understand it, for this is equivalent to substituting error for it. It would be much better to have no idea of the Divinity, than to have ideas which are low, fanciful, wrongful, or unworthy of him. Not to know the Divinity is a lesser evil than to have unworthy conceptions of him. "I would much prefer," says the good Plutarch, "that one should believe there is no Plutarch in existence, than to say that Plutarch is unjust, envious, jealous, and so tyrannical as to exact more than he gives power to perform."

The great evil of the deformed images of the Divinity which are traced in the minds of children is that they remain there as long as they live, and that when they have become men they have no other conception of God than that of their childhood. In Switzerland I once saw a good and pious mother so convinced of this truth, that she would not instruct her son in religion in his childhood for fear that, satisfied with this rude instruction, he would neglect a better at the age of reason. This child never heard God spoken of save with seriousness and reverence; and the moment he attempted to speak

of him himself silence was imposed on him, as though the subject were too sublime and too grand for him. This reserve excited his curiosity, and his self-love yearned for the moment when he might know this mystery which was so carefully kept from him. The less one spoke to him of God, and the less he was suffered to speak of him himself, the more his thoughts were occupied with him; that child saw God everywhere. And what I would fear from this air of mystery indiscreetly affected is, that by exciting the imagination of a young man too vividly his head might be turned, and that finally he would become a fanatic instead of a believer.*

But let us fear nothing of this sort for my Émile, who, constantly refusing his attention to whatever is beyond his reach, hears with the most profound indifference the things which he does not understand. There are so many things respecting which he is accustomed to say that they do not fall within his province, that an additional one scarcely embarrasses him; and when he begins to be disturbed by these great questions, it is not from having heard them proposed, but because the natural progress

* One of Rousseau's cardinal doctrines is the progressive development of the child's powers; but he seems to miss the truth that there is a corresponding progress in the child's knowledge. Émile shall not read fables till he can form a clear comprehension of them; shall not learn the demonstration of a proposition till the logical faculty has been fully developed; and shall have no notion of the Supreme Being till the time comes when he can form an adequate notion of him. St. Paul was wiser: "When I was a child I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man I put away childish things." The natural genesis of knowledge is from the vague to the definite. Rude notions suffice for the child; they serve his present needs best, and are the necessary antecedents to the higher form of knowledge which is befitting to men.—(P.)

of his intelligence carries his researches in that direction.*

We work in concert with Nature, and while she is forming the physical man, we are trying to form the moral man; but our progress is not the same. The body is already robust and strong while the soul is still languishing and feeble, and notwithstanding all that human art can do, temperament always precedes reason. It is to hold the one and to excite the other that we have so far devoted all our care, so that as far as possible man might always be one. While developing the disposition we have diverted his nascent sensibility; we have regulated it by cultivating the reason. Intellectual objects modify the impressions of sensible objects. By ascending to the principle of things we have withdrawn him from the empire of the senses. It was easy to rise from the study of Nature to the search for its author.

When we have reached this point what new holds we have gained on our pupil! What new means we have of speaking to his heart! It is only then that he finds his real interest in being good and in doing good, with no regard to men, and without being forced to it by the laws; in being just between God and himself; in performing his duty, even at the cost of his life; and in maintaining purity of heart, not only for the love of order to which each always prefers the love of self, but for the love of his Creator which is mingled with this very love of self, in order that he may finally enjoy the lasting happiness which the repose of a good conscience and the contemplation of that Supreme Being promise him in the other

* At this point intervenes the Savoyard Vicar's Confession of Faith, a sort of philosophical gospel of deism and natural religion. It forms a religious tract too long to quote, and a mere extract would give only a very imperfect idea of it.—(P.)

life, after having made a good use of this. Depart from this, and I see nothing but injustice, hypocrisy, and falsehood among men; and the individual interest which, in competition, necessarily prevails over everything else, teaches each of them to adorn vice with the mask of virtue. Let all other men consult my happiness at the expense of their own; let everything have reference to me alone; let the whole human race die, if necessary, in pain and in wretchedness, in order to spare me a moment of sorrow or of hunger: such is the inward language of every unbeliever who reasons. Yes, I will maintain it as long as I live: whoever has said in his heart there is no God, and speaks differently, is but a liar or a fool.

The true moment of nature finally comes, as it necessarily must. Since man must die, he must reproduce himself in order that the species may endure and the order of the world be preserved. When, by signs which I have mentioned, you have a presentiment of the critical moment, instantly and forever abandon your former manner with him. He is still your disciple, but he is no longer your pupil. He is your friend—he is a man; henceforth treat him as such.

What! must I abdicate my authority when it is the most necessary? Must the adult be abandoned to himself at the moment when he is the least capable of self-conduct, and is in danger of making the greatest mistakes? Must I renounce my rights when it is of the most importance to him that I use them?

I freely acknowledge that, if coming in direct collision with his nascent desires, you were stupidly to treat as crimes the new needs which make themselves felt within him, you would not long be listened to by him; but the moment you abandon my method I am no longer responsible to you for anything. Always recollect that you

are the minister of Nature; you are never to be her enemy.

But what course shall we follow? All that is to be expected here is the alternative of favoring his propensities or of opposing them; of being his tyrant or his accomplice; and both have such dangerous consequences that it is only too difficult to decide between them.

Considering that Nature has no fixed limit which can not be advanced or retarded, I think I may assume that, without departing from her law, Émile has remained up to this time, through my care, in his primitive innocence; and I see this happy epoch ready to terminate. Surrounded by ever-increasing perils, he is on the point of escaping from me on the first occasion, regardless of all I may do; and this occasion will not be slow in making its appearance. He will follow the blind instinct of his senses, and a thousand to one he will be lost. I have reflected too much on the manners of men not to see the invincible influence of this first moment on the rest of his life. If I dissimulate and pretend to see nothing, he takes advantage of my weakness; thinking that he deceives me, he holds me in contempt, and I am the accomplice of his ruin. If I attempt to hold him back, the time for it is passed, and he no longer listens to me. I become disagreeable to him, odious, unendurable, and he will not be likely to lose any time in getting rid of me. There is therefore, henceforth, only one reasonable course for me to take: and this is, to make him accountable to himself for his actions, to shield him, at least, from the surprises of error, and to show him without concealment the perils by which he is surrounded. Up to this time I have held him back through his ignorance; but now he must be controlled by his intelligence.

These new instructions are important, and it behooves

us to discuss matters from a higher point of view. This is the moment, so to speak, for presenting to him my account, by showing him the use that has been made of his time and of my own; for declaring to him what he is and what I am; what I have done and what he has done; what we owe to each other, all his moral relations, and all the engagements which he has contracted; what point he has reached in the progress of his faculties, what part of the route remains to be traversed, the difficulties he will find there, the means for overcoming them, and how far I am able to aid him; then, how far he alone is henceforth able to aid himself; lastly, the critical point where he now stands, the new perils which surround him, and all the valid reasons which should induce him to watch attentively over himself before listening to his nascent desires.

Recollect that for adult conduct we must adopt the very reverse of the course you have followed in the management of a child. Do not hesitate to instruct him in those dangerous mysteries which you have so long concealed from him with so much care. Since he must finally know them, it is important that he learn them neither from another nor from himself, but from you alone. For fear of surprise, he must know his enemy, since he will henceforth be compelled to fight him.

Young men who are found wise on these subjects, without knowing how they became so, have never gained their wisdom with impunity. This indiscreet instruction, as it can not have an honest purpose, at least sullies the imagination of those who receive it, and disposes them to the vices of those who give it. This is not all: domestics thus insinuate themselves into the mind of the child, gain his confidence, make him regard his tutor as a gloomy and disagreeable person, and one of the favorite purposes

of their secret gossip is to slander him. When the pupil has reached this point the master may retire, for there is no longer any good that he can do.

But why does the child choose secret confidants? Always through the tyranny of those who govern him. Why should he conceal himself from them if he were not forced to do so? Why should he complain of them if he had no subject of complaint? Naturally they are his first confidants; and we see from the eagerness with which he comes to tell them what he thinks, that he believes that he has only half thought it until he has told them. Consider that, if the child fears neither lecture nor reprimand on your part, he will always tell you everything; and that no one will dare confide anything to him which he ought to conceal from you, if he is very sure that he will conceal nothing from you.

So long as he continues thus to open his heart freely to me, and tell me with pleasure whatever he feels, I have nothing to fear—the danger is not yet near; but if he becomes more timid and more reserved, and I perceive in his conversation the first embarassment from shame, the instinct is already developing itself, and the idea of evil is already beginning to be associated with it. There is no longer a moment to lose; and, if I do not make haste to instruct him, he will soon be instructed in spite of myself.

Reading, solitude, idleness, an aimless and sedentary life, intercourse with young men and women, these are the paths dangerous to open to one of his age, and which ceaselessly keep him alongside of peril. It is through other sensible objects that I divert his senses; it is by tracing another course for his inclinations that I turn them aside from the one which they began to follow; it is by exercising his body at painful labor that I arrest

the activity of the imagination that is leading him away.

When the hands are fully occupied, the imagination is in repose; when the body is very weary, the heart does not become excited. The promptest and easiest precaution is to take him away from local danger. At first I remove him from cities, far from objects capable of tempting him. But this is not enough. In what desert, in what wild retreat, will he escape the images which pursue him? It is of no account to withdraw him from dangerous objects, if I do not also withdraw him from the recollection of them; if I do not find the art of detaching him from everything. If I do not distract his attention from himself, I might as well leave him where he was.

Émile knows a trade, but this trade is not our resource here; he loves and understands agriculture, but agriculture does not suffice us. The occupations which he knows become routine; in devoting himself to them it is as though he were doing nothing; he is thinking of a wholly different thing; head and hands are acting separately. What is needed is a new occupation which interests him by its novelty, which keeps him in good humor, gives him pleasure, occupies his attention, and keeps him in training—an occupation of which he is passionately fond and in which he is wholly absorbed. Now the only one which seems to me to fulfill all these conditions is hunting. If hunting is ever an innocent pleasure, if it is ever fitting for a man, it is now that we must have recourse to it. Émile has everything necessary for success in it; he is robust, dexterous, patient, indefatigable. Without fail he will contract a taste for this exercise; he will throw into it all the ardor of his age; for a time, at least, he will lose in it all the dangerous inclinations which spring from idleness. Hunting toughens the heart

as well as the body; it accustoms us to blood and to cruelty. Diana has been represented as the enemy of love, and the allegory is very appropriate. The languors of love spring only from a pleasing repose; violent exercise suppresses tender emotions.

Never employ dry reasoning with the young; therefore clothe reason with a body, if you would make it effective. Cause the language of the intellect to pass through the heart, in order that you may make it understood. I repeat it, cold arguments may determine our opinions, but not our actions; they cause us to believe, but not to act; we demonstrate what must be thought, but not what must be done. If this is true for men in general, it is all the more true for young men who are still enveloped in their senses, and who think only as they imagine.

I shall carefully refrain, therefore, even after the preparations of which I have spoken, from going suddenly into Émile's chamber to treat him to a long and dull discourse on the subject designed for his instruction. I will begin by arousing his imagination; I will choose the time, the place, and the objects most favorable for the impression which I wish to make; I will summon the whole of Nature, so to speak, to witness our conferences; I will call the Eternal, whose work Nature is, to witness the truth of what I shall say; I will make him the judge between Émile and myself; I will mark the place where we are, the rocks, the woods, and the mountains which surround us, as so many monuments to his engagements and my own; and in my eyes, my accent, and my gestures, I will put the enthusiasm and ardor with which I wish to inspire him. Then I shall speak to him, and he will hear me; I shall grow tender, and he will be moved. By impressing myself with the sanctity of my duties I shall give him a greater respect for his own. I will employ images and figures to give ani-

mation and force to my reasoning. I will not be tedious and diffuse by the use of lifeless maxims, but will abound in overflowing emotions. My reasoning will be grave and sententious, but my heart will never have said enough. It is then, while showing him all I have done for him, that I shall show it to him as done for myself, and he will see in my tender affection the reason of all my cares. What surprise, what agitation I shall cause him by this sudden change in my manner of speech! Instead of contracting his soul by always speaking to him of his own interest, it is of mine alone that I shall henceforth speak to him, and I shall affect him the more by it. I shall make his young heart burn with all the feelings of friendship, generosity, and gratitude which I have already caused to spring up there, and which are so sweet to cherish. I will press him to my heart while shedding over him tears of tenderness, and I will say to him: "You are my all, my child, my workmanship; it is from your happiness that I expect my own; if you frustrate my hopes, you rob me of twenty years of life, and becloud my old age with unhappiness." It is thus that we make ourselves heard by a young man, and engrave in the depths of his heart the remembrance of what we have told him.

If I have been able to take all the necessary precautions in the use of these maxims, and to hold with my Émile the conversations adapted to the juncture to which his progress in years has brought him, I do not doubt for an instant that he will come of himself to the point where I wish to lead him; that he will put himself with eagerness under my protection; and that he will say to me, with all the warmth of his age, when pressed by the dangers which he sees surrounding him: "O my friend, my protector, my master, resume the authority which you would lay down at the moment when it most concerns me that

it should remain with you. Thus far you have had this authority only through my weakness, but you shall henceforth have it through my will, and it shall be the more sacred to me on this account. Protect me from all the enemies who assail me, and especially from those whom I carry with me and who betray me. Watch over your work to the end, that it may remain worthy of you. It is my constant wish to obey your laws, and this forever. If I ever disobey you, it will be against my will. Make me free by protecting me against the passions which assail me; prevent me from being their slave, and compel me to be my own master by not obeying my senses, but my reason."

When you have brought your pupil to this point (and if he does not come to it it will be your fault), be on your guard against taking him too quickly at his word, for fear that, if your control should ever seem to him too harsh, he might think himself entitled to escape from it by accusing you of having taken him by surprise. It is at this moment that reserve and gravity are in place; and this tone will affect him all the more because it will be the first occasion on which he will have seen you assume it.

How narrow one must be to see in the nascent desires of a young man only an obstacle to the lessons of reason! As for myself, I see in them the true means of making him docile to these very lessons. We have no hold on the passions save through the passions; it is through their empire that we must make war on their tyranny, and it is always from Nature herself that we must draw the instruments proper for controlling her.

Émile is not made for living always in solitude; as a member of society he ought to fulfill its duties. Made to live with men, he ought to know them. He knows men in general, and it remains for him to know them as in-

dividuals. He knows what is done in the world, and it remains for him to see how men live in it. It is time to show him the exterior of that grand stage whose concealed workings he already knows. He will no longer entertain for it the stupid admiration of a young rattle-brain, but the discernment of an upright, an accurate mind. His passions will be able to impose on him, doubtless; but when will it happen that they do not impose on those who abandon themselves to them? But at least he will not be deceived by the passions of others. If he sees them, he will see them with the eye of a sage, without being influenced by their examples or seduced by their prejudices.

As there is a proper age for the study of the sciences, there is also one for properly apprehending the use of the world. Whoever learns this use too young follows it all his life without choice or reflection, and, although with self-conceit, without ever really knowing what he does; but he who learns it and sees the reasons of it, follows it with more discernment, and consequently with more propriety and grace. Give me a child of twelve years who knows nothing at all, and at fifteen I will guarantee to make him as wise as he whom you have instructed from infancy; but with this difference, that the knowledge of your pupil will be only in his memory, while that of mine will be in his judgment. So also, introduce a young man of twenty into the world; if well trained, he will in one year be more amiable and more judiciously polished than he whom you have reared there from infancy; for the first, being capable of feeling the reasons of all the procedures relative to age, condition, and sex, which constitute this usage, can reduce them to principles and extend them to unforeseen cases; whereas the other, having only routine for his sole guide, is embarrassed the moment there is a departure from it.

It is true, on the other hand, that we must not wait too long. Whoever has passed all his youth at a distance from cultivated society will maintain there for the rest of his life an air of embarrassment and restraint, a style of conversation that is always inappropriate, and dull and awkward manners which the habit of living there no longer corrects, and which become only the more ridiculous by the effort to escape from them. Each kind of instruction has its fit time which must be known, and its dangers which must be avoided. There are special dangers clustering around the subject in hand; but I shall not expose my pupil to them without taking precautions to shield him from them.

Your heart, I say to the young man, has need of a companion, and we are going to look for one who is suitable for you. We shall not find her easily, perhaps, for true merit is always rare; but we shall neither be in haste nor discouraged. Doubtless there is such an one, and we shall at last find her, or at least one who approaches our ideal the nearest. With a project so flattering for him, I introduce him into society. What need have I to say more of it? Do you not see that I have done all that is necessary?

In describing to him the lady whom I destined for him, imagine whether I shall be able to make myself heard on the subject; whether I can make agreeable and dear to him the qualities which he ought to love; whether I shall be able to bring all his feelings into conformity with what he ought to seek or shun. I must be the most unskillful of men if I do not make him enamored in advance without knowing the object of his affections. It does not matter that the object which I picture to him is imaginary; it suffices that it disgusts him with those who might tempt him, and that he everywhere finds com-

parisons which make him prefer his dream to the real objects which will excite his attention. What is real love itself, if not a dream, a fiction, an illusion? We love the picture which we form much more than the object to which we apply it. If we saw what we love exactly as it is, there would no longer be any love in the world. When we cease to love, the person whom we loved remains the same as before, but we no longer see her the same. The veil of delusion falls, and love vanishes. Now, by furnishing the imaginary object, I am the master of comparisons, and easily prevent the illusion of real objects.

For this purpose I do not wish the young man to be deceived by painting for him a model of perfection which can not exist; but I will so choose the faults of his sweetheart that they befit him, please him, and serve to correct his own. Nor do I wish to deceive him by falsely asserting that the object depicted to him really exists; but if he is pleased with the picture, it will soon make him wish for the original.

But whether he personify or not the object which I shall have made endearing to him, this model, if it is well conceived, will not attach him the less to whatever resembles it, and will give him no less repulsion for whatever does not resemble it than as if the object were real. What an advantage to preserve his heart from the dangers to which his person must be exposed, to restrain his senses through his imagination, and especially to rescue him from those mistresses of education who make it so costly, and who train a young man to politeness only by divesting him of all his honor! Sophie is so modest! How will he view their advances? Sophie has such simplicity! How will he love their airs? There is too great a distance between his ideals and his observations for the latter ever to be dangerous to him.

You can not imagine how Émile, at the age of twenty, can be docile. How different our ideas are! As for me, I can not conceive how he could be docile at ten; for what hold had I on him at that age? It cost me the cares of fifteen years to secure that hold. I was not then educating him, but was preparing him for being educated. He is now sufficiently trained to be docile; he recognizes the voice of friendship, and can be obedient to reason. I grant to him, it is true, the appearance of independence; but he was never in more complete subjection, for his obedience is the result of his will. So long as I could not make myself the master of his will I remained master of his person; I did not take a step from him. Now I sometimes leave him to himself, because I always govern him. On leaving him, I embrace him, and say to him with an air of assurance: "Émile, I confide you to my friend; I intrust you to his honest heart, and he will be accountable to me for you."

What precautions to be taken with a young man of good birth, before exposing him to the scandalous manners of the times! These precautions are painful, but they are indispensable; it is through neglect on this point that so many of the young are lost. It is through the disorders of early life that men degenerate, and that we see them become what they are to-day.

In whatever station he may have been born, and into whatever society he may begin to introduce himself, his first appearance shall be simple and without display. God forbid that he shall be so unfortunate as to shine there! The qualities which instantly attract attention are not his; he neither has them nor wishes to have them. He sets too little value on the judgments of men to incur their prejudices, and is not at all anxious to be esteemed before being known. His manner of presenting himself

is neither modest nor vain, but natural and true. He knows neither constraint nor disguise, and is the same in society as when alone and without witness. On this account will he be rude, scornful, and attentive to no one? Just the contrary. If, alone, he takes no account whatever of other men, does it follow that he should take no account of them while living with them? He indicates no preference for them over himself in his manners, because he does not prefer them in his heart; but, on the other hand, he does not treat them with an indifference which he is very far from feeling; if he has not the formalities of politeness, he has the active instincts of humanity. He does not love to see any one suffer. He will not offer his place to another through affectation, but will yield it to him voluntarily through goodness of heart, if, seeing him neglected, he thinks that this neglect mortifies him; for it will cost my young man less to remain standing voluntarily than to see the other remain standing by compulsion.

He speaks little, because he hardly cares to occupy the attention of others; for the same reason, he says only things that are of some importance; otherwise, what excuse has he for engaging in conversation? Émile is too wise ever to be a babbler. Excessive prattle necessarily comes either from pretension to wit—of which I shall speak hereafter—or from the value put on trifles which we are silly enough to think are valued as highly by others as by ourselves. He who has such a knowledge of things as to give to all of them their real value, never speaks too much, for he can also appreciate the attention which is given him, and the interest which can be taken in his conversation. Generally speaking, people who know little speak much, and people who know much speak little. It is plain that an ignorant man thinks

everything that he knows is important, and so tells it to everybody. But a wise man does not readily open his stores; he will have too much to say, and he sees that there is still more to be said after he is done, and so he remains silent. Far from shocking the manners of others, Émile conforms to them with good grace; not for the sake of seeming well informed in social usages, nor to affect the airs of a polished gentleman, but, on the contrary, for the sake of escaping notice, for fear that he may be observed; and he is never more at ease than when no one is paying attention to him.

Although, on entering society, he is in absolute ignorance of its usages, he is not on this account timid and nervous. If he keeps in the background, it is not through embarrassment, but because in order to see well, he must not be seen; for he is hardly disturbed by what people think of him, and ridicule does not cause him the least fear. It is on this account that, always being calm and cool, he is not troubled by bashfulness. Whether he is observed or not, whatever he does is always the very best he can do; and being wholly free to observe others, he catches their manners with an ease that is not possible to the slaves of opinion. We may say that he learns the habits of society the more readily, precisely because he sets but little value on them.

I grant that with principles so different, Émile will not be like other people, and may God preserve him from ever being so! But in so far as he is different from others he will be neither disagreeable nor ridiculous; the difference will be felt, but will occasion no inconvenience. Émile will be, if you please, an amiable foreigner, and at first his peculiarities will be pardoned by saying: "He will outgrow all that!" In the end, people will become perfectly accustomed to his manners, and, seeing that

he does not change them, he will again be pardoned for them by saying: "He was made so!"

He will not be *fêted* in society as a popular man, but people will love him without knowing why. No one will extol his understanding, but he will readily be accepted as an umpire among men of genius; his own comprehension will be clear and limited, and he will have good sense and sound judgment. Never running after new ideas, he could not pride himself on his wit. I have made him feel that all ideas which are wholesome and truly useful to men are the first that were known, that they have ever constituted the true bonds of society, and that all that is left for transcendent minds to do is to distinguish themselves by ideas which are pernicious and dangerous to the human race.* This manner of gaining admiration scarcely affects him; he knows where he ought to find the happiness of his life, and in what way he can contribute to the happiness of others. The sphere of his knowledge does not extend beyond what is profitable. His route is straight and well defined. Not being tempted to step aside from it, he is lost among those who follow it. He aims neither at eccentricity nor brilliancy. Émile is a man of good sense, and wishes to be nothing else; any attempt to hurt his feelings by this title will be in vain, for he will always think himself honored by it.

Although the desire to please does not leave him absolutely indifferent to the opinion of others, he will accept only so much of that opinion as relates directly to his own person, without caring for those arbitrary appreciations which have no law save fashion or preju-

* This is good philosophy, but has a strange sound when uttered by Rousseau.—(P.)

dice. He will have the pride of wishing to do well whatever he undertakes, and even of wishing to do better than others. In running he would be the fleetest, in a contest the strongest, in work the most clever, and in games of skill the most dexterous; but he will care little for advantages which are not clear in themselves, but which need to be established by the judgment of others—as of having more genius than another, of being a better talker, of being more learned, etc.; still less those which become no one, as of being better born, of being thought richer, more respectable, more highly esteemed, and of overawing by a grander display.

Loving men because they are his fellows, he will love those in particular who resemble him the most, because he will feel that he is good; and judging of this resemblance by conformity of taste in things moral, in whatever pertains to a good character he will be very glad to be approved. He will not say exactly that he rejoices because people approve him, but that he rejoices because people approve the good he has done; and that he rejoices because the people who honor him honor themselves in doing it. So long as they judge in this wholesome way, it will be a fine thing to obtain their esteem.

Studying men through their manners in society, just as he previously studied them through their passions in history, he will often have occasion to reflect on what gratifies or shocks the human heart. In this way he philosophizes on the principles of taste, and this is the study that is proper for him during this period.

If, in order to cultivate the taste of my disciple, I had to choose between countries where this culture is yet to be born and others where it has degenerated, I would follow the retrograde order: I would begin his round with the latter and finish it with the former. The reason

of this choice is that taste is corrupted by an excessive delicacy, which makes us sensitive to things which the most of mankind do not perceive. This refinement leads to the spirit of discussion, for the more we subtilize objects the more they are multiplied; and this subtilty makes the tact more delicate and less uniform. Then there are formed as many tastes as there are minds. In disputes as to the preference, philosophy and learning are exhausted; and it is in this way that we learn to think that shrewd observations can hardly be made save by people who are much in society, whereas they occur afterward to all the others, and people who are little accustomed to large assemblies there exhaust their attention on the more obvious features. At this moment there is perhaps no civilized place on the globe where the general taste is as bad as in Paris. And yet it is in this capital that good taste is cultivated; and there appear but few books esteemed in Europe whose author was not trained in Paris. Those who think it suffices to read the books which are written there are deceived, we learn much more from the conversation of authors than from their books; and the authors themselves are not those from whom we learn the most. It is the spirit of society which develops the thinking mind and extends the view as far as it can go. If you have a spark of genius, come and spend a year in Paris; you will soon be all you are capable of being, or you will never be anything.

I will go to still greater lengths in order to secure to him a taste that is pure and wholesome. In the tumult of dissipation I shall hold carefully arranged conversations with him, and always directing them to objects which please him, I shall be careful to make them both amusing and instructive. This is the time for reading and for agreeable books, the time to teach him to make

an analysis of a discourse, and to make him sensible to all the beauties of eloquence and diction. It is of little account to learn languages for themselves, for their use is not so important as we think; but the study of language leads to the study of general grammar. We must learn Latin in order to know French well; and we must study and compare both in order to understand the rules of the art of speaking.

There is, moreover, a certain simplicity of taste which penetrates the heart and which is found only in the writings of the ancients. In oratory, in poetry, in every species of literature, he will find them, just as in history, abundant in matter and sober in judgment. Our authors, on the contrary, say little and talk much. To be ever giving their judgment for law is not the means of forming our own. The difference between the two tastes is visible on monuments, and even on tombstones. Ours are covered with eulogies, while on those of the ancients we read facts:

Sta, viator; heroem calcas.

In general, Émile will contract a greater taste for the books of the ancients than for our own, on the simple ground that, being the first, the ancients are nearer to Nature, and have more native genius. Whatever La Motte and the Abbé Terrasson may say to the contrary, there is no real progress in reason in the human race, because what is gained on the one hand is lost on the other; for as all minds always start from the same point, and as the time spent in learning what others have thought is lost for teaching one's self how to think, we have more acquired knowledge and less vigor of mind. Our minds, like our hands, are trained to do everything with tools, and nothing by themselves. Fontenelle said that all this dispute on the ancients and moderns reduced

itself to knowing whether the trees of former times were taller than those of to-day. If there had been a change in agriculture this question would not be an improper one to discuss.

After having thus ascended to the sources of pure literature, I show him also their outlets in the reservoirs of modern compilations—newspapers, translations, dictionaries. He throws a glance over all this, and then he leaves it never to return to it. For his amusement I make him listen to the babble of the academies; I call his attention to the fact that each of the members alone is always worth more than the whole body; and thence he will draw an inference as to the utility of those noble establishments.

I take Émile to the theatre in order to study, not manners, but taste; for it is there, in particular, that he will be presented to those who know how to reflect. Let alone precepts and ethics, I will say to him; it is not here that he is to learn them. The theatre is not made for truth, but to please and amuse men; there is no school where we learn so well the art of pleasing them and of interesting the human heart. The study of the theatre leads to that of poetry; they have exactly the same object. If he has the least spark of taste for poetry, with what pleasure he will cultivate the languages of poets—the Greek, the Latin, and the Italian! These studies will be amusements for him without constraint, and will profit him only the more for it. They will be delicious to him at an age and in circumstances when the heart is interested so charmingly in all varieties of beauty calculated to touch it. Imagine on one side my Émile, and on the other a college blade, reading the fourth book of the *Æneid*, or Tibullus, or the *Banquet* of Plato. What a difference! How the heart of one is stirred by

that which does not even affect the other! O choice young man! pause, suspend your reading, for I observe that you are too much affected. It is my earnest wish that the language of love may please you, but not that it mislead you. Be a man of feeling, but be a wise man. If you are but one of these, you are nothing. Moreover, whether he succeed or not in the dead languages, in the *belles-lettres*, or in poetry, matters but little to me. He will be worth none the less if he knows nothing of all this, and we have to do with none of this nonsense in his education.

My principal object in teaching him to feel and to love the beautiful in all its forms is to fix on it his affections and his tastes, to prevent his natural appetites from becoming corrupted, and to prevent him from some day seeking in his riches the means of happiness which he ought to find within himself. I have said elsewhere * that taste is but the art of discerning the value of little things, and this is very true; but since the happiness of life depends on the contexture of little things, such concerns are far from being unimportant; for it is through them that we learn to fill up life with the good things placed within our reach, to the full extent of the truth which they may have for us. I do not here mean moral good, which depends on a happy frame of the soul, but only physical good and real pleasure, leaving out of account the prejudices of opinion.

In order to develop my thought the better, allow me to leave Émile for a moment, whose pure and wholesome heart can no longer serve as a rule for any one, and to seek in myself a more obvious and familiar example of the manners which I wish to commend to the reader.†

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* Lettre à d'Alembert.

† What follows is characteristic of Rousseau's mind and heart—

There are positions which seem to change our nature, and to recast, for better or for worse, the men who fill them. I have thought a hundred times that if I had the misfortune to-day to fill such a position as I have in mind, in a certain country, to-morrow I should be almost inevitably a tyrant, an extortioner, a destroyer of the people, a menace to the prince, an enemy by profession of the whole human race, a foe to all equity and to every species of virtue.

So also, if I were rich, I should have done whatever was necessary to become such. I should therefore be insolent and mean, tender-hearted and sensitive for myself alone, pitiless and harsh for all the world, a scornful witness of the miseries of the rabble. I should make of my fortune the instrument of my pleasures, and these would be my sole occupation.

From that boundless profusion of good things which cover the earth I should seek whatever is most agreeable to me, and which I can the best appropriate to my use. To this end, the first use I should make of my riches would be to purchase leisure and liberty, to which I should add health if it were to be bought; but as it can be bought only with temperance, and as there is no pleasure in life without it, I should be temperate for sensual reasons.

I would always keep as near to Nature as possible in order to humor the senses which I have received from her, very sure that the more of herself that is added to my enjoyments the more of reality I should find in them.

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his ideal, in brief, of happiness in this world. It is almost autobiographic, for it reproduces memories of some of his happiest moments. He was addicted to meditation, was shy of society, loved solitude and simple pleasures, was a man of the people, and a foe to oppression in all its forms.—(P.)

In the choice of objects for imitation I should always take her for my model; in my appetites I would give her the preference; in my tastes I would always consult her; and in my viands I should always prefer those which she has made the most toothsome, and which have passed through the fewest hands in order to reach my table.

For the same reason I should not imitate those who, finding nothing good save where they are not, always place the seasons in contradiction with themselves, and the climate in contradiction with the seasons; who, seeking for summer in winter and winter in summer, would have cold in Italy and heat in the north. For my part I would stay in my place, where I would adopt the opposite course. I would draw from a season whatever was agreeable in it, and from a climate all that was peculiar to it. I would go to spend the summer in Naples and the winter in St. Petersburg, now breathing sweet zephyrs, half reclining in the cool grottoes of Tarentum, and now in the illumination of an ice palace, out of breath and fatigued with the pleasures of a ball.

In my table service and in the adornment of my apartments I would imitate the variety of the seasons by the use of simple ornaments, and I would draw from each all the delight it could afford, without anticipating those which were to follow.

In order to be well served, I would have few domestics. A private citizen derives more real service from a single servant than a duke from the ten gentlemen who surround him.

I would not have a palace for a dwelling, for in that palace I would occupy but one apartment. Every room in common belongs to no one, and the apartment of each of my household would be as foreign to me as that of my neighbor.

My furniture should be as simple as my tastes. I would have neither picture-gallery nor library, especially if I loved books and were a judge of pictures. I should then know that such collections are never complete, and that the loss of what is lacking in them occasions more regret than to have nothing. In this case abundance causes misery; there is not a collector who has not experienced this.

Play is not an amusement for a rich man, but the resource of an idler; and my pleasures would give me too much employment to leave me much time to be so poorly employed. Being solitary and poor, I do not play at all, save sometimes at chess, and this is too much. We rarely see thinkers who take much pleasure in play, for it suspends this habit, or employs it in dry combinations, and so one of the benefits, and perhaps the only one, which a taste for the sciences has produced, is to deaden somewhat this sordid passion.

I would be the same in my private life as in my intercourse with the world. I would have my fortune diffuse comfort everywhere, and never create a sense of inequality. The glitter of apparel is an inconvenience in a thousand respects. To preserve among men all possible liberty, I should be dressed in such a way that among all classes I should seem in my place, and that I should be an object of remark in none.

The only bond between me and my associates should be mutual attachment, conformity of tastes, and fitness of character. I would enter society simply as a man, and not as a man of wealth.

We are never so ridiculous as when acting in set forms. He who can vary his situations and his pleasures effaces to-day the impression of yesterday; he may go for nobody with other men; but he enjoys life, for at each

hour and in everything he is his own master. My only set form shall be this: in each situation I shall not busy myself with any other, and I shall employ each day on its own account, independently of yesterday or of to-morrow. As I would be one with the people, I shall be a countryman in the country, and when I talk of farming, the peasant will not laugh at me. I shall not go and build me a villa in the country, or expect in the solitude of some province to have the Tuileries before my apartment. On the slope of some pleasant and well-shaded hill I would have a little rustic cottage, a white house with green blinds; and though a roof of thatch is the best for all seasons, I should prefer, on the score of magnificence, not the gloomy slate, but tile, because it has a more befitting and pleasing appearance than a roof of thatch, and, besides, it recalls somewhat the happy period of my youth, for the houses in my native country were commonly covered with tile. For court-yard I would have a poultry-yard, and for stable a cow-house, in order to have milk, cream, butter, and cheese, of which I am very fond. My garden I would devote to the raising of vegetables, and for a park I would have a fine orchard like the one which I shall mention hereafter. The fruit, at the service of all who pass, shall be neither counted nor picked by my gardener; and my miserly magnificence shall never display to the eye superb espaliers which one dare scarcely touch. Now this slender prodigality would cost but little, because I should have chosen my retreat in some remote province, poor in money but rich in food, where abundance and poverty prevail.

There I would bring together a society, more select than numerous, of friends loving pleasure and knowing how to find it, and of women who can leave their chairs, take part in rustic sports, and sometimes, instead of the

netting-needle and cards, use the line, the lime-twig, the hay-rake, and the vintage-basket. There all the manners of the city would be forgotten, and, having become villagers of the village, we should find ourselves addicted to hosts of different amusements, which each evening would give us the embarrassment of a choice for the morrow. Exercise and an active life would give us a new stomach and new tastes. All our repasts would be feasts, more pleasing by their abundance than by their delicacy. Gayety, rustic employments, and frolicsome sports are the prime cooks of the world, and elaborate stews are very ridiculous to people who have been up and doing since sunrise. The table service would have no more order than elegance. The dining-room would be everywhere—in the garden, in a boat, under a tree, and sometimes at a distance, near a living spring, on the grass, fresh and green, and under clusters of alders and hazels. A long procession of happy guests would carry the preparations for the feast singing as they went; the grass would serve for table and chairs, the rim of the spring for a buffet, and the dessert would hang on the trees. The dishes would be served without order, appetite dispensing with manners; for each one, openly preferring himself to others, would find good what every other one also preferred for himself. From this cordial and temperate familiarity would spring, without coarseness, insincerity, or constraint, a playful contest a hundred times more charming than politeness, and better adapted to unite human hearts.

The objection will doubtless be made that such amusements are within the reach of all men, and that one does not need to be rich to enjoy them. This is precisely the point I wish to make. We have pleasure when we are willing to have it. It is opinion alone which makes everything difficult, which drives happiness from us;

and it is a hundred times more easy to be happy than to appear so. A man of taste and fond of pleasure has the necessary riches at his command: all he needs is to be free and his own master. Whoever enjoys health and has the necessaries of life, is rich enough if he plucks from his heart the things which are made good by opinion. This is the *aurea mediocritas* of Horace. Men who are hoarding their wealth should therefore look for some other use for their riches, for on the score of pleasure they are good for nothing. Émile will not know all this better than I do; but having a purer and sounder heart he will feel it still more, and all his observations in the world will only confirm him in this belief.

While passing the time in this way we are always looking for Sophie, but we do not find her. It were better that she should not be found so soon, and we have been looking for her where I was very sure she was not.*

Finally, the pressing moment comes. It is time to look for her in earnest, for fear he may meet one whom he will take for her, and discover his mistake too late. Adieu to Paris, therefore, city of renown, of noise, of smoke, and of dirt, where women no longer believe in honor, nor men in virtue. Adieu, Paris. As we are looking for love, happiness, and innocence, we shall never be too far away from you.

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* "Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies." Proverbs xxxi, 10.

BOOK FIFTH.

THE EDUCATION OF WOMAN.

We have now reached the last stage of youth, but we are not yet at the *dénouement.*

It is not good for man to be alone. Émile is a man. We have promised him a companion, and she must be given to him. This companion is Sophie. In what region is her abode? Where shall we find her? In order to find her we must know her. Let us first know what she is, and then we shall the more easily determine the place where she dwells. And when we have found her all will not yet be done. "*Since our young gentleman*," says Locke, "*is now got within sight of matrimony, it is time to leave him to his mistress.*" And thereupon he finishes his work. For myself, who have not the honor to educate a gentleman, I shall refrain from imitating Locke in this particular.

Sophie ought to be a woman, as Émile is a man—that is, she should have whatever is befitting the constitution of her species and of her sex, in order to fill her place in the physical and moral world. Let us then begin by examining the conformities and the differences between her sex and ours.

All that we know with a certainty is that the only thing in common between man and woman is the species, and that they differ only in respect of sex. Under this

double point of view we find between them so many resemblances and so many contrasts, that it is perhaps one of the wonders of Nature that she could make two beings so similar and yet constitute them so differently.

These correspondences and these differences must needs have their moral effect. This consequence is obvious, is in conformity with experience, and shows the vanity of the disputes as to the superiority or the equality of the sexes; as if each of them, answering the ends of Nature according to its particular destination, were not more perfect on that account than if it bore a greater resemblance to the other! With respect to what they have in common they are equal; and in so far as they are different they are not capable of being compared. A perfect man and a perfect woman ought no more to resemble each other in mind than in features; and perfection is not susceptible of greater and less.

In the union of the sexes each contributes equally toward the common end, but not in the same way. Hence arises the first assignable difference among their moral relations. One must be active and strong, the other passive and weak. One must needs have power and will, while it suffices that the other have little power of resistance.

This principle once established, it follows that woman is especially constituted to please man. If man ought to please her in turn, the necessity for it is less direct. His merit lies in his power; he pleases simply because he is strong. I grant that this is not the law of love, but it is the law of Nature, which is anterior even to love.

Plato, in his Republic, enjoins the same exercises on women as upon men, and in this I think he was right. Having excluded private families from his ideal state, and not knowing what to do with the women, he sees himself compelled to make men of them. This great genius had

arranged everything, foreseen everything, and had anticipated objections which perhaps no one would have thought of making; but he has poorly resolved one which has been raised against him. I do not speak of that ordained community of wives, the censure of which, so often repeated, proves that those who make it have never read him; but I speak of that civil intermingling which everywhere confounds the two sexes in the same employments, the same duties, and can not fail to engender the most intolerable abuses; I speak of that subversion of the sweetest feelings of nature, sacrificed to an artificial feeling which can not exist save through them. Just as though a natural power were not necessary in order to form conventional ties! As though the love we have for our neighbors were not the basis of that which we owe the state! As though it were not through the little community, which is the family, that the heart becomes attached to the great! And as though it were not the good son, the good husband, and the good father, who makes the good citizen!

The moment it is demonstrated that man and woman are not and ought not to be constituted in the same way, either in character or in constitution, it follows that they ought not to have the same education. In following the directions of Nature they ought to act in concert, but they ought not to do the same things; their duties have a common end, but the duties themselves are different, and consequently the tastes which direct them. After having tried to form the natural man, let us also see, in order not to leave our work incomplete, how the woman is to be formed who is befitting to this man.

Would you always be well guided? Always follow the indications of Nature. All that characterizes sex ought to be respected or established by her. You are

always saying that women have faults which you have not. Your pride deceives you. They would be faults in you, but they are virtues in them; and everything would not go so well if they did not have them. Prevent these so-called faults from degenerating, but beware of destroying them.

All the faculties common to the two sexes are not equally divided, but, taken as a whole, they offset one another. Woman is worth more as a woman, but less as a man; wherever she improves her rights she has the advantage, and wherever she attempts to usurp ours she remains inferior to us. Only exceptional cases can be urged against this general truth—the usual mode of argument adopted by the gallant partisans of the fair sex.

To cultivate in women the qualities of the men and to neglect those which are their own is, then, obviously to work to their detriment. The shrewd among them see this too clearly to be the dupes of it. In trying to usurp our advantages they do not abandon their own; but from this it comes to pass that, not being able to manage both properly on account of their incompatibility, they fall short of their own possibilities without attaining to ours, and thus lose the half of their value. Believe me, judicious mother, do not make of your daughter a good man, as though to give the lie to Nature, but make of her a good woman, and you may be sure that she will be worth more for herself and for us.

Does it follow that she ought to be brought up in complete ignorance, and restricted solely to the duties of the household? Shall man make a servant of his companion? Shall he deprive himself of the greatest charm of society? The better to reduce her to servitude, shall he prevent her from feeling anything or knowing anything? Shall he make of her a real automaton? No,

doubtless. Nature, who gives to women a mind so agreeable and so acute, has not so ordered. On the contrary, she would have them think, and judge, and love, and know, and cultivate their mind as they do their form: these are the arms which she gives them for supplementing the strength which they lack, and for directing our own. They ought to learn multitudes of things, but only those which it becomes them to know. Whether I consider the particular destination of woman, or observe her inclinations, or take account of her duties, everything concurs equally to indicate to me the form of education which befits her.

On the good constitution of mothers depends, in the first place, that of children; on the care of women depends the early education of men; and on women, again, depend their manners, their passions, their tastes, their pleasures, and even their happiness. Thus the whole education of women ought to be relative to men. To please them, to be useful to them, to make themselves loved and honored by them, to educate them when young, to care for them when grown, to counsel them, to console them, and to make life agreeable and sweet to them—these are the duties of women at all times, and what should be taught them from their infancy. So long as we do not ascend to this principle we shall miss the goal, and all the precepts which we give them will accomplish nothing either for their happiness or for our own.

Little girls, almost from birth, have a love for dress. Not content with being pretty, they wish to be thought so. We see in their little airs that this care already occupies their minds; and they no sooner understand what is said to them than we control them by telling them what people will think of them. The same motive, very indiscreetly presented to little boys, is very far from having

the same power over them. Provided they are independent and happy, they care very little of what will be thought of them. It is only at the expense of time and labor that we subject them to the same law.

From whatever source this first lesson comes to girls, it is a very good one. Since the body is born, so to speak, before the soul, the first culture ought to be that of the body; and this order is common to both sexes. But the object of this culture is different; in one this object is the development of strength, while in the other it is the development of personal charms. Not that these qualities ought to be exclusive in each sex, but the order is simply reversed: women need sufficient strength to do with grace whatever they have to do; and men need sufficient cleverness to do with facility whatever they have to do.

The extreme lack of vigor in women gives rise to the same quality in men. Women ought not to be robust like them, but for them, in order that the men who shall be born of them may be robust also. In this respect the convents, where the boarders have coarse fare, but many frolics, races, and sports in the open air and in gardens, are to be preferred to the home where a girl, delicately reared, always flattered or scolded, always seated under the eyes of her mother in a very close room, dares neither to rise, to walk, to speak, nor to breathe, and has not a moment's liberty for playing, jumping, running, shouting, and indulging in the petulance natural to her age; always dangerous relaxation or badly conceived severity, but never anything according to reason. This is the way in which the young are ruined both in body and in heart.

Whatever obstructs or constrains nature is in bad taste, and this is as true of the ornaments of the body as of the

ornaments of the mind. Life, health, reason, and comfort ought to take precedence of everything else. There is no grace without freedom. Delicacy is not languor, and one need not be sickly in order to please. We excite pity when we suffer; but pleasure and desire seek the freshness of health.

Children of the two sexes have many amusements in common, and this ought to be so. Is not the same thing true of them when grown? They have also individual tastes which distinguish them. Boys seek movement and noise—drums, tops, carts; but girls prefer what appeals to the sight and serves for ornament—mirrors, trinkets, rags, and especially dolls. The doll is the especial amusement of this sex; and in this case the girl's taste is very evidently determined by her destination. The mechanics of the art of pleasing consists in dress, and this is all of this art that children can cultivate.

Observe a little girl spending her time with her doll, constantly changing its attire, dressing and undressing it hundreds of times, continually seeking for new combinations of ornaments, well or badly selected, no matter which; the fingers lack deftness, the taste has not been formed, but the disposition is already seen. In this endless occupation the time goes on without notice; the hours pass but she takes no note of them; she even forgets to eat, and has a greater hunger for dress than for food. But, you will say, she dresses her doll, but not herself. Doubtless. She sees her doll, but does not see herself; she can do nothing for herself; she has not been developed; she has neither talent nor strength; she is all absorbed in her doll, and on it she expends all her coquetry. She will not always devote herself to it, but waits the moment when she shall be her own doll.

Here, then, is a very decided primitive taste, and you

have only to follow it and regulate it. It is certain that the little one wishes with all her heart that she might adorn her doll and adjust its sleeve, its neckerchief, its furbelows, its lace; but in all this she is made to depend so rigorously on the pleasure of others that it would be very much easier for her to owe everything to her own industry. Thus appears the reason for the first lessons which are given her; they are not tasks which are prescribed for her, but kindnesses which we feel for her. And, in fact, almost all little girls learn to read and write with repugnance; but as to holding the needle, they always learn this willingly. They imagine themselves already grown, and take pleasure in thinking that these talents will one day be of service in adorning them.

Once opened, this first route is easy to follow; sewing, embroidery, and lace-work will come of themselves. Tapestry is not so much to their liking; and as furniture is not connected with the person, but with mere opinion, it is too far out of their reach. Tapestry is the amusement of women; young girls will never take very great pleasure in it.

This voluntary progress will easily extend itself to designing, for this art is not immaterial to that of dressing with taste; but I would not have it applied to landscape, and still less to portrait painting. Foliage, fruits, flowers, draperies, and whatever may serve to give an elegant outline to attire, and to make for one's self a pattern for embroidery when one can not be found to the taste—this is sufficient for them. In general, if it is important for men to restrict their studies to knowledge of practical use, this is still more important for women; for as the life of the latter, though less laborious, is, or ought to be, more devoted to their duties, and is more interrupted by

different cares, it does not allow them to devote themselves by choice to any talent to the prejudice of their duties.

Whatever may be said on the subject jokingly, the two sexes are equally endowed in respect of good sense. In general, girls are more docile than boys, and we ought to use even more authority over them, as I shall presently explain; but it does not follow that we are to require of them anything whose utility they can not see. The art of mothers is to show them the utility of everything which they prescribe for them; and this is so much easier as the intelligence of girls is more precocious than that of boys. This rule banishes from their sex, as it does from ours, not only all trifling studies which end in nothing good, and even fail to make those who have pursued them more agreeable to others; but even all those which have no utility for children of that age, and whose utility at a later period of life the child can not foresee. If I would not urge a boy to learn to read, for a stronger reason I would not force young girls to do this before I had made them understand the purpose of reading; and according to the usual manner of showing them this utility we follow our own idea much more than theirs. After all, why is it necessary that a girl should learn to read and write at an early age? Will she have a household to govern so soon? There are very few who will not abuse rather than use this fatal science; and all are a little too curious not to learn it without compulsion when they have the leisure and the occasion for it. Perhaps they ought to learn to cipher before everything else, for nothing offers a more obvious utility at all times, requires longer practice, or gives a stronger defense against error than the art of computation. If the little one could have cherries to her taste only through an arithmetical

process, I warrant you she would soon know how to calculate.

Always justify the duties which you impose on young girls, but never fail to impose them. Idleness and indocility are their two most dangerous faults, and when once contracted they are cured with the greatest difficulty. Girls ought to be heedful and industrious, and this is not all: they ought early to be brought under restraint. This misfortune, if it is one for them, is inseparable from their sex; and they never rid themselves of it save to suffer others which are much more cruel. As long as they live they will be subject to the most continual and the most severe restraint—that which is imposed by the laws of decorum. They must early be trained to restraint, to the end that it may cost them nothing; and to conquer all their whims, in order to subject them to the wills of others. If they wish always to be at work, they must sometimes be compelled to do nothing. Dissipation, frivolity, and inconstancy are faults which easily spring from their first tastes which have been corrupted, and then always followed. In order to prevent this abuse, teach them above all else to conquer themselves. By reason of our senseless customs, the life of a good woman is a perpetual combat with herself; and it is just that this sex share the discomfort of the evils which it has caused us.

Prevent young girls from becoming tired of their occupations, and from becoming enamored of their amusements, as it always happens in the common style of education, where, as Fénelon says, all the tedium is put on one side and all the pleasure on the other. The first of these two inconveniences will not occur if we follow the preceding rules, save when the persons who are with them are displeasing to them. A little girl who loves her

mother or her aunt will work all day at her side without weariness; her prattle alone will reward her for all her constraint. But if she who governs her is insupportable to her, she will include in the same disgust whatever she does in her presence. It is very difficult for those who are not happier with their mothers than with any one else in the world, ever to turn out well; but in order to judge of their real feelings we must study them and distrust what they say; for they are fawning, dissimulating, and soon know how to disguise themselves. Nor ought they to be ordered to love their mothers; affection does not come through duty, and constraint serves no purpose in this place. Attachment, kind offices, and simple habit will make the mother loved by her daughter if she does nothing to incur her hatred. Even the constraint in which she holds her, when well directed, far from weakening this attachment, will serve only to increase it, because, dependence being a state natural to women, girls feel that they are made to obey.

For the very reason that they have or ought to have little liberty, they carry to excess the liberty which is granted them; extreme in everything, they abandon themselves to their sports with even greater transport than boys do. This is the second of the inconveniences which I just mentioned. This transport ought to be toned down, for it is the cause of several vices peculiar to women—as, among others, caprice and infatuation, by which a woman is to-day carried away with an object which she will not regard to-morrow. The inconstancy of their tastes is as hurtful as their excess, and both come to them from the same source. Do not deny them gayety, laughter, noise, and sportive diversions; but prevent them from being satiated with one and running to the other; never suffer them for a single moment of

their lives to know themselves free from restraint. Accustom them to see themselves interrupted in the midst of their sports, and to be recalled to other things without a murmur. Mere habit is still sufficient for this purpose, because it merely supplements nature.

There results from this habitual restraint a docility which women need during their whole life, since they never cease to be subject either to a man or to the judgments of men, and they are never allowed to place themselves above these judgments. The first and most important quality of a woman is gentleness. Made to obey a being as imperfect as man, often so full of vices, and always so full of faults, she ought early to learn to suffer even injustice, and to endure the wrongs of a husband without complaint; and it is not for him, but for herself that she ought to be gentle. The harshness and obstinacy of women serve only to increase the wrongs and the bad conduct of husbands; they feel that it is not with these arms that their wives should conquer them. Heaven has not made them insinuating and persuasive in order to become waspish; has not made them weak in order to be imperious; has not given them so gentle a voice in order to use harsh language; and has not made their features so delicate in order to disfigure them by anger. When they become angry they forget themselves; they often have reason to complain, but they are always wrong in scolding. Each one ought to preserve the tone of his sex. The husband who is too mild may make a woman impertinent; but, unless a man is a brute, the gentleness of a wife reforms him, and triumphs over him sooner or later.

Let daughters always be submissive, but let not mothers always be inexorable. In order to render a young woman docile, it is not necessary to make her unhappy;

to render her modest, it is not necessary to brutalize her. On the contrary, I should not be sorry if she were sometimes indulged in a little adroitness, not to escape punishment for her disobedience, but to make her exempt from obeying. It is not proposed to make her dependence painful, but it suffices to make her feel it. Artifice is a talent natural to the sex, and, persuaded that all natural inclinations are good and upright in themselves, I advise the cultivation of this one, as well as of the others; all that is necessary is to prevent its abuse.

As to the truth of this remark, I appeal to every honest observer. I do not wish women themselves to be examined on this point; our annoying customs may force them to sharpen their temper. I would have the girls examined, the little girls who have only just come into the world, so to speak; compare them with little boys of the same age, and if the latter do not seem dull, thoughtless, and stupid in their presence, I shall be unquestionably wrong.

I know that austere teachers would have young girls taught neither singing, dancing, nor any other accomplishment. This seems to me ludicrous. To whom, then, would they have these things taught? To boys? To whom does it pertain, by preference, to have these talents: to men, or to women? To no one, they will reply; profane songs are so many crimes; the dance is an invention of the devil; a young girl ought to have no amusement save her work and her prayers. Strange amusements these for a child of ten! For myself, I greatly fear that all those little saints who are forced to spend their childhood in praying may spend their youth in something very different, and, when married, may do their best to redeem the time which they lost while girls. I think that we must have regard to what befits age as well as sex; that a

young girl ought not to live like her grandmother, but ought to be lively, playful, frolicsome; to sing and dance as much as she pleases, and to taste all the innocent pleasures of her age. The time will come only too soon for being sedate and for assuming a more serious deportment.

We have gone too far in reducing the pleasure-giving talents to arts; they have been systematized too much; everything has been reduced to maxim and precept, and we have made very tedious to young persons what ought to be for them only amusements and pleasant diversions. I can imagine nothing more ridiculous than to see an old dancing-master approach with a grim air young persons who want merely to laugh, and, while teaching them his frivolous science, assume a tone more pedantic and magisterial than if it were their catechism he was teaching. For example, is the art of singing limited to written music? May not one render his voice flexible and accurate; learn to sing with taste, and even to accompany an instrument, without knowing a single note? Is the same kind of singing adapted to all voices? Is the same method adapted to all minds? I shall never be made to believe that the same attitudes, the same steps, the same movements, the same gestures, and the same dances are equally becoming to a little brunette, lively and keen, and to a tall, beautiful blonde with languishing eyes. When, therefore, I see a master giving exactly the same lessons to both, I say that the man follows his routine but understands nothing of his art.

It is asked whether the teachers for young girls should be men, or women. I do not know. I wish that neither might be necessary, but that they might be free to learn what they are so much inclined to learn, and that we might not see constantly going about in our cities so

many laced buffoons. I have some difficulty in believing that the deportment of these fellows does not do more harm than good to young girls, and that their jargon, their tone, and their airs do not give to their pupils the first taste for those frivolities, so important for their masters, which they will hardly be slow, following their example, to make their sole occupation.

In the arts which are merely pleasure-giving in their purpose everything may serve to teach young persons—their father, mother, brother, sister, their friends, their governesses, their mirror, and especially their own taste. We ought not to offer to give them lessons, but they should find it necessary to demand them. We should not turn a reward into a task; and it is especially in studies of this sort that the very condition of success is a desire to succeed. However, if formal lessons are absolutely necessary, I shall not decide the sex of those who are to give them.

Through industry and talent the taste is formed; and through the taste the mind is insensibly opened to ideas of the beautiful in all its forms, and finally to the moral notions which are connected with it. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the feeling of propriety and virtue is developed sooner in girls than in boys; for, in order to believe that this precocious feeling is the work of governesses, we must be very badly instructed in their style of lessons and in the progress of the human mind. Talent in speaking holds the first place in the art of pleasing, and it is through it alone that we can add new charms to those to which habit accustoms all the senses. It is the mind which not only vivifies the body, but which in some sort renews it; it is through the succession of feelings and ideas that it gives animation and variety to the features; and it is through the discourse which it in-

spires that the attention is kept alive and for a long time sustains the same interest on the same object. It is for all these reasons, I presume, that young girls so soon acquire an agreeable prattle, that they throw an accent into their speech even before they are conscious of its meaning, and that men so soon find amusement in listening to them even before they can be understood by their fair listeners. Men watch the first movement of this intelligence in order thus to penetrate the dawn of emotion.

Women have a flexible tongue; they speak sooner, more easily, and more agreeably than men. They are accused also of speaking more. This is proper, and I would willingly change this reproach into a commendation. With them the mouth and the eyes have the same activity, and for the same reason. A man says what he knows, and a woman what is pleasing. In order to speak, one needs knowledge and the other taste; one ought to have for a principal object things which are useful; the other, things which are agreeable. In their forms of conversation the only thing in common should be the truth.

If boys should not be allowed to ask indiscreet questions, for a still stronger reason they should be forbidden young girls, whose curiosity, when satisfied, or when wrongly evaded, has very different consequences, due to their penetration in anticipating the mysteries which are concealed from them, and to their cleverness in discovering them. But, without awaiting their questions, I would have them thoroughly interrogated themselves, would take care to make them talk, and would tease them in order to make them speak easily and to loosen the mind and the tongue, when it could be done without danger. These conversations, always turned into pleasing channels, but managed with art and well directed,

would make a charming amusement for that age, and might carry into the innocent hearts of these young persons the first and perhaps the most useful lessons in morals which they will ever learn, by teaching them, through the bait of pleasure and vanity, to what qualities men really accord their esteem, and in what the glory and happiness of a noble woman consist.

It is easy to see that if boys are not in a condition to form any true idea of religion, for a still stronger reason the same idea is above the conception of girls. It is on this very account that I would speak to them the earlier on this subject; for if we must wait till they are in a condition to discuss these profound questions methodically, we run the risk of never speaking to them on this subject. The reason of women is a practical reason, which gives them great skill in finding the means for reaching a known end, but it does not cause them to find the end itself. The social relation of the sexes is admirable. From this association there results a moral personality of which woman is the eye and man the arm, but with such a dependence of one on the other that it is from the man that the woman learns what must be seen, and from the woman that the man learns what must be done. If the woman could ascend to principles as well as the man, and if the man had the same talents for details that she has, always independent of each other, they would live in perpetual discord, and their union could not subsist. But in the harmony which reigns between them everything tends to the common end, and we do not know which contributes the most to it, each follows the impulsion of the other; each obeys, and both are masters.

For the reason that the conduct of woman is subject to public opinion, her belief is subject to authority. Every daughter should have the religion of her mother,

and every wife that of her husband. Even were this religion false, the docility which makes the mother and the daughter submit to the order of nature expunges in the sight of God the sin of error. As they are not in a condition to judge for themselves, women should receive the decision of fathers and husbands as they would the decision of the Church.

Not being able to draw from themselves alone the rule of their faith, women can not confine it within the boundaries of evidence and reason, but, allowing themselves to be carried away by a thousand extraneous impulses, they are always on this side or that of the truth. Always extremists, they are all free-thinkers or devotees; none of them are able to combine discretion with piety. The source of the evil is not only in the tendency to extremes which characterizes their sex, but also in the badly regulated authority of our own. The looseness in morals makes this authority despised, and the fear of repentance makes it tyrannical; and this is how we are always doing too little or too much.

Since authority ought to regulate the religion of women, it is not so important to explain to them the reasons which we have for believing as to expound to them with clearness what we believe; for the faith which we have in obscure ideas is the primitive source of fanaticism, and that which we require for absurd things leads to madness or to incredulity.

In the first place, in order to teach religion to young girls, never make it a thing of sadness and constraint for them, and never a task or a duty; consequently, never make them learn by heart anything connected with it, not even their prayers. Be content with saying your own prayers regularly before them, but without forcing them to take part in them. Make them short, according to

the precepts of Jesus Christ. Always make them with suitable solemnity and respect; recollect that as we require of the Supreme Being attention in order to listen to us, we are in duty bound to reflect on what we are going to say to him.

It is less important that young girls know their religion so soon than that they know it well, and especially that they love it. When you make it burdensome to them, when you always represent God as angry with them, when you impose on them in his name a thousand painful duties which they never see you fulfill, what can they think, save that to know one's catechism and to pray to God are the duties of little girls, and desire except to be grown up in order to be exempt, just as you are, from all this constraint? Example! Example! Without this we shall never succeed in anything with children.

When you explain to them the articles of faith, let it be in the form of direct instruction, and not by question and answer; they ought never to answer save what they think, and not what is dictated to them. All the replies of the catechism are on the wrong side—it is the pupil who instructs the teacher; they are even falsehoods in the mouths of children, since they explain what they do not understand, and affirm what they are not able to believe.

I wish some man who thoroughly knows the steps of progress in the child's mind would write a catechism for him. This would perhaps be the most useful book that was ever written, and would not be, to my mind, the one which would do the least honor to its author. One thing is very certain: if this book were good, it would bear but little resemblance to those in use.

Such a catechism will be good only when, from the

questions alone, the child will make for himself the replies without having to learn them, it being understood that he will sometimes take his turn in asking questions. To make what I wish to say understood, a sort of model would be necessary, and I well know what I lack in order to trace it out.

It is well to recollect that until the age when the reason is illumined, and when dawning emotion causes the conscience to speak, that which is right or wrong for young persons is what the people who surround them have decided to be such. What they are commanded to do is right, what they are forbidden to do is wrong, and here their knowledge ought to end.* From this we see how important it is, and still more so for girls than for boys, to make a choice of the persons who are to approach them and have some authority over them. Finally, the moment comes when they begin to judge of things for themselves, and then it is time to change the plan of their education.

To what condition should we reduce women if we make public prejudice the law of their conduct? Let us not abase to this point the sex which governs us, and which honors us when we have not degraded it. There exists for the whole human species a rule anterior to opinion. It is to the inflexible direction of this rule that all the others are to be referred. It judges prejudice even; and it is only so far as the esteem of men accords with it that this esteem ought to constitute authority for us.

This rule is the inner moral sense. I shall not repeat what I have previously said on this point. It is sufficient

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* This reflection should have occurred to Rousseau when he composed the dialogue intended to prove that children are incapable of reason.—(P.)

for me to remark, that if these two rules do not co-operate in the education of women, it will always be defective. The moral sense, without opinion, will not give them that delicacy of soul which adorns good manners with universal honor; and opinion, without the moral sense, will never produce anything but artificial and immodest women, who substitute appearance in the place of virtue.

It is important, then, to cultivate a faculty which serves as an arbitrator between the two guides, which does not allow the conscience to go astray, and which corrects the errors of prejudice. This faculty is the reason. But at this word how many questions arise! Are women capable of solid reasoning? Is it important for them to cultivate it? Will they cultivate it with success? Is this culture useful to the functions imposed on them? Is it compatible with the simplicity which is becoming to them?

It results from the different ways of approaching and resolving these questions that, going to opposite extremes, some restrict woman to sewing and spinning in her household with her servants, and thus make of her but the head servant of the master; while others, not content with securing her rights, go farther, and make her usurp our own. For, to place her above us in the qualities peculiar to her sex, and to render her our equal in everything else, what is this but to transfer to the wife the primacy which nature gives to the husband?

The reason which leads man to the knowledge of his duties is not very complex; and the reason which leads woman to the knowledge of hers is still simpler. The obedience and fidelity which she owes to her husband, the tenderness and care which she owes to her children, are such natural and obvious consequences of her condition, that she can not, without bad faith, refuse her consent to

the inner sense which guides her, nor fail to recognize her duty in the inclination which has not yet been perverted.

If a woman were wholly restricted to the tasks of her sex, and were left in profound ignorance of everything else, I would not indulge in indiscriminate censure; but this would require a very simple and wholesome state of public morals, or a very retired manner of living. In large cities and among corrupt men such a woman would be too easily led astray, and in this philosophical age she must be above temptation; she must know in advance what may be said to her, and what she ought to think of it.

Moreover, subject to the judgment of men, she ought to merit their esteem; she ought, above all, to secure the esteem of her husband; she ought not only to make him love her person, but make him approve her conduct; she ought to justify before the public the choice which he has made, and make her husband honored with the honor which is paid his wife. Now, how shall she go about all this if she is ignorant of our institutions, if she knows nothing of our usages and our social customs, if she knows neither the source of human judgments nor the passions which determine them? When she depends at once on her own conscience and the opinions of others, she must learn to compare these two rules, to reconcile them, and to prefer the first only when they are in opposition. She becomes the judge of her judges; she decides when she ought to submit to them and when she ought to challenge them. Before rejecting or admitting their prejudices she weighs them; she learns to ascend to their source, to anticipate them, and to render them favorable to her; she is careful never to draw censure upon herself when her duty permits her to avoid it. Nothing of all this can be well done without cultivating her mind and her reason.

The search for abstract and speculative truths, principles, and scientific axioms, whatever tends to generalize ideas, does not fall within the compass of women; all their studies ought to have reference to the practical; it is for them to make the application of the principles which man has discovered, and to make the observations which lead man to the establishment of principles. All the reflections of women which are not immediately connected with their duties ought to be directed to the study of men and to that pleasure-giving knowledge which has only taste for its object; for as to works of genius, they are out of their reach, nor have they sufficient accuracy and attention to succeed in the exact sciences; and as to the physical sciences, they fall to that one of the two which is the most active, the most stirring, which sees the most objects, which has the most strength, and which exercises it most in judging of the relations of sensible beings and of the laws of nature. Woman, who is weak, and who sees nothing external, appreciates and judges the motive powers which she can set to work to offset her weakness, and these motive powers are the passions of man. Whatever her sex can not do for itself, and which is necessary or agreeable to her, she must have the art of making us desire. She must therefore make a profound study of the mind of man, not the mind of man in general, through abstraction, but the mind of the men who surround her, the mind of the men to whom she is subject, either by law or by opinion. She must learn to penetrate their feelings through their conversation, their actions, their looks, and their gestures. Through her conversations, her actions, her looks, and her gestures she must know how to give them the feelings which are pleasing to her, without even seeming to think of them. They will philosophize better than she can on the human heart, but she will read better

than they can in the hearts of men. It is for women to discover, so to speak, an experimental ethics, and for us to reduce it to a system. Woman has more spirit and man more genius; woman observes and man reasons. From this concurrence there result the clearest light and the most complete science which the human mind can acquire of itself—the surest knowledge, in a word, of one's self and others which is within the scope of our species. And this is the way in which art may incessantly tend to perfect the instrument given by nature.

The world is woman's book; when she reads it wrong, it is her fault or some passion blinds her. However, the real mother, far from being a woman of the world, is hardly less a recluse in her house than a nun in her cloister. We must then do for young women who marry just as we do or ought to do for those who are placed in convents—show them the pleasures which they part with before allowing them to renounce them, for fear that the false image of those pleasures, which are unknown to them, may one day come to lead their hearts astray and disturb the happiness of their retreat. In France girls live in convents and women travel the world over. Among the ancients it was just the contrary: girls, as I have said, indulged in sports and public festivals, while the women lived in retirement. This custom was the more reasonable and better maintained the public morals. A sort of coquetry is granted to marriageable girls; their chief business is to enjoy themselves. Women have other cares at home, and no longer have to search for husbands. Mothers, at least make companions of your daughters. Give them a sense of uprightness and a soul of honor, and then conceal nothing from them, nothing which a chaste eye may look at. Balls, banquets, games, even the theatre, everything which, wrongly viewed, makes the charm of

unadvised youth, may be offered without risk to uncorrupted eyes. The better they see these noisy pleasures the sooner will they be disgusted with them.

I hear the clamor which is raised against me. What girl will resist this dangerous example? They have no sooner seen the world than all their heads are turned; not one of them is willing to abandon it. This may be; but before offering them this deceptive picture, have you prepared them well for seeing it without emotion? Have you clearly announced to them the objects which it represents? Have you really painted them just as they are? Have you thoroughly armed them against the illusions of vanity? Have you put in their young hearts a taste for the true pleasures which are not found in this tumult? What precautions, what measures, have you taken to preserve them from the false taste which is leading them astray? Far from offering any opposition to the power of public prejudice which sways their minds, you have nourished it there; you have made them love in advance all the frivolous amusements which they find. You make them love them still more by surrendering them to them. Young women entering society have no other governess than a mother who is often more senseless than they are, and who can show them objects only as she sees them. Her example, stronger even than reason, justifies them in their own eyes, and the authority of the mother is for the daughter an unanswerable excuse. When I advise a mother to introduce her daughter into society, it is on the supposition that she will make her see it just as it is.

The evil begins still earlier. The convents are veritable schools of coquetry—not of that honest coquetry of which I have spoken, but of that which produces all the caprices of women and makes the most extravagant

female fops. On leaving them to enter at once into the din of social life, young women at first feel that they are in their place. They have been educated to live there, and need we be astonished if they find themselves at home? I do not put forward what I am going to say without fear of taking a prejudice for an observation; but it seems to me that, in general, Protestant countries have more family affection, more worthy wives, and more tender mothers than Catholic countries; and if this is true, we can not doubt that this difference is due in part to the education of convents.

In order to love the peaceful life of the home, we must know it; we must have felt its charms from infancy. It is only under the paternal roof that we contract a taste for our own home, and a woman who has not been educated by her mother will not love to educate her children. Unfortunately, private education in our large cities no longer exists. Society there is so general and so mixed that there is no longer an asylum for retreat, and we live in public even at home. By reason of living with everybody we no longer have a family, we hardly know our parents, we see them as strangers, and the simplicity of domestic manners has become extinct along with the sweet familiarity which constituted its charm. It is thus that with our milk we imbibe a taste for the pleasures of the world and for the maxims which we see prevailing there.

An apparent restraint is imposed on girls to order to find dupes who will marry them on the strength of their deportment. But study these young persons for a moment. Under an air of constraint they poorly disguise the lust which devours them, and already we read in their eyes the ardent desire to imitate their mothers. What they covet is not a husband, but the license of marriage.

All these different educations equally create in young persons a taste for the pleasures of gay society, and to the passions which soon spring from this taste. In the large cities the depravation begins with life, and in the small it begins with reason. Young women from the provinces, taught to despise the happy simplicity of their manners, make haste to come to Paris to share the corruption of ours; the vices adorned with the fine name of *talents* are the sole object of their journey; and, ashamed on arriving to find themselves so far from the noble freedom of city women, they are not slow in deserving to be considered residents of the capital. In your opinion, where does the evil begin—in the place where it was conceived, or in the place where it was accomplished?

I would not have a sensible mother take her daughter from the provinces to Paris in order to show her these sights so pernicious to others; but I say that if this is done, either that daughter has been badly educated or these sights will have little danger for her. With taste, sense, and love for things honorable, we do not find them so attractive as they are for those who allow themselves to be charmed by them. At Paris we may observe young, hare-brained girls, who have come in haste to copy the manners of the city and have devoted themselves to the fashions for six months, only to make themselves hissed for the rest of their lives; but who takes notice of those who, disgusted by all this hubbub, return to their province content with their lot, after having compared it with that which is the envy of others? How many young women I have seen brought to the capital by their good-natured husbands, and at liberty to stay there, who dissuaded their husbands from this purpose, departed more willingly than they had come, and feelingly said, on the eve of their departure: "Ah, let us return to our humble

home; life is much happier there than in the palaces of Paris." We do not know how many good people there still are who have not bent the knee before the idol and who despise his senseless worship. Only fools are loud in their conduct; women who are wise create no sensation.

It is not necessary to disgust young girls with your long sermons nor to retail to them your dry moralities. For both sexes these moral lectures are the death of all good education. Gloomy lessons serve only to involve in hatred both those who give them and all that they say. It is not necessary, in speaking to young women, to make them afraid of their duties, nor to make more grievous the yoke which is imposed on them by nature. In setting forth their duties, be precise and affable; do not allow them to think that the discharge of duty is disagreeable; do not wear an air of displeasure or of solemnity. All that is to go to the heart ought to come from it; their moral catechism ought to be as short and as clear as their religious catechism, but it ought not to be as grave. Show them that the source of their pleasures and the basis of their rights lie in the same duties. Is it so painful to love in order to be loved, to make oneself amiable in order to be loved, to make oneself estimable in order to be obeyed, and to make oneself honorable in order to be honored?

Would you, then, inspire young women with a love for good morals? Without saying to them constantly, *Be discrete*, create in them a strong interest in being so; make them feel all the value of discretion, and you will make them love it. It is not enough to place this interest in a distant future; show it to them in the present moment, in current events, and in the character of their admirers. Depict to them the man of probity, the man of merit,

and prove to them that when they are loved, only such a man can make them happy. Encourage virtue through an appeal to reason; make them feel that the power of their sex and all its advantages do not depend solely on their good conduct and morals, but also on those of men; that they have little hold on vile and low natures, and that a man can serve his sweetheart only so far as he can serve virtue. You may then be sure that, by depicting to them the manners of the day, you will inspire them with a sincere disgust for them; and that, by showing them the men of fashion, you will make them despise them; you will give them only dislike for their maxims, an aversion for their sentiments, and a disdain for their vain compliments; you will cause to spring up in them a nobler ambition—that of reigning over grand and powerful souls—that of the women of Sparta, which was to command men.

Sophie is well born and has a good disposition; she has a very sensitive heart, and this extreme sensibility sometimes gives her an activity of imagination difficult to control. She has a mind less accurate than penetrating; a temper that is yielding and yet unequal; a figure plain but agreeable; a physiognomy which bespeaks a soul and does not lie; people may approach her with indifference, but can not leave her without emotion. Others have good qualities which she lacks; others have in a larger measure those which she has; but no one has qualities better suited for producing a happy character. She knows how to derive advantage even from her faults; and if she were more perfect she would be less pleasing.

Sophie is not beautiful; but in her presence men forget beautiful women, and beautiful women are discontented with themselves. At first sight she is hardly pretty, but the more we see her the more beautiful she

looks; she gains where so many others lose, and what she gains she does not afterward lose. We may see more beautiful eyes, a finer mouth, and a more imposing presence; but no one can have a more finely shaped figure, a more beautiful complexion, a whiter hand, a more dainty foot, a sweeter smile, or a more touching countenance. She interests without dazzling; she charms, but no one can tell why.

Sophie loves dress, and is a good judge of it; her mother has no other waiting-maid; she has much taste in dressing herself to advantage, but she hates rich garments, and in what she wears we always see simplicity united with elegance; she does not love what glitters but what is becoming; she does not know what the fashionable colors are, but she knows perfectly which are becoming to her. There is no young woman who seems dressed with less study, yet whose attire is more elegant; there is not a single article of her clothing chosen at random, yet in no one of them is there the appearance of art. Her attire is very modest in appearance but very coquettish in effect; she does not display her charms, she covers them; but in covering them she knows how to make them imagined.

Sophie has natural talents; she is conscious of them, and has not neglected them; but not having been in a condition to devote much art to their culture, she has been content to exercise her fine voice in singing with accuracy and taste, her little feet in walking trippingly, easily, and gracefully, and in making courtesies in all sorts of situations without embarrassment or awkwardness. Moreover, she has had no teacher of singing save her father, and no dancing-master but her mother; an organist of the neighborhood has given her a few lessons in accompaniment on the harpsichord, which she has since

practiced by herself. At first her only thought was to exhibit her hand to advantage on the black keys; next she discovered that the sharp and thin sound of the harpsichord made the sound of her voice more melodious; little by little she became sensitive to the harmony; and finally, as she grew up, she began to feel the charms of expression and to love music for itself. But this is a taste rather than a talent; she is unable to play a tune by note.

What Sophie knows best, and what has been taught her with the most care, is the work of her sex, even those kinds which are not usually considered, like cutting and making her dresses. There is no kind of needle-work which she does not know how to do, and which she does not do with pleasure; but the work which she prefers to all others is lace-making, because there is none which affords a more pleasing attitude and in which the fingers are exercised with more grace and deftness. She has also devoted herself to all the details of housekeeping. She is acquainted with the kitchen and the pantry; she knows the price of provisions, and also their qualities; she has a thorough knowledge of book-keeping, and serves her mother as housekeeper. Destined one day to become the head of a family, by directing the father's household she learns to direct her own. She can take the place of servants, and always does so willingly. We can never order a thing done properly which we do not know how to do ourselves; this is the reason why Sophie's mother employs her in this way. But Sophie does not look so far ahead; her first duty is that of daughter, and it is now the only one which she thinks of fulfilling. Her simple purpose is to serve her mother, and to relieve her of a part of her cares. It is true, however, that she does not discharge all these duties with equal pleasure. For example,

though she is fond of eating, she does not love cooking; its details have something of disgust for her; she never finds sufficient neatness in it. On this point she has an extreme delicacy, and this delicacy, carried to an extreme, has become one of her faults; she would rather let the whole dinner burn up than soil a ruffle. For the same reason, she has never been willing to oversee the garden—the earth seems unclean to her.

She owes this fault to the lessons of her mother. According to her, among the duties of woman, one of the first is cleanliness—a duty that is special, indispensable, and imposed by nature. There is no more disgusting object in the world than a slovenly woman, and a husband who is disgusted with her is never wrong. She has preached this duty to her daughter so much from her childhood, she has exacted of her so much cleanliness with respect to her person, her clothing, her apartment, her work, and her toilet, that all these attentions, converted into habit, take up quite a large part of her time, and even encroach on the remainder; so that to do well whatever she does is but the second of her cares; the first is always to do it neatly.

Nevertheless, all this has not degenerated into vain affectation nor into want of spirit, and the refinements of luxury play no part in it. Only simple water will ever enter her apartment; she knows no other perfume than that of flowers, and her husband will never breathe one sweeter than her breath. Finally, the affection which she bestows on the exterior does not make her forget that she owes her life and her time to nobler duties. She ignores or disdains that excessive cleanliness of body which soils the soul. Sophie is much more than clean—she is pure.

I have said that Sophie was fond of eating; she was so naturally; but she has become temperate by habit, and is

now so by virtue. It is not with girls as with boys, who can be governed up to a certain point by their appetite. This inclination has its consequences for the sex; it is too dangerous to go unchecked. The little Sophie, in her girlhood, going alone into her mother's pantry, did not always come back empty-handed, and her fidelity with respect to sugar-plums and *bonbons* was not above suspicion. Her mother detected her, reproved her, punished her, and made her fast. At last she succeeded in persuading her that *bonbons* spoiled the teeth, and that eating too much made one stout. In this way Sophie reformed. As she grew up she contracted other tastes, which have turned her aside from this low sensuality. In women, as in men, as soon as the heart grows warm gluttony is no longer a dominant vice. Sophie has preserved the characteristic taste of her sex: she likes milk, butter, cream, and sweetmeats; is fond of pastry and dessert, but eats very little meat; she has never tasted either wine or intoxicating liquors. Moreover, she eats very moderately of everything; her sex, less laborious than ours, has less need to repair its waste. In everything she likes what is good, and knows how to enjoy it; she also knows how to put up with what is not so, without allowing this privation to cost her anything.

Sophie has a mind pleasing without being brilliant, and solid without being profound—a mind of which people say nothing, because they never observe in it either more or less than in their own. She always has a mind which pleases the people who speak to her, although it is not copiously adorned according to the notion which we have of the intellectual culture of women; for hers has not been formed by reading, but only by the conversations of her father and mother, by her own reflections, and by the observations which she has made in the little

of the world which she has seen. Sophie is naturally gay—she was even frolicsome in her childhood; but little by little her mother has taken care to repress her giddy airs, for fear that too sudden a change might ere long apprise her of the moment which had rendered it necessary. She has therefore become modest and reserved even before the time for being so; and now that this time has come, it is easier for her to preserve the tone she has taken, than it would have been to take it without indicating the reason for this change. It is a pleasant thing to see her occasionally abandoning herself, through a residuum of the habit, to the vivacities of childhood, and then suddenly come to herself, grow silent, lower her eyes, and blush. The intermediate term between the two ages must necessarily partake somewhat of each.

Sophie has too great a sensibility to preserve a perfect evenness of disposition; she has too much sweetness for this sensibility to be very annoying to others; it is to herself alone that she does wrong. Let a single word be spoken which wounds her, and she does not pout, but her heart swells, and she tries to escape in order to go and weep. But if, in the midst of her tears, she is recalled by her father or her mother, she instantly appears, cheerful and smiling, while drying her eyes and trying to stifle her sobs.

Nor is she wholly exempt from caprice; her temper, if provoked a little too much, degenerates into unruliness, and then she is liable to forget herself. But allow her time to come to herself, and her manner of making amends for her fault will make it almost meritorious. When punished, she is docile and submissive, and we see that her shame arises not so much from her chastisement as from the fault. If nothing is said to her, she never fails to make reparation of her own accord, but so frankly and

with such good grace that it is not possible to bear any ill-will. She would kiss the ground before the meanest domestic, and yet this abasement would not cause her the least pain, and the moment she is pardoned she shows by her joy and her caresses of what a weight her good heart has been relieved. In a word, she suffers the wrongs of others with patience, and repairs her own with pleasure. Such is the lovable nature of her sex before we have spoiled it. Woman is made to submit to man, and even to endure his injustice. You will never reduce young boys to the same point; in them the inner sense rises in revolt against injustice; nature has not made them for tolerating it.

Sophie is religious, but her religion is reasonable and simple, with few dogmas and fewer practices of devotion; or rather, knowing no essential practice save morality, she devotes her whole life to serving God by doing good. In all the instructions which her parents have given her on this subject they have accustomed her to a respectful submission, by always saying to her: "My daughter, this knowledge is beyond your years; your husband will instruct you in it when the time comes." However, in place of pious discourses long drawn out, they content themselves with preaching piety to her through their example, and this example is graven on her heart.

Sophie loves virtue, and this love has become her ruling passion. She loves it because there is nothing so beautiful as virtue; she loves it because virtue constitutes the glory of woman, and a virtuous woman seems to her almost equal to an angel; she loves it as the only road to true happiness, and because she sees only misery, desertion, misfortune, opprobrium, and ignominy in the life of a corrupt woman; finally, she loves it because it is dear to her venerated father and to her tender and honored mother. Not content with being happy in their own virtue,

they wish also to be happy in hers; and her chief happiness is the hope of making them happy. All these feelings inspire her with an enthusiasm which exalts her soul, and holds all her lower inclinations in subjection to such a noble passion. Sophie will be chaste and upright even to her last breath; she has sworn it in the depths of her soul, and at a time when she felt all that such an oath might cost her to keep; she has sworn it when she might have revoked the engagement if her senses had been made to reign over her.

Sophie has not the honor of being an amiable French woman, cold by temperament and coquettish by vanity, wishing rather to shine than to please, and seeking amusement rather than pleasure. The one need of loving devours her, and comes to distract and trouble her heart in the midst of her enjoyments; she has lost her old-time gayety; her playful amusements are no longer enjoyed by her; far from fearing the irksomeness of solitude, she seeks it; she there thinks of the one who is to make it agreeable to her. All the indifferent displease her; she does not desire a courtship, but a lover; she would rather please a single good man, and please him always, than to excite in her favor the applause of the world, which lasts a day and then is turned into jeers.

The judgment is developed sooner in women than in men; being on the defensive almost from their childhood, and charged with a treasure difficult to guard, good and evil are necessarily sooner known to them. As her temperament inclines her to be precocious in everything, the judgment is developed earlier in Sophie than in other girls of her age. There is nothing very extraordinary in this, for maturity is not everywhere the same at the same age.

Sophie is instructed in the rights and duties of her sex

and of ours. She knows the faults of men and the vices of women; she also knows the good qualities, the opposite virtues, and has them all imprinted in the depth of her heart. One can not have a higher idea of a noble woman than she has conceived of her, and this idea does not frighten her; but she thinks with more complacency of the noble man, the man of merit; she feels that she is made for such a man, that she is worthy of him, that she can return to him the happiness which she will receive from him, and she feels that she will be perfectly able to recognize him; it is merely a question of finding him.

Women are the natural judges of the merits of men, as men are of the merits of women; this is a mutual right, and neither sex is ignorant of it. Sophie is conscious of this right, and makes use of it, but with the modesty befitting her youth, her inexperience, and her station; she judges only of things which are within her comprehension, and she judges of them only when this serves to develop some useful rule of conduct. She speaks of the absent only with the greatest circumspection, especially if they are women. She thinks that what makes them slanderous and satirical is the habit of speaking of their own sex; for as long as they restrict themselves to speaking of ours they are only just. Sophie, then, limits herself to this. As to women, she never speaks of them save to say of them the good which she knows—it is an honor which she thinks she owes to her sex; and of her of whom she knows nothing good to say, she says nothing at all, and this is understood.

Sophie is little versed in the ways of the world; but she is obliging, attentive, and puts an air of grace into everything she does. A happy disposition serves her better than much art. She has a certain politeness of her own which does not depend on formulas, which is not

subject to fashion, which does not change with it, which does nothing through custom, but which comes from a true desire to please, and which does please. She knows nothing of trivial compliments, and does not go out of her way to invent them; she does not say that she is greatly obliged, that one does her great honor, that one need not take the trouble, etc. Much less does she think of exchanging compliments.

To a courtesy, or to a formal act of politeness, she replies by a bow or by an *I thank you;* but this word from her mouth is worth many others. For a real service she lets her heart speak, and it is not a compliment that it dictates. She has never allowed French customs to subject her to the yoke of affectation, as in giving her arm, while going from one room to another, to an old man of sixty whom she might the rather desire to assist. When a perfumed gallant offers her this impertinent service she leaves this officious aid on the stairs, and trips into the parlor, saying that she is not lame. In fact, although she is not tall, she has never wished for high heels; she has feet that are small enough to do without them.

She not only maintains a silent and respectful bearing in the presence of women, but even in the presence of married men, or those much older than she is; she will never accept a place above them save through obedience, and will resume her own place below them the moment she is able to do so; for she knows that age has precedence over sex, as it carries with it the presumption of wisdom, which ought to be honored before everything else.

With young men of her age it is different. She has need of a different manner in order to impress them, and she can assume it without forsaking the modest air which becomes her. If they are modest and reserved them-

selves, she will willingly continue with them the pleasing familiarity of youth; their conversations, full of innocence, will be playful but decent; if they become serious, she tries to make them useful; if they degenerate into insipidity, she will soon bring them to a close; for she has a supreme contempt for the petty cant of gallantry as very offensive to her sex. She well knows that the man whom she seeks does not indulge in this cant, and she never willingly suffers from another what is improper for him whose character is imprinted in the depths of her heart. The high opinion which she has of the rights of her sex, the pride of soul which gives her the purity of her feelings, that energy of virtue which she feels in herself and which makes her respectable in her own eyes, make her listen with indignation to the mawkish speeches with which people presume to amuse her. She does not receive them with an anger that is apparent, but with an ironical applause which is disconcerting, or with a coolness of manner which is unexpected. Let a loquacious beau pay her compliments, extol her in high terms for her wit, for her beauty, her graces, and for the priceless happiness of pleasing her, and she promptly interrupts him by saying politely: "Sir, I am very much afraid that I know those things better than you do, and if we have nothing more interesting to talk about, I think we had better cut short our conversation at this point." To accompany these words with a grand courtesy, and then to find herself twenty paces from him, is to her but the work of an instant. Ask your fops if it is easy to show off their wit at any length before a character as testy as this one.

This is not saying, however, that she does not greatly love to be praised, provided it is in earnest, and that she can believe that what is said of her is really sincere. In

order to appear affected by her merits we must begin by showing some ourselves. Homage founded on esteem may flatter her haughty spirit, but all gallant quizzing is always repelled; Sophie was not made to practice the little arts of a stage-dancer.

With such a great maturity of judgment, and developed in all respects like a girl of twenty, Sophie at fifteen will not be treated by her parents as a child. They no sooner observe in her the first restlessness of youth than they hasten to provide for it before it progresses further; they will hold tender and sensible conversations with her. These conversations are adapted to her age and character. If this character is such as I have imagined it to be, why might not her father address her somewhat as follows?

"Sophie, you are now a large girl, and it is not always to remain a girl that you have become such. We wish you to be happy, and it is for our sakes that we wish this, because our happiness depends on yours. The happiness of a noble girl consists in making a good man happy. We must therefore think of your marriage, and we must think of it thus early, for on marriage depends the destiny of life, and there is never too much time for thinking of this.

"Nothing is more difficult than the choice of a good husband, save, perhaps, that of a good wife. Sophie, you shall be that rare woman. You shall be the glory of our life and the happiness of our old age; but with whatever accomplishments you may be endowed, the world will never be lacking in men who are still more accomplished than you are. There is not one who ought not to feel honored by honoring you, but there are many who would honor you more. Of this number it is your task to find one who is fit for you, and to make yourself acquainted with him, and him acquainted with you.

"Your mother was of good family, and I was rich; and these were the sole considerations which induced our parents to unite us I have lost my property and she has lost her rank. Forgotten by her family, of what use is it to her to-day to have been born a lady? In our misfortunes the union of our hearts has consoled us for all our losses; conformity of tastes has made us choose this retreat. We live here happy in our poverty, and what each is to the other takes the place of all besides. Sophie is our common treasure. We thank Heaven for having given her to us and for having taken from us everything else. See, my child, where Providence has led us. The considerations which led to our marriage have disappeared, and we are happy only by reason of those which then counted for nothing.

"Husband and wife must be matched. Mutual inclination ought to be their first bond. Their eyes and their hearts ought to be their first guides; for as their first duty, when united, is to love each other, as loving or not loving does not depend on ourselves, this duty necessarily involves another, and this is to begin by loving each other before becoming united. This is the law of nature, which nothing can abrogate; and those who have obstructed its action by so many civil laws, have had more regard for apparent order than for the happiness of marriage and the morals of citizens. You see, my Sophie, that we are not preaching to you a difficult morality. It tends merely to make you mistress of yourself, and to bring us into consultation with you on the choice of your husband.

"After having stated to you our reasons for granting you entire liberty, it is just to speak to you also of the reasons why you should use this liberty with wisdom. If equality of merit were the only question, I do not know

what limit I ought to place on your hopes; but do not raise them above your fortune, and do not forget that it is of the lowest rank. Although a man worthy of you does not count this inequality as an obstacle, you ought to do in that case what he will not do. Sophie ought to imitate her mother, and enter only a family which feels honored by her. You have not seen our opulence. You were born during our poverty, and you have made it sweet to us by sharing it without complaint. Believe me, Sophie, never seek property, of which we thank Heaven for having relieved us. We never tasted happiness until after having lost our wealth.

"You will be sought for, and doubtless by persons who will not be worthy of you. If they appeared to you as they really are, you would estimate them for what they are worth; all their display would not long impose on you; but, although you have good judgment and know your own merits, you are lacking in experience, and do not know to what extent men can disguise themselves. An adroit rascal may study your tastes in order to lead you astray, and in your presence feign virtues which he does not have. This one might ruin you, Sophie, before you were aware of it, and you would become conscious of your error only to weep over it. The most dangerous of all snares, and the only one which reason can not avoid, is that of the senses. If you ever have the misfortune to fall into it, you will see nothing but illusions and idle fancies; your eyes will be fascinated, your judgment will be unsettled, your will will be corrupted, and you will cherish even your illusion, and when you are in a condition to be conscious of it you will not disown it. My daughter, it is to Sophie's reason that I confide you, but I do not confide you to the inclinations of her heart. As long as you are cool-headed, remain your own judge; but

as soon as you are in love, then trust the care of yourself to your mother.

"I propose to you an agreement which indicates to you our esteem and reestablishes the order of nature between us. Parents choose a husband for their daughter and consult her only as a matter of form; this is the custom. But between ourselves, we shall do just the contrary—you shall choose, and we shall be consulted. Exercise your right, Sophie; exercise it freely and wisely. The husband who is fit for you ought to be your choice, and not ours; but it is for us to judge whether you are not deceived as to what is best, and whether, without knowing it, you are not doing something different from what you intend. Birth, wealth, rank, opinion, will not enter at all into our reasons. Choose an honorable man, whose person pleases you and whose character is adapted to you, and, whatever he may be in other respects, we shall accept him as our son-in-law. His wealth will always be great enough if he has hands, good morals, and loves his family. His rank will always be sufficiently illustrious if he ennobles it by virtue. Were the whole world to blame us, what matters it? We are not seeking the approbation of the public, but are satisfied if you are happy."

Readers, I do not know what effect such a conversation would have on girls educated in your way. As to Sophie, she will not be able to reply to it in words; shame and emotion will not allow her easily to express herself; but I am very sure that it will remain graven in her heart as long as she lives, and that if we can count on any human resolution, it is on that which she will make of being worthily esteemed of her parents.

Man in a state of nature is hardly a thinker. Thinking is an art that is learned, as other arts are, and even

with more difficulty. In the two sexes I know of but two classes that are really distinct—people who think and people who do not think; and this difference depends almost wholly on education. A man belonging to the first of these two classes ought not to form an alliance with the second; for the greatest charm of companionship fails him when, having a wife, he is reduced to thinking alone. Men who devote their whole lives to working for a living have no other idea than that of their work or their interests, and their whole mind seems to be at the ends of their fingers. This ignorance is hurtful neither to probity nor to manners; often it is serviceable to them. We often compromise with duty by reflecting on it, and in the end we substitute talk for things. The conscience is the clearest of philosophers, and we need not know Cicero's *Offices* in order to be a man of worth; and the most honorable woman in the world has perhaps the least idea of what honor is. But it is none the less true that only a cultivated mind can make companionship agreeable; and it is a sad thing for the father of a family who loves his home to be compelled to shut himself up there alone, unable to make himself understood by any one.

Moreover, how shall a woman who has not the habit of reflection educate her children? How shall she discover what is best for them? How shall she incline them to virtues which she does not know, and to attainments of which she has no idea? She will be able only to humor or to threaten them, to make them insolent or timid; she will make of them affected apes or rattle-headed rogues, but never children of good minds or amiable dispositions.

It is then not meet for an educated man to take a wife who is uneducated, nor, consequently, to marry into a class where education is impossible. But I would a

hundred times prefer a simple girl, rudely brought up, to a girl of learning and wit who should come to establish in my house a literary tribunal of which she should make herself the president. A woman of wit is the scourge of her husband, her children, her friends, her servants, of everybody. In the sublime elevation of her fine genius she disdains all the duties of woman, and always begins by making a man of herself, after the example of Mademoiselle de l'Enclos. Away from home she is always the subject of ridicule, and is very justly criticised, as one never fails of being the moment she leaves her proper station and enters one for which she is not adapted. All this pretense is unworthy of an honorable woman. Were she the possessor of real talents, her pretension would abase them. Her dignity is in leading a retired life; her glory is in the esteem of her husband; her pleasures are in the happiness of her family. Readers, I appeal to you on your honor—which gives you the better opinion of a woman as you enter her room, which makes you approach her with the greater respect: to see her occupied with the duties of her sex, with her household cares, the garments of her children lying around her; or, to find her writing verses on her dressing-table, surrounded with all sorts of pamphlets and sheets of note-paper in every variety of color? If all the men in the world were sensible, every girl of letters would remain unmarried all her life.

It is asked whether it is good for young men to travel, and the question is in great dispute. If it were differently stated, and it were asked whether it is good for men to have traveled, perhaps there would not be so much discussion.

The abuse of books kills science. Thinking they know what they have read, men think they can dispense

with learning it. Too much reading serves only to make presumptuous ignoramuses. Of all the centuries of literature there is not one in which there has been so much reading as in this, and not one in which men have been less wise; of all the countries of Europe, there is not one where so many histories and travels have been printed as in France, and not one where less is known of the genius and customs of other countries. So many books make us neglect the book of the world; or, if we still read in it, each one confines himself to his leaf.

A Parisian fancies he knows men, while he knows only Frenchmen. In his city, always full of strangers, he regards each foreigner as an extraordinary phenomenon which has no fellow in the rest of the universe. We must have had a near view of the citizens of that great city, we must have lived with them, in order to believe that with so much spirit they can also be so stupid. The queer thing about it is, that each of them has read, perhaps ten times, the description of the country one of whose inhabitants has filled him with so much wonder.

It is too much to have to wade through at the same time the prejudices of authors and our own in order to arrive at the truth. I have spent my life in reading books of travel, and I have never found two of them which gave me the same idea of the same people. On comparing the little which I was able to observe with what I had read, I have ended by abandoning travelers, and by regretting the time which I had spent in order to instruct myself in their reading, thoroughly convinced that in respect of observations of all sorts we must not read, but see. This would be true even if all travelers were sincere, if they related only what they have seen or what they believe, and if they disguised the truth only by the false colors which it takes in their eyes. What must it be when, in

addition, we have to discern the truth through their falsehoods and their bad faith?

Let us, then, abandon the expedient of books which are commended to us, to those who are made to be contented with them. Like the art of Raymond Lully,* they are useful for teaching us to prate about what we do not know. They are useful for preparing Platos of fifteen for philosophizing in clubs, and for instructing a company on the customs of Egypt and India, on the faith of Paul Lucas or of Tavernier.

I hold it for an incontestable maxim, that whoever has seen but one people, instead of knowing men, knows only those with whom he has lived. Here, then, is still another way of stating the same question of travels. Is it sufficient for a well-educated man to know only his own countrymen, or is it important for him to know men in general? There no longer remains dispute or doubt on this point. Observe how the solution of a difficult question sometimes depends on the manner of stating it.

But, in order to study men, must we make the tour of the whole earth? Must we go to Japan to observe Europeans? In order to know the species, must we know all the individuals? No; there are men who resemble one another so closely that it is not worth the trouble to study them separately. He who has seen ten Frenchmen has seen them all. Although we can not say the same of the English and of some other peoples, it is nevertheless certain that each nation has its peculiar and specific character, which is inferred by induction, not from the observation of a single one of its members, but of several. He

* An allusion to the *Ars Magna* of Raymond Lully, a sort of verbal and syllogistic mechanism or machine for forming propositions.—(Souquet).

who has compared ten peoples knows mankind, just as he who has seen ten Frenchmen knows the French.

For purposes of instruction it is not sufficient to stroll through countries, but we must know how to travel. In order to observe, we must have eyes, and must turn them toward the object which we wish to examine. There are many people whom travel instructs still less than books, because they are ignorant of the art of thinking; whereas in reading, their mind is at least guided by the author, while in their travels they do not know how to see anything for themselves. Others are not instructed because they do not wish to be instructed. Their object is so different that this hardly affects them. It is very doubtful whether we can see with exactness what we are not anxious to observe. Of all the people in the world, the Frenchman is he who travels the most; but, full of his own ways, he slights indiscriminately everything which does not resemble them. There are Frenchmen in every corner of the world. There is no country where we find more people who have traveled than we find in France. But notwithstanding all this, of all the people of Europe, the one that sees the most of them knows them the least. The English also travel, but in a different way; and it seems that these two nations must be different in everything. The English nobility travel, the French nobility do not travel; the French people travel, the English people do not travel. This difference seems to me honorable to the latter. The French have almost always some personal interest in their travels; but the English do not go to seek their fortune abroad, unless it is through commerce, and with full pockets. When they travel, it is to spend their money abroad, and not to live there on the fruits of their industry; they are too proud to go prowling about away from home. This also causes them to learn more from for-

eigners than the French do, who have a totally different object in view. The English, however, have their national prejudices also, and even more of them than any one else; but these prejudices are due less to ignorance than to passion. The Englishman has the prejudices of pride, and the Frenchman those of vanity.

There is a great difference between traveling to see the country and traveling to see the people. The first object is always that of the curious, while the other is only incidental for them. It ought to be the very opposite for one who wishes to philosophize. The child observes things, and waits until he can observe men. The man ought to begin by observing his fellows, and then he can observe things, if he has the time.

It is bad reasoning to conclude that travels are useless because we travel in the wrong way. But, admitting the utility of travels, does it follow that they are best for everybody? Far from it; on the contrary, they are good for only a very few people; they are good only for men who have sufficient self-control to listen to the lessons of error without allowing themselves to go astray, and to see the example of vice without permitting themselves to be drawn into it. Travel develops the natural bent of character, and finally makes a man good or bad. Whoever returns from a tour of the world is, on his return, what he will be for the rest of his life. Of those who return, more are bad than good, because more of those who start out are inclined to evil rather than good. Badly educated and badly trained young men contract during their travels all the vices of the peoples whom they visit, but not one of the virtues with which these vices are mingled; but those who are happily born, those whose good-nature has been well cultivated, and who travel with the real purpose of becoming instructed, all return better and

wiser than when they started out. It is thus that my Émile shall travel.

Whatever is done through reason ought to have its rules: Travels, considered as a part of education, ought to have theirs. To travel for the sake of traveling, is to be a wanderer, a vagabond; to travel for the sake of instruction, is still too vague an object, for instruction which has no determined end amounts to nothing. I would give to the young man an obvious interest in being instructed; and this interest, if well chosen, will go to determine the nature of the instruction. This is always the method which I have attempted to put in practice.

Now, after having considered my pupil through his physical relations with other creatures, and through his moral relations with other men, it remains to consider him through his civil relations with his fellow-citizens. For this purpose he must begin by studying the nature of government in general, the different forms of government, and, finally, the particular government under which he lives.

APPENDIX.

THE following quotations are taken from John Grand Carteret's J. J. Rousseau jugé par les Français d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1890), and they doubtless represent the mature judgments of the most eminent French writers of to-day respecting their enigmatical countryman. As frequently happens, Rousseau's earliest and most enthusiastic admirers and disciples were not Frenchmen, but Germans and Englishmen, and it was not till within a recent period that this prophet found honor in his own country.

For the last one hundred years there has not been a single reform which we may not see formulated in some one of Rousseau's works.

All our current political theories are contained in the Contrat Social.

All our aspirations after justice are in the Discours sur L'inégalité.

All our programmes of instruction and education are found announced in the Émile.

All attempts at religious renovation are traceable to the Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard. JOHN GRAND CARTERET.

The Émile is the most complete monument of Rousseau's philosophy. Under the pretext of education, he grasps at their very origin the principles of religion and morals, and follows them in all their applications to society and to human life. The fundamental idea is the one announced in his other works—that man is naturally good, but that he has been depraved by society. The ordinary edu-

cation is the instrument of this depravation; it substitutes our prejudices and acquired vices for the original rectitude of nature. The only good education is a "negative education," which does not produce the virtues, but prevents vices; which does not teach the truth, but preserves from error. All foreign influence being avoided or paralyzed, the child must be allowed to grow up and develop in his natural liberty; isolated and handed over to himself, he will invent in succession the arts and sciences, religion and morals; he will learn to know the world and will find God. Each one must therefore reproduce for his own use the work of the centuries, and rediscover for himself whatever has a real value in the acquisitions of humanity. This isolation from society and its traditions, and from the progress which they summarize, or of the errors which they transmit, is a chimera which, by a flagrant contradiction, the preceptor of Émile abandons almost constantly in practice.

Within the compass of the most artificial system that can be imagined there are developed, one after another, with an equal eloquence, the strangest paradoxes and the truest observations, the eccentricities of the partisan and the most sensible reforms. We everywhere feel ourselves in the presence of a thinker and writer who propagates ideas less through their truth than through sentiment, and who addresses himself less to reason than to passion.

While others devote themselves body and soul to the ardent task of breaking in pieces the religion of the past, and destroying the political and social order which rests upon it, he feels the need of reconstructing, in the midst of the ruins about him, a new society, where man, regenerated, may be both better and happier. He traces the plan of this in all its details with as much of imagination as of logic and of sentiment. After the grand philosophic dreamers—the Platos, the Thomas Mores, and the Fénelons—he opens the way and gives the inspiration to all modern utopians. In place of humanity as it is, and as it has been created from day to day by the necessities of history and of life, he requires a new man for the society of his dreams, and fashions one as chimerical as the other, and both conform to his ideal. He who did not always take into account the duties of ordinary life, but accused himself indiscreetly of so many acts of baseness, would fashion and subject by authority all men to the highest and most formal perfection.

To the service of his personal ideas he brings the magic of a style of a new order, and an eloquence full of movement and passion,

scholarly and forceful, fanciful and personal, sonorous and colored, and of irresistible power. G. VAPEREAU.

Rousseau has extolled the state of Nature, both for society and for the individual, and has pushed his indictment against the vices of civilization and the refinements of culture so far, that it has been held that he presumed to relegate men to the state of communism and barbarism. This is an error founded on a superficial or partial examination of his writings.

Rousseau was not a pure theorist, proceeding by $a + b$ and subjecting society without pity to the bed of Procrustes, nor a systematic philosopher, obedient only to cold logic; but was truly and above all else a man, with a heart profoundly human and reflective, and hence an impassioned *moralist.*

Whatever may have been the sophisms, the contradictions, and the faults of Jean Jacques, it is nevertheless undeniable that he loved the true, the beautiful, and the good with an ardent affection, and that he bitterly repented whenever he allowed himself to be induced to betray them. This is true even of the deplorable abandonment of his children. It is certain that he preached and practiced the cult of friendship, country, and humanity. A. ESCHENAUER.

Rousseau was never more than a man of the woods out of his native element. Obstinately opposed to civilized life, he pined in the midst of his fellows as though in an enemy's country, and he remained an unconquerable savage. He responded to friendship by suspicion, and to love by defiance; never saw fortune pass his door without thinking of a snare, and was always somber and, restless like a captive wolf.

No one felt to the same degree the worship of Nature. He who scorned to cut his beard in order to appear before the King of France, sprang from his bed at dawn in order to go to salute in the forest an early flower or a spring bird. Nature was his grand inspiration, and consoled him for his contact with men. Seated at the entrance of a solitary valley he found himself in his real country; he reposed with delight on grass untouched by human feet, forgot his bitter thoughts, and became good and tender-hearted; a ray of the sun caused him to shed gentle tears, and his genius was called into life.

Always and everywhere he loves Nature; but his preferences are well known; his ardent and restless imagination prefers to monoto-

nous pictures the sight of contrasts and convulsions. "I have need of torrents, fir-trees, rocks, dark woods, rugged paths, and precipices which strike me with fear." JULES DE GLOUVET.

The essential element in Rousseau's genius was imagination, and hence his striking originality. He might be defined as an impassioned, exalted imagination, a marvelous subjective imagination.

This imagination was due to an extraordinary sensibility, to an excessive impressibility of the sensitive apparatus and nervous system, so that there was a continuous flow to his brain of innumerable vivid and subtile emotions and of intense and sparkling pictures. Profoundly affected by praise and blame, but little sure of himself by reason of his febrile temperament and incomplete education, Jean Jacques was at the same time very conceited and very timid.

He lacked the quality which, according to himself, was essential to a hero, namely, power of soul or *action*. He therefore became a philosopher and a novelist. Weak, poor, ignorant, timid, scarcely possessing an exact sense of reality, having but little direct hold on the world, and not being able to satisfy in person his double advocacy of love and virtue, he satisfied it through cerebral invention, through books.

Instead of furnishing sensations and affections, his imagination produced ideas. Not being able to adapt himself to people and to things, this thinker remade people and things according to his need. This same man, so weak and so powerless when it was necessary to act, became all-powerful the moment he was not trammeled by ponderous matter. And it is not in the air that he builds. He does not relegate the ideal to heaven, but logically and mathematically he builds upon the earth for a living humanity.

Having the genius of imagination, he is naturally a man of all contrasts as of all harmonies. He resolutely traverses the paradox in order to arrive at the truth. Artist and philosopher, he revolts against art and civilization the moment he sees that through their excessive development, civilization and art, like a parasitic vegetation, mask, pervert, and sterilize Nature and humanity.

A revolution is the advent of a new moral force. In the eighteenth century he created a new faith. Without him the United States of America would probably not be a republic. He is the soul of the French Revolution. This whole epoch is impregnated with

him. Mirabeau interprets him, and Madame Roland is his Julie in power.

Rousseau developed a superior ideal of society by conciliating the principles of authority and of liberty through the association of souls, wills, and interests, and a higher ideal of religion by conciliating reason and faith through the culture of the beautiful. This is his highest glory and his best title to the eternal gratitude of mankind. For divine right he substituted human right. The republic is no longer the ancient closed city, so narrow and so jealous, founded on paternal right and slavery. He would have each one find in it his share of liberty and of happiness.

In order to place his work above all dispute, he rehabilitates the people. Full of a generous unselfishness, has not the people a supreme degree of moral power, and is not moral power as necessary to progress as intellectual power? By this superiority of the humble, Rousseau has justified the sovereignty of all, and has consecrated universal suffrage. Then, feeling the importance of the education of a people which has become sovereign, he has shown that no one must be allowed the license to corrupt a multitude, as Villeroy corrupted Louis XV when a child, and that a government ought, above everything else, to be a system of national education.

ÉMILE BLÉMONT.

Rousseau is immortal; his name will never perish. We may imagine and even predict that a day will come when there will no longer be a single man in the world who has opened a single volume of Voltaire; but Rousseau! As long as the French language shall resound in the world, his works will remain an integral part of the soul of France.

The moment we scrutinize his system of morals and come into close relations with it, it stands the test no better than his philosophy or his politics. The form is a marvel, but the substance is only an incoherent jumble of maxims, relatively true, but often false in their application.

His intelligence was no sounder than his morality. Admirable as an intellectual machine, it produced only false ideas. If the intelligence, as the etymology of the word indicates, is the faculty of tying together accordant ideas in order to form a clear and true conception of things, there is nothing more directly opposed to the intelligence than the paradox. Just as the paradox is ingenious and

startling when it is used to enforce a misconceived truth, so it is insufferable the moment it is reduced to a simple *jeu d'esprit*. Now, taking Rousseau's works from beginning to end, save descriptions of Nature and certain pictures of sentiment, we shall not find in them a line which is anything else than a paradox, eternally reproduced under all its forms. Whatever can decry, humiliate, disconcert, insult, revolt, or excite hatred and disgust, he sees everywhere, exhibits it at every word, and with a warmth and enthusiasm and an eloquence which does not leave the least doubt as to his sincerity. He sees the wrong side of everything—that is, everything wrong side out; he does not see the right side, and he is not in a condition to see where it is. He does not perceive that all he has to do is to turn the fabric over. His mind was deformed from infancy, and could never be repaired. No; he withdraws from the real world, and with the ink and paper of the old books with which he has stuffed his head he builds a moral and philosophic world, where imaginary men play a sort of fairy scene of ideal virtue. These are the models of reason and virtue that he presents to his contemporaries; and, to crown all, it is always in the name of Nature and truth that he professes to speak.

But this is not all; for the more this frightful paradox is developed and confirmed, the clearer the evidence becomes of another paradox, not less alarming, and one which we are constrained to acknowledge. It is this: if Rousseau, instead of the imaginary ideas which disturbed his intelligence, and instead of the moral derangement which upset his heart, had possessed only a mind that was sound and strong, and a heart that was pure and upright, there would have been one more honest man in the eighteenth century, but one less great man.

This honest man would have brought up his children, instead of sending them to the hospital; would have made watches and clocks of honest and merchantable quality; would have had no enemies; would have lived happy, and would have died in peace.

As a great man this is what he has done: He brought back to a respect for God and virtue a society corrupted by irreligion and debauchery; he restored to the family the feeling of that simple fireside poesy which in the most humble condition can make of life an endless felicity; he led man back to Nature, making him drink of its sweetness and revere its power; he revealed to him, in the order and magnificence of creation, the eternal source of all justice

and all truth; in order to enjoy the grand spectacles of life and Nature, he taught him reverie as a new art—for we may boldly say that before Rousseau humanity did not know how to dream. A martyr to all the exquisite and devouring passions of the human soul, it is in the midst of these flames that he raised to Heaven those cries of suffering or of love which after more than a century we can not hear without a shudder. For his reward, he lived the most unhappy of men, and died, God knows how! Even his memory has found no repose; as unfortunate as his life, it has been dragged from pinnacle to gutter and from gutter to pinnacle, by enemies or by admirers equally furious.

That which gives to the work, as to the life of Rousseau, this savage violence, this childish rage, this drunkenness of morals or of reason, this blind zeal in error, this faith in things of which he is ignorant, is that heart of the workman which beats under the coat of the man of the world. It is that popular fiber which nothing can enervate, but which beats forever. This fact has not been sufficiently noticed, and perhaps has not been mentioned before.

As the miseries of this poor man have now been buried with him, it is time that death, which absolves even assassins, should finally and forever put an end to that inquest which has too long held in suspense the justice of posterity. The man is dead—let him rest in peace; but his genius survives, and whatever may be said of it by some ingrates and by some literary dolts, this genius is full of life, and still animates with its breath that art of writing which is the first of arts. We may boldly declare that it is Rousseau who has created the literature of the nineteenth century. He has created it by his inspiration, and has given it the blood and the nerves of the modern man, and the heart and the soul of France. He has also created it by his toil. He is the most consummate of dialecticians and the most potent of the artists who have explored, extended, and elevated the science of thought. EUGÈNE MOUTON.

In addition to his own Confessions, we have a thousand grounds for believing that his entire life was disordered by a wretched state of health, and by moral crises often bordering on madness. If he was not a madman, he certainly had a mind that was addicted to hyperbole and exaggeration, and a romantic imagination delighting in fictions and in delusive narrations. Men, things, and circum-

stances developed beyond measure the original characteristics of his mental personality.

Would Jean Jacques have risen to the admirable heights which he has attained if, in order to facilitate his flight, he had not experienced the reaction which follows the phases of physical enfeeblement and moral concentration? Would he have become our Rousseau if he had been the father of a family, tied down to an orderly and sedentary life by cares for his children and by the necessities of daily bread? Certainly not. But he would probably have remained an excellent engraver.

Endowed with the analytic sense, he discovered the source of public ills in the bad education of children by ignorant parents, and in the bad education of the people by a nobility heedless of the rights of man as well as of the grand duties of the social compact.

Dr. J. Roussel.

It is the idea of the *sovereignty of the people*, proclaimed by the author of the Contrat social, as the only natural and legitimate basis of political power and national life, which made possible the Revolution, by furnishing it at once with a flag, a motive of action, an ideal to realize, and an end to attain. Ch. Fauvety.

Rousseau is far from having disregarded the importance of heredity in biology; but he had a profound intuitive faith in the omnipotence of a rational education for the eradication of the morbid germs of body and mind.

The Émile, burned at Paris and at Geneva, condemned in 1762 by the faculty of theology, is a book clearly conceived and expressed —a sort of memorandum of the griefs of childhood, in which Rousseau eloquently demands for the little creature the right to the maternal bosom, and banishes without return swaddling-clothes, leading-strings, memorizing, artificial prematurity, and that educational overpressure which Locke had just stigmatized in England. The first in our country to amplify the ideas of the great English philosopher, Rousseau dared to demand a little more art and less science in education. The Émile was the pedagogic gospel which preceded the doctrine of the Froebels and Pestalozzis, the declaration of rights of infancy, the real seed of new ideas and hygienic progress. Dr. E. Monin.

Of all the great writers belonging to the cycle of modern civilization, Rousseau is, with Shakespeare, the one who has the most loved and the best understood music. OSCAR COMETTANT.

The literary fortune of Rousseau is one of the most extraordinary in history. No writer is better informed than he; none has better understood all the resources of the French language, so difficult to handle; none has pursued with a more delicate taste and a more tenacious patience the perfection of form.

To the appeal to reason Rousseau has added an appeal to passion; it is with passion particularly that he brought the old *régime* to trial. Others, in fact, resigned themselves to the existing evil. They adapted themselves to that society which nursed them. Rousseau, on his part, hates this society with all his soul. He hates it because there is no place in it worthy of him; he hates it because he is poor; he hates it because he is misunderstood and humiliated. He has known hunger and cold, physical and moral sufferings. He was born susceptible, proud, jealous, envious. He carries within him appetites and lusts which he can not satisfy; and his rancor makes an appeal not only to justice, which condemns the present state of things, but also to the lusts and appetites of all the disinherited. He shows them the banquet where others are seated, and where, nevertheless, their place was marked. CHARLES BIGOT.

According to Rousseau, the nature of man had been poorly understood until he appeared; the human intelligence had been developed to an extreme degree; by going back to the culture of the body, humanity will find its primitive virtue. In reality, this magnificent system carries us back to the innocence of brutes; the ideal proposed to us is the triumph of instinct, life without thought, and the unvarying toil of the beaver, the ant, and the bee. Since the great evil which the philosopher makes war against—the inequality of human conditions—is caused by the inequality of education, the less men think the more nearly equal they will be. It was once believed that the real sign of man's superiority, that which distinguished him from animals, was the faculty of reflecting. This was a mistake; the evil begins with reflection. The man who thinks is a depraved animal; the moment he reflects he is lost—he leaves the state of Nature, and introduces inequality into the world through the disproportion of intelligences. The last word of the

reform inaugurated with such pomp and so solemnly announced, is to invite humanity to adopt henceforth for a type a well-conditioned savage.

Shall Rousseau's errors make us insensible to the puissant qualities of his mind, to the force of his language, to so many noble sentiments which he often expresses with eloquence, and sometimes with charm? Has he not understood, better than any one else in France, the life of Nature and the mysterious poesy of fields and woods? Was he not the first to hear that universal voice which rises at certain hours from the bosom of the earth and which speaks of infinity? And the soul which is moved so profoundly by the spectacle of Nature, and which from tree or flower ascends without effort to Him who has created them, does it not preserve, notwithstanding its stains, a luminous trace of its divine origin? It will be the eternal honor of Rousseau that he brought back in triumph, in the midst of a frivolous and incredulous society, sentiments which worldly irony had banished from it. The Émile introduces us into a moral world which has not yet the beauty of the Christian world, but which no longer has the frivolity of the century; it speaks to us of duty and order, while we heard yesterday only of inclination and pleasure. ED. MÉZIÈRES.

Though Rousseau was born at Geneva, he belongs to France by his life and his death. Switzerland was his cradle, but France has his tomb. It is in France that he passed the greater part of his life; it is with us that he suffered and struggled, and with us and for us that he wrote; it was here that he was loved and hated, defended and persecuted.

Rousseau is the ancestor of all of us who participate in political and literary life. In the largest and grandest sense of the term he was one of the fathers of the Revolution.

He saw clearly that in order to build up a new society new men were necessary, and so he begins all his reforms, so to speak, *ab ovo*.

In order to have in his state the citizens which he fancies, he must reform the whole education of his time. He takes the child at birth, in order to make of him a man absolutely different from what he had been in the past; and he writes the Émile, a powerful book, full of ideas, even to repletion, a book prodigiously fruitful, in which there is a complete renewal of the society which saw the end of the eighteenth century.

His theories must not be interpreted literally, but must be adapted to the situation, to the time, and to everything which, exterior to ourselves, modifies and sometimes binds our nature. But it is undeniable that Rousseau's books have been an inexhaustible mine of reforms, and even before the Revolution he exercised an astonishing influence on habits and manners. GUSTAVE RIVET.

No one has raised a louder voice than Rousseau in behalf of abstract justice in favor of the poor and the oppressed; no one has protested more strongly against human inequalities, even against those which result from the nature of things. To the definite but stationary and conservative notion of social utility, so dear to established governments, he opposes the higher doctrine, more favorable to progress, but also more equivocal and dangerous, of social justice, always ready to overthrow them. He was the ancestor and the precursor of the socialists, so powerful in modern states.

M. BERTHELOT.

There is no book in the world so worthy of commendation as that in which there is traced a plan of education. Read or reread the Émile, observe all that we are doing, the manner in which we train the child and conduct his instruction, and you will be convinced that our master is Rousseau. EDGAR MONTEIL.

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girl is absorbed in her doll, but she waits the moment when she shall be her own doll. This is a decided primitive taste, and in order to regulate it we have only to follow it. The adornment of her doll will naturally lead to sewing, embroidery, lace-work, designing, etc. 265, 266

In respect of good sense, the two sexes are equally endowed, and trifling studies should be banished from the education of both. There is no reason why a girl should learn to read and write at an early age. There are very few who will not abuse this fatal science. Girls should be obedient and industrious, and must be trained to restraint in order that it may cost them nothing. Maternal affection should attach them to their duties, and make necessary constraint easy. Their disposition to go to extremes should be toned down, and their natural inconstancy checked . . 267–269

The first and most important quality of woman is gentleness, and she ought early to learn to suffer every injustice, and to endure the wrongs of a husband without complaint. But in order to make a young woman docile, it is not necessary to make her unhappy, and she should be indulged in all innocent amusements, such as dancing and singing. Her best teachers may often be her father, mother, brother, sister, friend; but when formal lessons are needed her teachers may be of either sex 270–273

Women speak sooner, more easily, and more agreeably than men. A man says what he knows, and a woman what will please, and so one needs knowledge and the other taste. In the use of speech girls should be trained to be discreet and pleasing, 274

It is even more difficult for girls than for boys to form a true idea of religion. Women have great skill in finding the means for reaching a known end, but very little in finding the end itself. For this reason every daughter should have the religion of her mother, and every wife that of her husband. Naturally, women are either free-thinkers or devotees, and their religion should be regulated by authority 275, 276

Religious duties should be made pleasing to girls, and never a burden, and the mother's example is the best guide. In explaining the articles of faith, do not proceed by question

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and answer, but by direct instruction. A proper catechism for children is yet to be written. It will have but little resemblance to those in use. The questions should be so framed that the child can formulate his own answers. Until the age of reason comes, that which is right or wrong for the young is what they are commanded to do or not to do by those who surround them. Hence the importance of a right choice of associates . . . 277, 278

The inner moral sense should co-operate with public opinion in the education of women, but a counterpoise to each of these forces should be found in the cultivation of the reason. Between a slavery to her domestic duties and the usurpation of man's prerogatives there is a middle ground where woman may cultivate her reason, and thus protect herself against the prejudices of society . . . 278–280

Women should make a profound study of the men who surround them, and should learn to govern them by knowing what will please men. Woman has more spirit and man more genius; woman observes and man reasons. Counseled by their mothers, girls should enter society in order to discover its illusions, and thus be protected from them. Convents are schools of coquetry, and in Protestant countries there is a higher type of womanhood than in Catholic countries. In order to love the peaceful life of the home it must be known, and to this end domestic education is recommended. Mothers are warned against bringing their daughters to Paris to learn the manners of the gay capital 281–285

Dry moral lectures and gloomy lessons disgust the young. In order to teach young women to be discreet, create in them a strong interest in being so; and this interest should not be placed in a distant future, but in the present moment and in current events. Encourage virtue by an appeal to reason, and make girls feel that the power of their sex does not depend alone on their own good conduct and morals, but also on those of men—that they can have but little hold on vile and low natures 286, 287

Sophie's disposition, qualities, appearance, tastes, dress, talents, accomplishments, and faults described 287–298

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Admonitions to Sophie by her father 298–301

Thoughtful men should not marry women incapable of thinking, but a simple girl, rudely brought up, is preferable to a wife of learning and wit, who would make of her house a literary bureau 301–303

The reading of books is not a substitute for travel, but it is not necessary to know all the individuals in order to know the species. We must know how to travel in order to profit by it. But travels are good for only a few people—only for those who have sufficient self-control to listen to the lessons of error without allowing themselves to go astray . 304–308

SYLLABUS OF ROUSSEAU'S ÉMILE.

Pages 1 to 40.

1. From what three sources is education derived?
2. In what sense does nature consist in habits?
3. What constitutes the "training for manhood" that Rousseau deems the sole education?
4. What general principle underlies the right care of the infant?
5. Has the young man as teacher more sympathy with childhood and youth than the older teacher?
6. Can Rousseau's treatment of his ideal child directly guide one in the care and training of children in real life?
7. What is meant by the assertion that the child should be allowed to contract no habit?
8. To what extent is it wise to permit liberty of action to the impulses of the child's mind and body?

Page 41 to 67.

9. Is it wise to ignore a child's slight sufferings in order to make him more patient and courageous?
10. Should the end of education be found in future or in present happiness?
11. To what extent should parent or teacher follow the maxim, "Keep the child dependent on things alone"?
12. Are the formulas of politeness in any sense conducive to false education?
13. What valuable benefits may result from early suffering? Are they certain to result?

14. Are children at the age of ten utterly incapable of reasoning upon questions of good and evil?
15. Does the practice of reasoning with children upon their conduct generally tend to make them deceitful and untruthful?
16. In what respects is it important in education to lose time rather than to gain it?
17. Can we discover the bent of a child's mind before beginning to instruct him?
18. Can punishments be limited to the direct consequences of wrong-doing?

Pages 67 to 100.

19. Would it be wise to leave a child untaught from a fear that he might be taught wrong?
20. May it be right sometimes to require memory-work beyond the child's full grasp of the ideas involved?
21. How early may it be wise to instruct a child in a language other than his mother tongue?
22. May the instruction given to children be limited to that of which they can see the actual and present advantage?
23. Can school government be based on other foundation than the authority and direct command of the teacher?
24. Under home influences alone, would Rousseau's scheme of government prove successful?
25. How can the lessons learned upon the playground be made use of in increasing the value of lessons learned from books?
26. What general principle as regards clothing might avoid the evils from which Rousseau warns us, as

well as those to which his directions would be likely to lead us?

27. What argument for manual training, as a branch of school work, may be drawn from the plea for the exercise of all the senses?

Pages 100 to 130.

28. How are children to be practically trained in school so as to "arm them against unforeseen accidents"?
29. Can a teacher be justified in adopting a willful deception in order to promote in a child that acuteness of perception that will detect the deception?
30. What relation has the sense of sight to that of touch in its earliest development?
31. What is the especial great advantage in drawing from objects rather than from copy?
32. What is the argument for combining drawing from the copy with object drawing?
33. What advantages has experimental geometry, as suggested for Émile, over the geometry as commonly presented by theorem and formal demonstration?
34. When should the latter properly come in to supplement the former?
35. To what extent should the physical exercises of the schoolroom have for their purpose muscular dexterity and agility?
36. For what chief purpose are the arts of recitation and singing to be included in the training of youth?
37. From the age of five to twelve can all needed instruction be acquired through experience and the senses under any conditions that can be assumed?

Pages 131 to 160.

38. Is the normal boy, at the age of twelve to fifteen, possessed of physical and mental strength relatively greater than his desires?
39. Is Rousseau right in ascribing the exception to such rule to faults in educational training?
40. In what sense is it true that it is only necessary to know that which is useful?
41. What are the necessary objections to the doctrine that the child "is not to learn science, but to discover it"?
42. Can the child who does not read think more clearly than the child who reads?
43. How may Rousseau's doctrine concerning the sign and the thing be best observed in modern school work?
44. What prevalent error violates his "fundamental principle" concerning the teaching of sciences?
45. What are the advantages in using simple and "home-made" apparatus rather than that which is more elaborate?

Pages 161 to 191.

46. Is the stimulus of emulation necessarily harmful in dealing with children from twelve to fifteen years of age?
47. What objection is there to making the state of Robinson Crusoe the ideal state with reference to which the elements of early education are to be chosen?
48. In what manner may the instruction of children be extended from the material relations of life to the social and spiritual relations?

49. What is the most forcible argument in favor of teaching a trade to the young man whose circumstances indicate that he may never have occasion to resort to it for a livelihood?
50. Should manual training in the public schools have reference to artisan skill or to general mental development?
51. Does Rousseau's scheme give to the boy of fifteen years all of knowledge and of culture that should be acquired at that age?

Pages 192 to 224.

52. How can the right self-love be kept distinct in the training of children from the evil self-love?
53. Can love of self be used as a basis of benevolence in the mind of a child?
54. How may the developing boy or girl be best guarded from the effects of evil imagination?
55. Is the thought that any given suffering may come to himself necessary to the awakening of pity for a sufferer?
56. Will all right feelings arise spontaneously in the heart of the child, or must there be direct effort to call them forth?
57. Can the author's distinction between man as individually good and man in society as evil be maintained?
58. Is history a better field for the study of human nature than is current experience?
59. How may tables be most successfully made use of in the moral instruction of youth?

Pages 224 to 258.

60. How is a youth best taught to be in sympathy with humanity?
61. Should the apparent tendency of many boys to little acts of cruelty toward the lower animals be dealt with as an acquired or as a natural trait?
62. Is it possible to acquire all the good lessons of experience in social relations without any of the evil?
63. If all thought of God and of religion be kept from the child and the youth, can the man acquire a truer conception of divine things?
64. Is the young man who has been restrained through ignorance more likely to be controlled by intelligence when the ignorance can be no longer maintained?
65. Can the "child of twelve years who knows nothing" be well instructed at the age of fifteen?
66. Is the young man at twenty likely to become more "amiable and polished" in society because of not having any early contact with social requirements and customs?
67. How much of Rousseau's scheme of education and training commends itself as practicable?
68. What would be the marked weaknesses or faults in a youth trained as this work suggests?

Pages 259 to 308.

69. Is it in any sense true that while the perfect man should be active and strong, the perfect woman should be passive and weak?

70. Within the limits of school life is there any right education for the young man that is not right education also for the young woman?
71. Do the boy's love of noisy toys and the girl's love of dolls and ornament mark a natural or an acquired difference in their tendencies?
72. Is restraint, leading up to self-control, more important in the training of a girl than in the training of a boy?
73. Do women differ from men in the scope and power of the reasoning faculty?
74. Is marriage an end in life to be more definitely sought and prepared for by the young woman than by the young man?
75. What is your final judgment of Rousseau's scheme for the education of Émile?

THE END.

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